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18th November 2019 
 
When news broke early in 2019 that the University of California had walked away from 
licensing negotiations with the world’s largest scholarly publisher (Elsevier), a wave of 
triumphalism spread through the OA Twittersphere. The talks had collapsed because of 
Elsevier’s failure to offer UC what it demanded: a new-style Big Deal in which the university 
got access to all of Elsevier’s paywalled content plus OA publishing rights for all UC authors 
– what UC refers to as a “Read and Publish” agreement. In addition, UC wanted Elsevier to 
provide this at a reduced cost.1 Given its size and influence, UC’s decision was hailed as “a 
shot heard around the academic world”.2 The news had added piquancy coming as it did in 
the wake of a radical new European OA initiative called Plan S. Proposed in 2018 by a 
group of European funders calling themselves cOAlition S, the aim of Plan S is to make all 
publicly funded research open access by 2021.3 Buoyed up by these two developments open 
access advocates concluded that – 17 years after the Budapest Open Access Initiative (BOAI) 
– the goal of universal (or near-universal) open access is finally within reach. Or as the 
Berkeley librarian who led the UC negotiations put it, “a tipping point” has been reached.4 
But could defeat be snatched from the jaws of success?  
 
 
 
 
 
Photo by Phil Botha on Unsplash 
  
 
1 The issue of costs is complicated, with both sides of the dispute putting a different spin on it. But UC believes 
it should be paying less in an OA world. In fact, it can expect to pay more. See Page 63 for more on this.   
2 Elsevier did not cut off access until July.  
3 Initially it was meant to be 2020, but in response to criticism more time has been given. 
4 This is by no means a new claim. A tipping point for open access has been called regularly over the past ten 
years – see, for instance, this from six years ago, and this from three years ago.  
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You were will silly like us; your gift survived it all: 
The parish of rich women, physical decay, 
Yourself. Mad Ireland hurt you into poetry. 
Now Ireland has her madness and her weather still, 
For poetry makes nothing happen: it survives 
In the valley of its making where executives 
Would never want to tamper, flows on south 
From ranches of isolation and the busy griefs, 
Raw towns that we believe and die in; it survives, 
A way of happening, a mouth. 
 
-- W H AUDEN  
IN MEMORY OF W. B. YEATS 
  
In the way of background 
 
Let’s start with some history: Although a few researchers (mainly physicists) had begun to 
make their papers freely available on the internet a number of years before the 2002 Budapest 
Open Access Initiative, it was at the BOAI meeting that the term “open access” was first 
used. And it was there that the OA movement is said to have been born. 
 
The accompanying declaration issued by BOAI called for the removal of all obstacles 
preventing access to scholarly research, notably paywalls (financial barriers) but also legal 
and technical barriers. By make their work OA, BOAI said, researchers could “accelerate 
research, enrich education, share the learning of the rich with the poor and the poor with the 
rich, make this literature as useful as it can be, and lay the foundation for uniting humanity in 
a common intellectual conversation and quest for knowledge.”  
 
In short, the goal of the open access movement was to make all research freely available to 
everyone in the world. The assumption was that this will democratise knowledge and benefit 
not just the research community but the public (who fund research) and, crucially, researchers 
in the Global South, for whom the cost of journal subscriptions has always been prohibitively 
high.5 
 
Open access advocates viewed OA as a no-brainer in an online world, and it was assumed 
that OA would be a bottom-up revolution in which researchers voluntarily made their 
research papers freely available to all by placing copies of them on the open internet. 
Alternatively, publishers would do it for them.6 There was no expectation that governments 
or funders would be involved, or that researchers would need to be compelled to embrace 
OA, although it was accepted that they and their publishers might need a little persuading. 
 
BOAI was very much of its time. Six years earlier cyberlibertarian John Perry Barlow had 
posted online his Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace. This was in response to the 
 
5 That little consideration was given to the fact that many in the Global South have no or very poor access to 
the internet is telling. 
6 By, for instance, allowing authors to self-archive their papers on the internet (green OA ) and/or themselves 
make papers OA (via gold OA).  
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passing into law of the US Telecommunications Act of 1996, which had for the first time 
included the internet in broadcasting and spectrum allotment. Addressing governments, 
Barlow proclaimed: “I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally 
independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor 
do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.”7 
 
Inherent to Barlow’s declaration was an assertion that governments had no authority to 
determine what happens on the internet, where a new self-governing, extraterritorial 
community was being created, which operated with rules based on unwritten codes and ethics 
independent of nation states. Amongst other things, this new culture held that in an online 
world information can and should be freely shared with anyone, regardless of their 
geographical location, nationality, religious belief, or the political context in which they 
lived. And it was assumed that this sharing would be done in a democratic non-hierarchical 
way.8  
 
Cyberlibertarians like Barlow viewed the emergence of the internet as analogous to the 
invention of the printing press, but far more revolutionary and far more democratising.9 What 
was held to be especially liberating was that it was now possible to copy and share 
information and content with anyone on the internet with a “click of the mouse”10  
 
Embracing this credo, OA advocates predicted that the internet would see radical new forms 
of scholarly communication emerge. Stevan Harnad,11 for instance, anticipated that 
researchers would engage in what he called “Skywriting” by means of Quote/Commenting. 
However, before this would be possible, he added, it would be necessary to achieve universal 
open access. As he put it, “The last papyrocentric habit we need to break is the notion that 
access-toll-gates must always separate our skywritings from their would-be skyreaders, 
commentators, and users.” 
 
A key point to make is that the internet was created not by entrepreneurs, start-ups or large 
companies in pursuit of profits but by the research community working in a non-commercial 
environment. As such, business models were not considerations. Of course, the network was 
subsequently commercialised (in 1995), but the ethos of free sharing had by then been baked 
into the internet. It was assumed, therefore, that what the internet offered corporations was 
 
7 This view bears comparing with that of the free market creed of neoliberalism. As Shoshana Zuboff put it in 
her book, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, the free-market creed “aimed to revive acceptance of a self-
regulating market as a natural force of such complexity and perfection that it demanded radical freedom from 
all forms of state oversight”. She added. “Hayek explained the necessity of absolute individual and collective 
submission to the exacting disciplines of the market as an unknowable ‘extended order’ that supersedes the 
legitimate political authority vested in the state: ‘Modern economics explains how such an extended order . . . 
constitutes an information-gathering process . . . that no central planning agency, let alone any individual, 
could know as a whole, possess, or control. . . .’” 
8 However, as Clay Shirky pointed out in 2003, with all human interaction power laws come into play. 
9 The Gutenberg Revolution on speed if you like. 
10 The constant battle over copyright on the internet that we have seen since Barlow’s declaration, most 
recently over the EU Copyright Directive, demonstrates how naïve cyberlibertarians were. 
11 Skywriting, wrote Harnad in 2011, is “a new medium that … made my e-mailing seem as remote and 
obsolete as illuminated manuscripts. The principle is the same as e-mail, except that your contribution is 
‘posted’ to a global electronic network, consisting currently of most of the universities and research 
institutions in America and Europe and growing portions of the rest of the scholarly and scientific world. I’m 
not entirely clear on how ‘the Net,’ as it is called, is implemented and funded, but if you have an account at 
any of its ‘nodes,’ you can do skywriting too.” 
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not a platform for extracting new profits but a new way of engaging with customers by means 
of mutually beneficial online “conversations”.  
 
This argument was most fully articulated in the 1999 Cluetrain Manifesto, which asserted 
that a powerful global conversation has begun. Through the Internet, it said, “people are 
discovering and inventing new ways to share relevant knowledge with blinding speed.”  
 
In a list of 95 points, the authors went on to argue, amongst other things, that “In just a few 
more years, the current homogenised ‘voice’ of business – the sound of mission statements 
and brochures – will seem as contrived and artificial as the language of the 18th century 
French court.” 
 
They added that companies that do not belong to a community of discourse “will die.” 
 
Tellingly, the word profit appears just four times in the Cluetrain Manifesto, including in this 
paragraph: “Fact is, we don’t care about business – per se, per diem, au gratin. Given half a 
chance, we’d burn the whole constellation of obsolete business concepts to the waterline. 
Cost of sales and bottom lines and profit margins – if you’re a company, that’s your problem. 
But if you think of yourself as a company, you’ve got much bigger worries.” 
 
This is not what we see on the internet today of course: mission statements abound, talk of 
profit is perennial and the web has become a massive shopping mall with most companies 
focused on doing what they always do: selling products and services. And corporate use of 
social media by and large differs very little from the way companies have always 
communicated with the world – i.e. in a contrived, artificial and homogenised way. 
 
This should not surprise us. The one and only objective of corporations is to sell products and 
make money, not to chat online. However, it draws our attention to the fact that a 
fundamental conflict of cultures has always been inherent to the network: while most users 
assume everything should be free for all, companies view the network as virgin territory to be 
conquered, appropriated and monetised, for the benefit of shareholders and owners. This 
disparity of culture and expectations could be characterised as a conflict between the utopian 
exceptionalism espoused by cyberlibertarians and the abiding commercial view that (even on 
the internet) the only valid goal is to create new markets and maximise profits. This conflict 
is best exemplified by the music industry’s response to the  launch in 1999 of the music 
sharing service Napster – it embarked on a massive legal campaign that saw Napster 
shuttered within two years.12 
 
There are lessons here for everyone who makes use of the internet – not least scholarly 
publishers and OA advocates – that I hope will become evident in what follows. Above all, 
we have re-discovered the hard truth that there is no such thing as a free lunch. Providing free 
content and services inevitably requires some form of revenue from somewhere. More 
noteworthy, we have learned that openness is by no means an unmitigated good. 
 
Thus, for instance, the internet’s foundational ethos of free sharing led web companies to 
devise business models that are now seen as both deceptive and predatory. Companies like 
 
12 Sure, the music industry changed as a result, but it is now more profitable than ever, while artists see less 
and less of the profits. What it has not seen is for music to become universally free to all.  
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Facebook and Google (a company whose motto was once “Don’t be Evil”) have created 
models that have worrying implications for, amongst other things, privacy and transparency. 
These are models in which (as the saying goes) “the user has become the product”.13 
 
Shoshana Zuboff has characterised this as “surveillance capitalism”, since it consists of 
silently monitoring users and harvesting, storing and selling not just their personal 
information but the “data exhaust” that their online activities generate.14 These data are then 
monetised in ways that not only run roughshod over and compromise users’ privacy but allow 
the harvesting companies to predict, modify and direct user behaviour. As such, says Zuboff, 
they present a serious threat not just to users’ freedom but to their moral agency.  
 
We could note in passing that in creating and promulgating surveillance capitalism, 
companies like Google have utilised (and continue to utilise) very similar arguments to those 
put forward by cyberlibertarians like Barlow – arguing, for instance, that, “The online world 
is not truly bound by terrestrial laws . . . it’s the world’s largest ungoverned space.”   
 
Most now view these arguments as both specious and dishonest. As Zuboff points out, 
surveillance capitalism was arrived at when search and social media companies faced the 
real-world dilemma of having to make money in order to be able to continue offering the free 
services they had developed. Today we know these models have had undesirable unintended 
consequences. I shall suggest that open access has also had undesirable unintended 
consequences. And it is partly because the internet was developed by and for the research 
community, in a non-commercial environment, that OA advocates failed to anticipate them.  
 
Thus the internet (which began life15 as the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, or 
ARPANET) was the product of a publicly-funded project,16 and it was a team at the public 
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)17that in 1969 sent the very first message over 
the network, creating the email system we know today. 
 
Likewise, it was at the publicly-funded European research organisation CERN that in 1991 
Tim Berners-Lee invented the Web, when he wrote the first web browser and editor. As 
Berners-Lee explained at the time, “The project started with the philosophy that much 
academic information should be freely available to anyone. It aims to allow information 
sharing within internationally dispersed teams, and the dissemination of information by 
support groups.” 
 
In other words, both the internet and the web were created and designed to share research 
information, not to make money. This was also the aim of the physics preprint server arXiv 
that Paul Ginsparg created it in 199118  
 
 
13 This phrase, says Shoshana Zuboff in her book Surveillance Capitalism, is a misnomer. “You are not a 
product; you are the abandoned carcase. The ‘product’ derives from the surplus that is ripped from your life.”  
14 What Zuboff calls the “behavioural surplus” created by user activity. 
15 In 1966. 
16 Specifically, the US Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation. 
17 Led by computer scientist Leonard Kleinrock. 
18 arXiv was created by Paul Ginsparg, initially as a central repository mailbox, later as an FTP service and then 
a Web service. Today arXiv hosts 1,509,050 e-prints in the fields of physics, mathematics, computer science, 
quantitative biology, quantitative finance, statistics, electrical engineering and systems science, and 
economics, all of which are freely available. 
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OA advocates also gave far too little thought to the fact that scholarly communication 
consists of a complex set of tasks and that these tasks incur costs (not least the cost of 
managing the peer review process). Nor did they factor in that many of these tasks – and 
ultimate control of the process – have since WWII to a great extent been outsourced (in the 
Global North at least) to for-profit companies with hungry shareholders to feed.  
 
It did not help that the costs of scholarly publishing have traditionally been paid by librarians 
(via journal subscriptions), not the readers of the journals. Since these subscriptions are paid 
by intermediaries, and so the journals are free at the point of use, most researchers were and 
remain oblivious to the true nature of the costs being incurred on their behalf.  
 
As a result researchers have too little understanding of the affordability problem that BOAI 
was partly intended to resolve.19 For their part, supporters of green OA argued that all that 
was necessary was for researchers to post copies of their papers online. This, they assumed, 
would not incur any additional costs (but would not solve the affordability problem of 
course).20 Alternatively, they anticipated new gold OA journals would be launched to offer 
publishing services at a much lower price than traditional journals. They failed to appreciate, 
however, that while some tasks can be discontinued in an online world new tasks become 
necessary. So while Harnad argued that in an online world costs would be less than 25% of 
the costs of print publishing, the reality may be that they are greater in an online world.  
 
In short, OA advocates were almost exclusively focused on the accessibility problem. When 
the costs of open access (the affordability problem) could no longer be ignored, they 
encouraged publishers to introduce a deeply problematic business model – pay-to-publish 
open access funded by means of article-processing charges (APCs). Much as social media 
companies developed predatory business models, the OA movement gave the world 
predatory publishing. 
 
OA advocates also failed to anticipate the ability of legacy publishers to adapt to the new 
environment in ways that would allow them to maintain their power and (as we now see) to 
increase it – by offering pay-to-play OA publishing services themselves, and priced at a level 
intended to migrate their profits to the new environment.21  
 
Meanwhile, researchers have consistently proved reluctant to embrace green OA. For it turns 
out that most are content to continue sharing their work in the way they have always done – 
i.e. by submitting their papers to traditional journals and leaving the task of distribution to the 
publisher. In this respect, physicists were not typical: arXiv was intended to extend to the 
internet a long-standing practice of sharing print-based preprints via the postal service or fax. 
This habit is not one that most researchers understood or were attracted to. 
 
Above all, researchers and their institutions have remained obsessed with ranking and scoring 
measures like the Impact Factor, not least because these provide off-the-shelf evaluation tools 
 
19 BOAI stated that “experiments show that the overall costs of providing open access to this literature are far 
lower than the costs of traditional forms of dissemination.” 
20 Harnad argued that self-archiving would force publishers to downsize or get out of the way As he put it, 
“Paper publishers will then either restructure themselves (with the cooperation of the scholarly community) so 
as to arrange for the minimal true costs and a fair return on electronic-only page costs … or … watch as the 
peer community spawns a brand new generation of electronic-only publishers who will.” 
21 Which, many will argue, was necessary.  
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for promotion and tenure purposes. Even though most now understand how inaccurate and 
manipulable such tools are 75% of European universities still use the IF to evaluate careers 
and 91% of Berkeley faculty still consider high impact factor an extremely important 
criterion when determining where to publish.22 Unsurprisingly, therefore, researchers 
continue to insist on publishing in the prestigious journals primarily owned by for-profit 
legacy publishers.  
 
In short, like all the early denizens of cyberspace, OA advocates gave little or no thought to 
how the free online content and services they were demanding would be funded.23 For their 
part, publishers were understandably chary about open access. Immediately seeing the 
potential threat to their businesses, they dragged their feet until they could see a way of 
making sufficient money out of open access. This has seen the affordability problem that OA 
was meant to solve ported to the new environment.  
 
It is this combination of publishers’ determination to maintain their revenues and researchers’ 
lack of interest in open access, plus the naivety of OA advocates, that has made achieving OA 
such a difficult and protracted process. 
 
However, two developments have brought these matters to a head. First, librarians (who 
signed up to OA in the belief that it would solve the affordability problem) have begun to 
insist that the traditional subscription agreements they sign with publishers must now include 
OA publishing rights as well as access to the publisher’s paywalled content. They are also 
demanding that these should be less costly than traditional subscription deals. And when they 
don’t get them they are now willing to walk away from the negotiating table today. 
California’s decision to reject Elsevier’s offer is just the latest such incident – we have seen 
similar decisions taken in both Germany and Sweden. 
 
Second, persuaded by OA advocates that open access will reduce costs and stimulate the 
economy, governments and funders have been introducing ever more coercive OA mandates 
to compel researchers to embrace OA. Plan S is just the most recent and oppressive such 
mandate.24 
 
These two developments have led open access advocates to conclude that a tipping point has 
been reached and the war won, or that it is about to be won. But if we have indeed arrived at 
a tipping point, can we be sure it will deliver the victory OA advocates expect? Will it 
achieve the objectives outlined in the BOAI Declaration? Will it solve both the accessibility 
and affordability problems? Will either be solved? Could defeat be snatched from the jaws of 
victory? 
 
Below I discuss a number of reasons why I believe the BOAI objective of “uniting humanity 
in a common intellectual conversation and quest for knowledge” may not be realisable. I 
make no pretence that I can predict the future, or that the issues I discuss will prove sufficient 
to derail the movement. But since OA advocates have a history of failing to see the big 
picture, or anticipating the unintended consequences of their advocacy, I think these scenarios 
are worthy of consideration – if only to anticipate potential problems and try to mitigate 
them. 
 
22 Despite attempts to censure the practice. 
23 It was this mindset that was to lead to the long-standing conflict over copyright laws we have seen on the 
internet, not least with Napster. 
24 Indeed, Plan S is the non plus ultra of coercive OA mandates. 
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Pushback/ counterrevolution? 
 
I want first to consider the possibility that open access could face a counterrevolution. One 
reason why it could is that while OA advocates often present openness as a moral issue,25 
governments have chosen to support OA for financial and economic reasons.26 For them, OA 
is grist to the neoliberal mill. That is, they believe greater openness will boost the national 
and/or regional economy and save money. They assume, for instance, that OA to scholarly 
papers will make it easier for SMEs to monetise publicly funded research and turn it into 
profitable products and services to drive the economy. 
 
The also assume that making scientific data freely available will have a positive financial 
effect. Thus a 2018 EU report estimated that FAIR data could save the economic bloc €10.2 
billion per year. More recently it was reported that the EU’s Open Data strategy is expected 
to provide an annual €40 billion boost to the EU’s economy. 
 
Such claims and estimates notwithstanding, it is in fact far from easy (perhaps not possible at 
all) to demonstrate that OA, open data, or open science will have, or is having, a positive 
economic impact.27 28 On the other hand, some of the costs of forcing openness on the 
research community are clear to see (also here).  
 
So, we have to wonder what will happen if the expected economic benefits fail to materialise. 
What if, instead of saving money, open initiatives turn out to be creating expensive new cost 
centres? Might we not see the current craze for openness start to fade, or even reverse? Might 
we see a backlash against openness? 
 
Considering open data specifically, it may turn out that the sheer quantity of data now being 
generated in the research process makes sharing data more expensive and difficult than any of 
the perceived benefits it provides. As Spinal Cord Injury researcher Vance Lemmon has put 
it, “Recently, with development of fluorescent light sheet microscopes that can image very 
large volumes at high resolution, image stacks have become enormous, from 5 GB to 1 TB. 
This kind of data is very hard to ‘share’.”29   
 
We have also learned that openness is not a one-way street. Two widely used data sources for 
remote-sensing imagery – the Landsat satellites30 and the agricultural-survey programme31 – 
 
25 OA advocate Martin Eve recently wrote, “economic and pragmatic arguments for OA have played a role … 
but ethics, global justice, and the special status of education have been core.”  
26 As the EC’s open access envoy Jean-Claud Burgelman explained in 2018, EU officials do not view open 
science as “an ideological debate”, but rather as an effort to provide a “better return on investment of our 
public money.” 
27 As this article put its “Use of open science outputs often leaves no obvious trace". 
28 In this article I mainly discuss open access, but in doing so I also use the more generic term open science and 
refer to other open movements. Open science can be seen as encompassing OA, open data, open notebooks, 
open source etc. etc. 
29 The European Open Science Cloud (ESOC) is meant to address this issue. But it is not clear that it will be 
successful. Either way, it will surely be necessary to charge those who use it.  
30 Operated by the US Geological Survey. 
31 Run by the US Department of Agriculture. 
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started life as charged-for services. In 2008, it was decided to make the data freely available. 
Recently, however, the US government has been considering re-introducing charges.32 
 
Likewise, journals can flip between open and closed states (peek-a-boo OA as Harnad has 
called it). This means that OA journals can go back behind a paywall – in what the authors of 
this article refer to as a “reverse flip”. In 2013, a whole bunch of journals were flipped from 
open to closed – for reasons that were not entirely clear. 33 And with the “Subscribe to Open” 
model now flavour of the OA month, open access could become a revolving door – because 
the decision on whether or not to make a journal OA is decided on an annual basis depending 
on whether a sufficient number of libraries have agreed to “subscribe”. 
 
In short, openness can be fragile. And despite the considerable mindshare that OA has 
acquired amongst funders and governments, new subscription journals are still being 
launched. 
 
Privacy concerns could also see pushback against openness. This is highly likely in the 
medical area, particularly now it has been realised that anonymous data can fairly easily be 
de-anonymised. This could see data initially made open later being moved behind some kind 
of access wall, or never being made open in the first place. News that millions of Americans’ 
medical images and data are as good as freely available on the internet feeds such concerns, 
as do the increasing number of articles pointing out that “anonymity takes more than 
protecting personal details”. There are also specific concerns around issues like sharing 
genome summary data from African populations for instance.  
 
Nor is it just medical information at issue. Victoria State Government in Australia discovered 
that the “de-identified” data of more than 15m myki public transport users it had released was 
fairly easy to de-anonymise. Researchers were quickly able to use a combination of the 
Public Transport Victoria dataset and tweets, for instance, to identify MP Anthony Carbines’s 
three-year travel history. This spurred Australian OA advocates to organise an Open Access 
Week event entitled “privacy vs access”.  
 
We are also beginning to understand the risks of making other types of information freely 
available. So, for instance, open access is helping wildlife poachers to identify endangered 
species, and leading to habitat destruction. It is also assisting the trade in human remains and 
the plundering of Roman coins. 
 
We also see worries about making climate data freely available, and concerns in the Global 
South that if they make their data freely available it will allow better resourced researchers in 
the North who have superior computing facilities to mine and analyse the data in ways they 
cannot – leaving local researchers with a “justifiable sense of unfairness” 
 
And there is concern about the possible negative consequences of making research in areas 
like artificial intelligence (or machine intelligence) open access, with at least one institute 
flipping the switch from open to “non-disclosed by default”.  
 
 
32 Such decisions are, of course, controversial.  
33 This is also what happened to the journals published by bepress when they were acquired by De Gruyter.  
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Elsewhere, the technology non-profit company OpenAI announced that it planned to hold 
back or delay making public its GPT-2 language learning tool for fear that bad actors would 
use it to swamp the world with machine-generated fake news. 
 
Others cite competitive and military concerns to argue that AI information should be treated 
as proprietary and/or secret. Entrepreneur and venture capitalist Peter Thiel has berated 
Google for opening an AI lab in China, on the basis that (as he put it) AI is “a military 
technology”. While Vox disagreed with Thiel’s larger claim, it did concede that “[M]any AI 
researchers are increasingly realising that the heyday of AI openness, where nearly all 
research is published for anyone in the world to explore, can’t last forever. AI research will 
probably have to go behind paywalls at some point.” 
 
There is also the question about how AI developers will be able to monetise their work in an 
open environment, particularly as universities encourage faculty to create “spin off” 
companies. Director General of the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO) Francis Gurry 
has argued that there is an inherent tension between AI and openness. “How do we reconcile 
the imperative of openness with innovation, on the one hand, with the desire or need of 
enterprises for closure at some point, and for a proprietary right at some point,” he says. 
“This is the major … strategic and geopolitical question thrown up by AI: How you balance 
openness and closure.”34 
 
What we do know is that AI patenting is growing rapidly, with 340,000 AI-related inventions 
patented since the 1950s.35 36 Of course, it will be techniques, methods and algorithms that 
are being patented not data. But in order to develop effective algorithms and AI techniques 
huge amounts of data are needed to train machines. As Zuboff puts it, “This is the essence of 
the machine intelligence project. As the ultimate tapeworm, the machine’s intelligence 
depends upon how much data it eats.” 
 
Today, data is viewed as the new oil for the 21st Century, and it is assumed that the most 
successful companies and countries will be those who best exploit data. That is why we are 
seeing growing interest in text and data mining (TDM) the research corpus.37 But if those 
who have the data believe it offers them a competitive advantage then can we not expect to 
see increasing reluctance to share data, including both scientific data and the data embedded 
in research papers? Why would they want to help their competitors?  
 
In other words, we are on the cusp of an AI arms race. And since those with the largest 
amounts of data can expect to have an advantage, they are likely to be more resistant to 
sharing data. That presumably is why Elsevier is reluctant to allow third part access to its data 
for the purposes of TDM – even where legislation has given researchers38 the right to do so 
(see here for instance). And it is doubtless part of the reason why China does not want US 
 
34 One obvious problem here is that under the EU the Database Directive researchers intending to mine works 
protected by copyright would need authorisation from the database owner or an appropriate copyright 
exception, about which there is much uncertainty. 
35 Mentions of deep learning in patent filings grew annually at an average rate of 175% from 2013-16. 
Mentions of neural networks grew annually at an average rate of 46% over the same period. 
36 More on this topic here. 
37 For a sense of what can be done by mining the scientific literature see this paper, and commentary here .  
38 E.g. in the UK. 
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companies to move data they gather on Chinese customers’ purchasing habits out of the 
country. 
 
Might we eventually see a proprietary mindset overwhelm the field? Could AI become one of 
the first areas where we see significant pushback against openness? 
 
We are also likely to see openness challenged when research budgets are squeezed, if only 
because there will inevitably be disagreement about priorities. Earlier this year, for instance, 
when Trump sought again to reduce science spending there was immediate disagreement over 
how the budget should be spent.39 Trump’s plan envisaged a new paediatric cancer initiative 
at the National Cancer Institute, and allowed for $50 million to be made available for drug 
discovery and studying the biology of paediatric cancers.40 But the overall NCI budget was 
expected to fall by 15% to $5.2 billion. 
 
Trump’s plan also envisaged data being pooled from cancer cases and existing data sets to 
“create a comprehensive, shared resource to support childhood cancer in all its forms.” This 
led researchers to complain that the plan was too heavily focused on data sharing, and that 
this would come at the expense of other paediatric cancer research and the overall NCI 
budget.41  
 
Similar concerns (and hard choices) inevitably surface when any country faces a cut in research 
funding. Recently Australia, Mexico, Brazil42 and Germany43 have all found themselves 
struggling with this.  
 
The point is that openness will inevitably have to compete with other priorities. And if it 
cannot demonstrate immediate or short-term economic and/or other tangible benefits – or 
comes at the expense of causes deemed more worthy – its value and role is likely to be 
questioned. 
 
In what follows I am assuming that, if it is to be successful, open access (and all forms of 
openness in research) will require a high degree of international collaboration. I am not alone 
in believing this, I think. Commenting on a recent study undertaken by Digital Science, 
Daniel Hook argued that there is a direct link between openness and collaboration.  
“Collaboration is one of the watchwords when it comes to pushing Open Science forward,” 
said Hook. “We need continued, coordinated initiatives … to keep the momentum going.” 
 
 
39 For more on this see the article here. “Trump has for the third year in a row proposed large cuts in science 
funding across a variety of agencies. Although Congress restored these cuts in the last two years, increased 
budgetary pressures may discourage them from doing so this year.” 
40 The NIH budget was expected to fall by $5 billion to $34.4 billion, a 13% cut. 
41 It is not clear to me whether it was intended for these data to be made open data or just shared between 
groups. But my point is that when costs are under pressure people are more inclined to question the merits of 
sharing. 
42 In August, Nature reported that more than 80,000 science scholarships have been threatened in Brazil in the 
wake of funding cuts ordered by President Jair Bolsonaro’s administration. Cuts to investments in schools of 
philosophy and sociology have also been proposed. It is hard to see OA being prioritised against this 
background.  
43 Oddly, a month after the announcement of a cut, Germans were promised a decade of budget increases. 
These are volatile times! 
 
1 3  O A :  C o u l d  d e f e a t  b e  s n a t c h e d  f r o m  t h e  j a w s  o f  v i c t o r y ?  
 
As I understand it, Hook’s thesis is that a rise in international collaboration is a key 
ingredient and consequence of open access, that they are co-dependent. 
 
In other words, openness and international collaboration feed off each other. This is surely 
also implicit in the raison d’être of BOAI – whose goal is to “lay the foundation for uniting 
humanity in a common intellectual conversation and quest for knowledge” by sharing “the 
learning of the rich with the poor and the poor with the rich”. 
 
I am also assuming that open access and international collaboration cannot flourish unless 
researchers have adequate autonomy and independence. As such, academic freedom would 
also seem to be essential. As I hope to show below, political and institutional interference in 
research, and attempts to curtail academic freedom, inevitably impede both sharing and 
collaboration. This can only impact negatively on the open access agenda.44  
 
Before considering the current state of open access, therefore, I want to look at some of the 
threats that sharing, collaboration and academic freedom face today.    
 
Populism and nationalism 
 
First I want to consider the resurgence of populism45 46 and nationalism. Leaving aside for the 
moment the threat this poses to democracy, there are surely negative implications for 
researchers, for universities, for academic freedom, for international scientific collaboration 
and, by extension, for BOAI’s goal of sharing “the learning of the rich with the poor and the 
poor with the rich”. 
 
The re-emergence of populism is said to be a product of several things, including the 2007/08 
financial crisis47 and the negative social impact that neoliberalism has had. We have also seen 
a fracturing of the Post-war Settlement that informed political and economic thinking in the 
West for 70-odd years. The election of Trump in the US and the outcome of the Brexit 
referendum are just the more visible signs of the new populism. And in a kind of non-
virtuous circle both these events have served to reinforce the populism that gave birth to 
them. 
 
In addition, we are seeing the emergence of what Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
calls “illiberal democracy” and the xenophobia and authoritarianism that go with it.48  
 
These developments are challenging for the research community not least because they 
undermine the principles and practice of international collaboration that are believed to be 
essential for effective scientific progress. They also threaten the autonomy of universities and 
research institutions and so threaten academic freedom. 
 
44 This seems also to be implicit in UNESCO’s Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education 
Teaching Personnel.  
45 For a sense of how this is growing in Europe, see the map here.  
46 Including what some call ethno-nationalism 
47 Janice Stein suggests the problem began earlier, with “the growth of inequality that began in the 1970”.  
48 The London Review of Books says that while not all populist leaders are the same, right-wing populists have 
developed a common strategy and what might even be called a shared authoritarian-populist art of 
governance  “They do not all look the same. But group them together and they clearly form a political family: 
Orbán, Erdoğan, Kaczyński, Trump, Modi, perhaps Netanyahu, Bolsonaro for sure.” 
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So, for instance, populism is leading to direct attacks on researchers, on research institutions, 
on the scientific process, and on science itself. This hinders the culture of openness and 
sharing that the BOAI Declaration assumed as a given. 
 
In Europe this is currently most evident in Poland and Hungary. The same threat is all too 
evident in Europe’s neighbour Turkey. However, the issue is by no means confined to these 
countries. The BBC image on this page demonstrates how widespread populism has become 
in Europe.49  
 
In Hungary we have seen the George Soros-founded50 Central European University hounded 
out of the country and subjects like gender studies banned. The government’s Program of 
Excellence is also directly undermining the independence (some say very existence) of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences.51 52 In short, we are seeing funding for research in the 
natural sciences, humanities, and social sciences coming under increased political control in 
Hungary.53 
 
University autonomy and academic freedom are also under threat in Poland, with researchers 
increasingly attacked for their ideas and research. Worryingly, these attacks are often state 
sponsored. We have also seen a new law passed that outlaws the blaming of Poland for any 
crimes committed during the Holocaust. This clearly has implications for those undertaking 
research in this area and has a general chilling effect on researchers. Moreover, the attacks 
are not confined to Polish territory: in Paris earlier this year a conference held by Polish 
historians of the Holocaust was disrupted, with those attending heckled and threatened by 
nationalist protesters. (See also here).54  
 
In 2018 the Polish government also tabled “Bill 2.0” (or a “Constitution For Education”), a 
sweeping bill that, among other things, “stripped small, regional universities of their research 
budgets and their right to award PhDs, and placed universities under the governance of 
external councils rather than collegial governance.” 
 
Likewise, in Turkey we have seen state-sponsored attacks on the university community, and 
the targeting of individual scholars.55 Following an attempted coup in 2016, 15 universities 
 
49 The recent European election might suggest it is not as threatening as assumed. A Science article published 
after the results includes this: “Far-right and euroskeptic parties did score high in countries such as Italy and 
France, but the predicted populist flood didn’t materialize across the continent … But scientists and their 
institutions should remain vigilant about their influence, says Maud Evrard, head of policy affairs at the 
Brussels-based Science Europe, a group of funding agencies and research organizations. ‘We’re concerned 
about academic freedom. We shouldn’t take it for granted,’ she says.” Vigilance and trepidation would seem 
the watchwords. 
50 George Soros has also been a key funder of open access initiatives, beginning with the BOAI.  
51 More here. 
52 In early July the Hungarian parliament adopted a controversial bill that will strip the 200-year-old Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences of its network of 15 research bodies and hand them over to a newly conceived state 
research network: the Eotvos Lorand Research Network (ELKH). This agency will be run directly by the 
government, through its minister for innovation and technology, László Palkovics. The new law is expected to 
come into force in September. This was challenged in the courts in September.  
53 More here and here. 
54 For background on the tussle over Poland’s historical disagreements see this LRB piece here.  
55 See also here 
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and many other institutions were closed by the Turkish government, allegedly for being 
affiliated to the Gülen movement. Aside from the inherent injustice of attacking researchers 
and their institutions for political reasons, incidents like this weaken the ability of the Turkish 
research community to engage in the independent pursuit of knowledge and it negatively 
impacts on academic collaboration between Hungary and the rest of the world.  
 
While petitions have been launched in support of the targeted Turkish academics (see also 
here), we must doubt these will have much impact on the policies of President Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan. True, he experienced some pushback this year, not least with his party’s loss of the 
mayoral election in Istanbul. But the dramatic changes to the constitution Erdogan has 
overseen in recent years have given him sweeping new powers. As evidence of his authority, 
he was able to get the first mayoral election in Istanbul annulled.56 Moreover, Turkey’s recent 
military offensive in Syria appears to have given Erdogan a boost in popularity. He also 
oversees “networks of influence” that, critics say, give him and his family a deeply rooted 
dominance of the Turkish polity.  
 
As with Poland, attempts to silence and intimidate critics of the Turkish regime have not been 
confined to it borders. We have seen complaints that the Turkish government has sought to 
exert political influence on American educational institutions and to prevent a Japanese 
University from running Kurdish language classes.57 
 
What is at stake for the research community above all here is academic freedom, the principle 
that to be effective research needs to be free of political control, or outside interference or 
pressure, and that research institutions should have autonomy. Populism threatens both the 
independence of research institutions and their ability to collaborate internationally. As such, 
it poses a serious challenge to the open access, open data and open science movements. We 
have to ask: how can “a common intellectual conversation and quest for knowledge” take 
place when universities and researchers are subjected to political censure and control, and 
international collaboration becomes difficult or impossible? 
 
Moreover, these developments are by no means confined to the European side of the Atlantic. 
Trump’s arrival in the White House has seen the science of climate change and the 
environment subjected to political attack. As such, a consensus arrived at by scientists after a 
century’s worth of research has been rejected by the President and his administration not as a 
result of scientific disagreement but for political and ideological reasons. 
 
Trump has also sought to reduce or withhold funding for research he does not like. Writing in 
The Guardian last year John Podesta, Chair and Counselor, of the Center for American 
Progress reported: “The Trump administration has twice now issued budget proposals that 
sought to dramatically reduce funding for or outright eliminate the collection and analysis of 
data about Earth’s atmosphere, oceans and geological, biological and energy systems.” 
 
Meanwhile, the president has overseen the suppression and deletion of scientific data. As the 
authors of a report published last year explain: “We have found significant loss of public 
 
56 Nevertheless, the re-run saw Erdogan’s AKP party lose by an even larger margin, with Erdogan saying, “legal 
action could remove him [Mr. Imamoglu] from office” for an insult he allegedly made to a regional governor 
during a recent argument. 
57 Wikipedia reports that in Turkey, it is illegal to use Kurdish as a language of instruction in both public and 
private schools. The Kurdish language is only allowed as a subject in some schools 
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access to information about climate change.”58 This is a direct attack on open access and open 
data and an act of scientific vandalism.  
 
And in an act that many view as a callous appropriation of the calls for open data, in 2018 the 
Trump administration proposed a new rule called “Strengthening Transparency and Validity 
in Regulatory Science” . This would require scientific studies that support “pivotal regulatory 
science” to publish their underlying data, models, and assumptions.59 Critics say the proposal 
would forbid the EPA, whose mission is to “protect human health,” from consulting scientific 
research into humans unless the data is publicly available. But medical researchers cannot 
make their supporting material open available without invading patients’ privacy, since the 
data is often gathered under confidentiality agreements.  
 
The proposal attracted a great deal of criticism, but when a new draft was published recently 
it became apparent that the scope of the rule has been extended and it will be applied 
retroactively. This will allow Trump to roll back rules or fail to update rules based on the best 
information to protect publish health and the environment. This, says Paul Billings, senior 
vice president for advocacy at the American Lung Association, “means more dirty air and 
more premature lungs,”  
 
As evidence that US populism poses a threat to international collaboration we could add that 
as part of his “America First” agenda Trump is gradually disengaging the US from 
international scientific efforts and initiatives. This year, for instance, the US left UNESCO, 
an organisation that has been key in supporting global scientific efforts – including the 
formation of the Geneva-based research institution CERN (where the web was invented) and 
the synchrotron light source (SESAME) in Jordan. 60  
 
In passing, we could add that Trump is ending US participation in the Paris Agreement on 
climate change (leaving in 2020) and he has adopted a hostile attitude to the International 
Criminal Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).61 While this last decision 
might not directly concern science, it underlines the degree to which the US is withdrawing 
from the global community. This is not the world envisaged by BOAI, which assumed 
international collaboration and collective endeavour as a given.  
 
More recently, Trump has been seeking to roll back most of the significant federal efforts to 
curb greenhouse-gas emissions initiated during the Obama administration. We have also seen 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) support an erroneous tweet 
by Trump as a result of political interference and contrary to scientific evidence. This is a 
threat to science, to scientists and to the scientific process. 
 
 
58 See also the New York Times article reporting that the Environmental Protection Agency plans to change the 
way it calculates the health risks of air pollution, making it easier to roll back a key climate change rule.  
59 As The Atlantic put it, “The seven-page proposed rule … uses the language of ‘scientific transparency’ to 
prohibit the agency from consulting a wide swath of peer-reviewed scientific research. If adopted, the policy 
would essentially bar the EPA from consulting most large-scale medical studies when creating rules about air 
pollution, toxic chemicals, and water contaminants. The proposal could also force the agency to revoke 
decades of clean-air protections.” 
60 True, the US has had an on/off relationship with UNESCO since 1984.  
61 While the US has never ratified the ICC, Trump is hostile to it, and in April revoked the visa of the 
international criminal court’s chief prosecutor in response to her intention to investigate potential war crimes 
by US soldiers in Afghanistan. 
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It is important to note, however, that political interference in science by the US government 
began before Trump’s arrival in the White House. Both Bush and Obama have been accused 
of doing this. We can presumably expect it to continue after Trump’s departure. 
 
What we have learned is that populism raises the likelihood of political interference and 
increases suspicion of scientists. This has seen declining public trust in science and in 
experts.  Ironically, many believe it is the very openness of the web that nurtures and feeds 
this distrust. As Gleb Tsipursky puts it, “The rise of the internet and, more recently, social 
media is key to explaining the declining public confidence in expert opinion.”  
 
Tsipursky adds, “Only a third of Americans trust scientists and most people can’t tell the 
difference between truth and falsehood online.”  
 
Climate denial aside, perhaps the most visible sign of the current distrust in science is the 
anti-vaxxer (or vaccine hesitancy) movement, which has led to a dramatic increase in measles 
around the world. As the Guardian reported in April: “Measles cases worldwide rose by 
300% during the first three months of 2019 compared with the same period last year, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) has said, amid growing concerns over the impact of anti-
vaccination campaigns, particularly spread through social media.”62 
 
It would seem that populism is at least partly a product of the open global network. and that 
openness is, therefore, by no means an unmitigated good. 
 
OA advocates argue that the answer to this distrust and scepticism is to make more research 
open access, on the basis that if “the facts” are made freely available the public will be able to 
assess the claims of, say, anti-vaxxers or climate change deniers. The problem is that the 
public cannot generally understand research papers or the raw data behind them. More 
importantly, if they no longer trust experts, they are unlikely to trust any evidence scientists 
put before them. 
 
Some are now so distrustful of science that even measles epidemics don’t appear to give them 
pause for thought. In May, hundreds of people attended an anti-vaccination event in New 
York, the city where the outbreak hit hardest.63 Elsewhere, we have seen parents in California 
taking their children out of school in order to prevent them being vaccinated by the state. 
 
The OA mantra that making publicly funded research open access will help the public better 
understand and respect science is far from self-evident.  
 
Trade protectionism, tariffs, sanctions and suspicion 
 
I want now to consider the implications that the current rise in trade protectionism, trade 
sanctions and growing international suspicion could have for openness. The evidence 
suggests that these too pose a threat to the sharing and collaboration assumed essential for 
effective research. And if it is correct that international collaboration and open access are co-
dependent they pose a threat to the BOAI goal too.  
 
 
62 See also this story: US measles cases hit highest mark in 25 years. And this one.  
63 See also an example of the dangers of homemade remedies here.  
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During his presidential election Trump pledged to rip up or renegotiate a whole raft of 
international trade deals. And once in office he moved quickly to act on his promise, taking 
on China and Europe,64 as well as Canada, and Japan. He also withdrew the US from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) and set about re-negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
between Canada, Mexico and the US.65 66 
 
Trump has also shown himself to be a keen proponent of trade sanctions – most notably on 
Iran after he pulled America out of the Iran nuclear deal framework, and also on North Korea. 
He is also happy to weaponise tariffs for political purposes – e.g. threatening to impose tariffs 
on Mexico unless it stopped or slowed down the flood of migrants entering the US via 
Mexico.67  
 
This kind of behaviour is always infectious. Not only does it trigger tit-for-tat responses, but 
other countries tend to emulate it. Thus we have seen China impose sanctions on US firms 
that sell arms to Taiwan and we have seen tariffs weaponised in the current dispute between 
Japan and South Korea. Elsewhere, France and Ireland threatened to do something similar in 
connection with the EU-Mercosur trade deal between the EU and a Latin American bloc that 
consists of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. 
 
Trump’s actions have been strongly informed by a belief that the trade agreements he 
inherited were not in the best interests of America. In the case of China there is also concern 
about the US’s growing trade deficit with the country.68  There is also longstanding 
frustration with the way China protects and subsidises its own industries – a practice the US 
refers to as its “predatory trade and investment policies.”  (Of which more later). 
 
We also need to view Trump’s actions against the geopolitical backdrop of the  
“great power rivalry” taking place today between the US and China. The two countries are 
competing for the status of primary superpower in the 21st Century.  
 
At the same time, we are seeing a larger and broader geopolitical shift taking place. This 
includes the growing economic power and assertiveness of Asia more widely, and of Latin 
America,69 plus a resurgent Russia keen to re-establish itself as a powerful international 
player following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  
 
Further complicating the picture, a number of other states are clearly keen to thrust 
themselves on the world stage, including some the US classifies as rogue states – e.g. Iran, 
Syria and North Korea. 
 
I believe these shifting geopolitical forces and tensions have important implications for 
international collaboration, for open access, and for scholarly communication more generally. 
 
Take the case, for instance, of Shahin Akhondzadeh, of the Tehran University of Medical 
Science. The Scientist reports that a paper he submitted to a US journal was rejected as a 
 
64 See also here.  
65 For an overview of the process and outcome of this see the Wikipedia page here.  
66 A timeline for Trump’s trade negotiations can be viewed here. 
67 A tactic that seems to have worked.  
68 Recently this was estimated at $419 billion. 
69 Brazil is now the ninth largest economy, above Canada. 
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result of his nationality and location. “We are used to having an unfair situation in politics,” 
Akhondzadeh said. “But to have an unfair situation in science is very bizarre.”  
 
Bizarre perhaps, but not surprising given the current environment. 
 
And while some Western publishers are still accepting papers from Iranian researchers, if the 
authors want to publish open access they have no way of paying APCs as many international 
banks have introduced their own restrictions in response to the US sanctions. The resulting 
blockade on currency exchange, says The Scientist, makes it impractical for Iranian scientists 
to pay the publication fees required by many open-access journals. 
 
Elsewhere, Iran’s science minister Mansour Gholami told Nature that Iranian researchers are 
being prevented from travelling to scientific conferences abroad and that active research 
collaborations between the US and Iran are also on hold. 
 
Again, it is important to note that while Trump has proved particularly aggressive, it was not 
he who began the process of marginalising and punishing the Iranian research community. As 
Abbas Edalat, a British-Iranian computer scientist at Imperial College London points out: 
“Even after the 2015 treaty [the so-called Iran Nuclear deal], under Obama there were all 
these limitations imposed by the United States on Iranians, including Iranian academics.”  
 
Edalat added that under Obama’s presidency the US State Department emailed him to say his 
membership of a visa waiver scheme was being cancelled because of his nationality. “It’s 
true that it has become much more accentuated under Trump – there is no comparison – but it 
all started under Obama”, Edalat said. 
 
Along with new tariffs and sanctions we are seeing increasing suspicion in the West that 
foreign governments and/or their agents and citizens are bent on stealing Western ideas and 
innovation, including technology and intellectual property. From the perspective of the US, 
the main culprits here are China, Russia and Iran. But India and Pakistan are viewed with 
suspicion too.  
 
We should not doubt this is now having a negative impact on international sharing and 
collaboration. And since many new ideas, techniques and innovations are described in 
research papers it is not impossible that at some point this will cause governments to question 
the advisability of open access and open science. Either way, foreign researchers are being 
treated with greater distrust, especially in the US.  
 
And perhaps there are good grounds for this distrust. In March last year, nine Iranians were 
charged with “conducting a massive cyber theft campaign on behalf of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps. Amongst other things, reported The Scholarly Kitchen (TSK) 
this involved the “the bulk theft of intellectual property from academic institutions in a 
brazen scheme to gather and redistribute scholarly content.” 
 
Specifically, more than 100,000 US professors were sent phishing emails in an attempt to 
steal their credentials and “access and copy materials, including scholarly journals, theses and 
dissertations, and electronic books for further distribution.” 
 
We are also seeing claims that foreign students and researchers are going to study and work 
in the US in order to steal intellectual property, engage in academic espionage and rob 
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research from labs. Last year a professor at Duke University alleged that a Chinese doctoral 
student working in his laboratory on materials for “cloaking” objects from electromagnetic 
waves had returned to China with sensitive, government-funded findings that he used to start 
a billion-dollar tech company.70 
 
As the largest public funder of biomedical research in the world, the US National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) finds itself in the middle of this new battleground. In early April, it was 
reported that all visitors to NIH,  including patients, must now disclose their citizenship as a 
condition of entry – a new rule that two Iranian students quickly fell foul of. When one of the 
researchers (who is based at Georgetown University) arrived for an interview at the NIH he 
was removed from a lab by NIH police and escorted off campus.71 
 
In another incident, an Iranian brain researcher visiting NIH said he was told to leave, then 
delayed at security for nearly an hour filling out online forms. It was only after interventions 
by NIH police and other officials, that he was he told that an exception would be made in his 
case so that he could deliver the presentation he had come to give to two dozen waiting 
researchers.  
 
These incidents mark a new era of suspicion within the US research community and it clearly 
has implications for both researchers and universities. The first signs of this became publicly 
discernible in a 2018 hearing of the Senate health committee that oversees NIH. Warnings 
were given of potential threats to biomedical research and the diversion of US intellectual 
property to foreign governments. As a result of these threats, NIH Director Francis Collins 
reported, NIH had written to more than 10,000 NIH-grantee institutions urging them to 
ensure that NIH grantees are properly reporting their foreign ties.  
 
Collins added that NIH was investigating about a half-dozen cases in which NIH-funded 
investigators may have broken reporting rules. “The robustness of the biomedical research 
enterprise is under constant threat”, he said, adding that “the magnitude of these risks is 
increasing.”  
 
Subsequently it was reported that NIH had also written to dozens of major US research 
universities asking them to provide information about specific faculty members with NIH 
funding and who are believed to have links to foreign governments that NIH did not know 
about. 
 
In April, Science reported that at least 55 institutions had launched investigations and MD 
Anderson Cancer Center in Texas had removed three senior researchers on the grounds that 
 
70 We can see the same concerns emerging in Australia, with warnings that Australian universities will need to 
be increasingly cautious about the international PhD students they enrol over the risk of compromising 
sensitive emerging technologies. 
71 Also of note, in July the National Science Foundation posted a statement on NSF’s “commitment to secure, 
open international research collaboration”. It said that NSF’s science and engineering enterprise is “put at risk 
when other governments endeavour to benefit from the global research ecosystem without upholding these 
values”. And it listed a number of actions it was taking to address the issue. 
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they had committed potentially “serious” violations of agency rules involving confidentiality 
of peer review and the disclosure of foreign ties.72 73 
 
In May it was reported that Emory University had sacked two US government-funded 
scientists for allegedly failing to disclose their sources of overseas financing and research ties 
in China. Their lab was also shut down.74  
 
In August an academic at the University of Kansas was accused of federal fraud for allegedly 
failing to disclose a full-time employment contract that was held with a Chinese university 
while simultaneously conducting research in Kansas financed via federal research contracts. 
“If convicted,” reported the Times Higher, “he faces up to 20 years’ imprisonment and a 
maximum fine of $250,000 (£204,000) on the wire fraud count, and up to 10 years’ 
imprisonment and a maximum fine of $250,000 on each of the counts of program fraud”.75 
 
In September two researchers in Ohio were charged with stealing exosome-related trade 
secrets related to the research, identification and treatment of a range of paediatric medical 
conditions from their medical research labs at the Nationwide Children’s Hospital’s Research 
Institute, having allegedly founded a company in China in 2015 without the hospital’s 
knowledge. While they continued to be employed by Nationwide Children’s, it is alleged 
they were marketing products and services related to exosome isolation through the Chinese 
company. 
 
Recently the NYT reported that nearly 200 investigations are now underway at major 
academic centres in the US and that NIH has referred 24 cases in which there may be 
evidence of criminal activity to the inspector general’s office of the Department of Health and 
Human Services. These include allegations of theft of scientific ideas, designs, devices, data 
and methods that may lead to profitable new treatments or diagnostic tools. Some researchers 
under investigation are said to have obtained patents in China on work funded by the United 
States government and owned by American institutions. Others are suspected of setting up 
labs in China that secretly duplicated American research. 
 
This new vigilance, reports the NYT, is ultimately being driven by the FBI and has been 
building for several years. In June 2016 the FBI contacted NIH officials “with unusual 
questions about the American scientific research system.” What we see today presumably is 
the unfolding of that initial inquiry.  
 
Again, it is important to note the timing because it is further evidence that concern about 
foreign researchers predates Trump’s arrival in the White House. As Science has pointed out, 
a 2015 FBI Counterintelligence Division handout had warned that recruiting scientists 
 
72 MD Anderson is part of the University of Texas (UT) system. 
73 We are also seeing the start of a tit-for-tat visa denial process getting underway, as reported in the Times 
Higher here. See also here. 
74 Days later, Jinan University in China’s southern Guangdong province, said that it would welcome of the 
Chinese researchers back, along with the rest of the Emory research team from the that lab had been closed. 
75 The US Education Department has also announced that it is probing Georgetown, Cornell and Rutgers 
seeking records dating as far back as nine years, outlining agreements, communication and financial 
transactions with entities and governments in countries such as China, Qatar, Russia and Saudi Arabia.” 
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through programs such as Thousand Talents76 was allowing China to “benefit from years of 
scientific research conducted in the United States’ and ‘severely impacts the US 
economy’.”77 
 
Universities and researchers are therefore going to have to adjust to the fact that their 
governments are becoming increasingly suspicious about foreign researchers, and that 
international collaboration and sharing is going to become more difficult as a result. One 
administrator told Science (on condition of anonymity): “People have already told me that 
they are rethinking whether they should continue to work with someone from another 
country. They say, ‘Maybe I should just do the work myself, or find a US-based 
collaborator.’” 
 
Today this is most evident in the US, but as international tensions grow the alarm is 
spreading to other nations, including Australia and the UK. In October it was reported that 
UK intelligence agencies MI5 and GCHQ had “warned universities to put national security 
before commercial interest as fears grow over state theft of research and intellectual property 
from campuses.” Both China and Russia were named, and universities were told that the 
growing number of international collaborations requires particular care.78 
 
This presents a clear challenge to the OA movement. After all, global sharing and 
collaboration is fundamental to BOAI’s goal of “uniting humanity in a common intellectual 
conversation and quest for knowledge”.  
 
It is also possible that at some point open access might start to look like a dangerous idea. 
Could we even see researchers told to stop making their work open access? 
 
Level of naïveté 
 
I have elsewhere argued that OA advocates have a history of being naïve about open access 
and the possibility that their advocacy could have unintended consequences. They did not 
anticipate, for instance, that pay-to-publish OA would open the floodgates to predatory 
publishing and prove extremely divisive as a result (of which more later). Likewise, they did 
not see that persuading funders and governments to force OA on researchers by introducing 
ever more coercive OA mandates would have the effect of alienating researchers from OA, 
with the result that some have dragged their heels and resisted funder policies. Likewise, they 
did not see that insisting on the use of liberal creative commons licences would be both 
divisive and counterproductive (of which more later). Librarians also did not anticipate the 
possibility that open access might lead to funding for libraries being reduced – as the authors 
of this document warn. (Page 3).  
 
 
76 Thousand Talents Program was established in 2008 by the central government of China to recognize and 
recruit leading international experts in scientific research, innovation, and entrepreneurship. The program has 
been praised for recruiting top international talent to China, but also criticised for being ineffective at retaining 
the talent. An unclassified 2018 US National Intelligence Council analysis highlights that the program threatens 
the US’s economic base by enabling technology transfer to China. See also this 2019 DOE memo. 
77 See also this more recent FBI document.  
78 The UK government agency Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, which has issued specific 
guidance to UK universities reports that a fifth of the world’s scientific papers are now produced through 
international collaboration.  
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And today the OA movement seems oblivious to the possible consequences that the changing 
geopolitical environment could have on their aspirations. 
 
It seems I am not the only one to have concluded that OA advocates (and the research 
community more widely) have and continue to be naïve. The FBI appears to have reached a 
similar conclusion. And it is precisely the issue of openness that concerns it. In January, the 
New York Times reported FBI director Christopher Wray telling Congress that China is 
“exploiting the very open research and development environment that we have.”79 And he 
added that “the level of naïveté on the part of the academic sector about this creates its own 
issues.” 
 
To tackle this naivety the FBI has been meeting with university officials to brief them on 
information security issues. The events at Emory, University of Kansas and MD Anderson 
Cancer Center are doubtless partly a consequence of this.  
 
There can be no doubt that there are implications here for open access. Wendy Streitz, 
president of the Council on Governmental Relations (which represents nearly 200 research 
universities and institutes) characterises the situation in this way: “We have two opposing 
forces here – there is a move towards open access publishing and open access data from the 
science agencies, and at the same time the security agencies are saying maybe we shouldn’t 
be sharing our research.”  
 
The possibility is that the latter position might tip the balance towards closed rather than 
open. 
 
As one might expect, the FBI’s intervention is controversial and has attracted criticism, not 
least because it inevitably leads to particular ethnic groups being focused on. As PEN 
complains, asking universities to monitor particular nationalities and groups, “raises serious 
concerns about privacy rights, racial profiling, and academic freedoms”.  
 
Fears that the FBI’s intervention will lead to injustice and overreaching are understandable, 
possible, and worrying.80 But agree with the agency or not, it has concluded that the research 
community has been, and remains, too trusting, if not negligent. And given its considerable 
powers it would be irresponsible for any US university to ignore the FBI. 
 
Doubtless for this reasons the University of California (the US university with the largest 
number of Chinese students) has been considering the implications of the FBI’s 
intervention.81 
 
 
79 See also the comments of Trump’s science advisor Kelvin Droegemeier here: “Think about what open access 
means: I’m giving open access to something I’m producing. If we’re saying we have to be vigilant and protect 
our assets – and by the way, everything is open – inherently there’s a conflict there. But there doesn’t have to 
be conflict. We’re having conversations and making plans about this – how we balance this important 
openness of our enterprise, including open access, which is vital to the conduct of research, with the vigilance 
that’s needed to make sure that our hard work is not taken. We do all the hard work, and bad actors reap the 
benefits. We don’t want that.” 
80 As a number of societies warn in this letter. 
81 This includes inaugurating a systemwide audit to identify risks related to “foreign influence” and reviewing 
all grants to assess compliance with federal rules and identifying categories that may be susceptible to 
problems. 
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Again, we should stress that these concerns predate Trump. Nor are they likely to go away 
when Trump does. At a nationwide level the US National Science and Technology Council 
(NSTC) is currently working to establish government-wide requirements for what 
information researchers need to disclose in order to receive federal research grants. The need 
for this was outlined in a memo to the US research community by the current chair of NSTC 
Kelvin Droegemeier. In his memo, Droegemeier warns that the US scientific ecosystem, 
“features new and extraordinary threats which must be confronted thoughtfully and 
effectively.” He adds that success in meeting these threats requires “striking a balance 
between the openness of our research ecosystem and the protection of our ideas and research 
outcomes.” 
 
More importantly, US politicians have also concluded there are threats that need addressing 
and proposing new legislation as a result. In March Representative Jim Banks introduced a 
bill called the Protect Our Universities Act of 2019, with the aim of ensuring that foreign 
students participating in “sensitive” research projects can be monitored. The bill would also 
prevent students with past or current citizenship in China, Russia, Iran or North Korea from 
having access to such projects “without a waiver from the Director of National Intelligence.” 
 
Elsewhere, Senator John Kennedy has proposed the Protecting American Technology Act of 
2019 in order “to safeguard the information and technology produced on college campuses by 
requiring a deemed export license to be in place before foreign nationals can conduct 
scientific research in university labs”. The goal: to “prevent controlled technologies from 
leaking to America’s competitors.” 
 
And in June Senator John Cornyn introduced a bill called the Secure Our Research Act, with 
the aim of protecting federally funded research from foreign theft. 
 
Finally, the Securing American Science and Technology Act (SASTA) has been introduced 
to “address academic espionage at our institutions of higher education”.  
 
As these bills indicate, the concern extends to a number of foreign countries. Nevertheless, 
we should not doubt that China is a primary target and considered the main threat, not least 
because it has been actively embedding itself in universities around the world by means of 
the so-called Confucius Institutes.82 
 
Initially considered a benign exercise in soft power and provider of language teaching these 
institutions are now viewed as tools designed to censor Chinese students studying abroad, to 
spread Chinese propaganda, and to erode academic freedom in their host universities and 
countries.83 
 
They are also said to lack transparency, and many of the universities hosting them are 
accused of having naively signed partnership agreements that give too much control to the 
Chinese government. A report by a US Senate committee published in February concluded 
that Confucius Institutes provide money with strings attached. Amongst other things, the 
 
82 The BBC reports that there were 548 Confucius Institutes around the world by the end of last year. 
According to Wikipedia these are expected to grow to 1,000 by 2020 in dozens of countries, with the highest 
concentration in the United States, Japan, and South Korea. 
83 More here. 
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committee said, they “compromise academic freedom” and export China’s censorship to host 
nations.84  
 
In March Human Rights Watch published a 12-point Code of Conduct intended to help 
universities still planning to host a Confucius Institute avoid being compromised. 
 
On this issue too new legislation is being proposed. One of the bills filed by Senator John 
Kennedy, for instance, is called The Confucius Act. This aims to “protect national security by 
ending China’s unfettered access to American college campuses” and to reduce its influence 
on US colleges and universities “by granting full managerial authority of Confucius 
Institutes’ teaching plans, activities, research grants and employees to the [host] universities.” 
 
Concern about Confucius Institutes has spread to other countries too. There is growing unrest 
in Australia,85 and in February the Times Higher (THE) reported discontent in the UK too.86 
THE added that universities around the world have been cutting ties with Confucius 
Institutes. 
 
One of the less obvious but more worrying aspects of censorship, of course, is that it chills 
speech and leads to self-censorship (a phenomenon that in the context of China has been 
dubbed the “anaconda in the chandelier”). It also makes people less willing to share and 
collaborate. 
 
Concern that China is bent on censoring activities it does not like in foreign countries has 
been amplified by reports in March that Chinese officials had pressured Canada’s Concordia 
University to cancel an event with a Uighur activist, and by a November report by a 
committee of UK MPs that said it had found “Alarming” evidence of Chinese interference in 
UK universities (including via the activities of the state-backed Chinese Students and 
Scholars Association). The report also said it had received reports of scholars in the UK being 
bugged in discussions about Russia, and that those studying Central Asia had received threats 
against their families. The committee added that it had been told that a Russian government-
sponsored body called Russkiy Mir is active on UK campuses. 
 
Meanwhile as a sign of its increasingly assertive stance, China is now happy to slap down 
foreigners who complain about matters that it views as its internal affairs. Gone are the days 
of China’s commitment to keeping a low profile – referred to as its Bide and Hide policy 87. 
In response to warnings from the UK Foreign Secretary over how Hong Kong was 
responding to civil protests, for instance, vice-president of the Centre for China and 
Globalisation Victor Gao told the BBC, “I don’t think the British government has the guts” to 
take a tough stance on the issue. 
 
 
84 In Australia The Sydney Morning Herald reviewed a number of contracts and concluded, “Australian 
universities hosting Chinese government-funded education centres have signed agreements explicitly stating 
they must comply with Beijing's decision-making authority over teaching at the facilities.” 
85 In July the Australian government whether Confucius Institutes at Australian universities require registration 
as a source of foreign influence. In a statement, the education minister, Dan Tehan, said he had spoken to 
Universities Australia on Thursday to stress “the importance of all universities that host foreign institutes 
complying with the foreign influence transparency scheme”. See also this.  
86 See also this.  
87 “Hide your strength, bide your time, never take the lead.” This was the principle of the former leader of 
China, Deng Xiaoping. The policy has been overturned by Xi Jinping.  
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More recently, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) responded robustly to what it 
viewed as a biased history of CAS published by Nature, challenging in particular the claim 
that the Chinese central government takes “harsh measures against its people”. CAS added, 
“In carrying out its scientific and technical mission, CAS stands firmly with the central 
government and with the people. We reject any such false allegations with disruptive 
intentions and are strongly opposed to biased judgments of China’s internal affairs, and to 
any unnatural linking of political or ideological positions with our mission.” 
 
The more tension rises between countries the less able will the research community be to 
collaborate and share. What price here a “common intellectual conversation and quest for 
knowledge?” To assume that the shifting of these geopolitical tectonic plates will have no 
impact on the research community, and on open access, would surely be naïve? 
 
Growing gulf 
 
Meanwhile, back home in China state control of universities and researchers continues to 
intensify and grow.88 And while we often see external protest and petitions in support of 
academics targeted for their dissenting views the likelihood that these will have much impact 
seems negligible. 
 
Nevertheless, we are seeing protests grow over the way foreign researchers are treated by 
authoritarian states. In April, for instance, Scholars at Risk filed a submission with the United 
Nations’ Universal Periodic Review (UPR) highlighting attacks and pressures on higher 
education in Iran, including wrongful imprisonment and prosecution and restrictions on 
student expression.89 90 
 
It is hard not to conclude that a growing gulf is opening up between the West and those 
countries whose values are deemed to be out of sync with the principles held dear in the 
West, including free speech, academic freedom91 and human rights. This inevitably has a 
negative impact on international collaboration. 
 
In response to the death sentence imposed on Iranian-Swedish academic Ahmadreza Djalali, 
for instance, European universities announced that they would restrict collaboration with 
Iranian institutions.  
 
Likewise, when Hong Kong police recently stormed university campuses, academics from 
around the world immediately signed an online statement saying, amongst other things, “We 
may have to reconsider our partnerships with Hong Kong universities in the future if 
student’s safety is at risk and such blatant violation of academic and intellectual freedom 
continues.” 
 
And when researchers from the West visiting authoritarian regimes are targeted by the host 
country, collaboration is again the first casualty. The controversial and high-profile arrest of 
 
88 And is surely likely to be extended to Hong Kong at some point.  
89 See also here. 
90 A subsequent report Scholars at Risk set out to map the “threats to academic freedom that jeopardize 
China’s higher education ambitions.” 
91 Ironically, one could argue (and some do) that the push for open access in Europe is itself a threat to 
academic freedom.  
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UK academic Matthew Hedges by UAE authorities last year for spying exemplifies this: UK 
universities immediately began to end their ties with UAE.  
 
Another source of friction are the international branch campuses (IBCs) that Western 
universities have been setting up in regimes considered authoritarian – e.g. UAE, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore and China. Critics complain that in doing so Western universities 
are signing ill-thought-through partnership agreements that cede too much control to the host 
country and show far too little regard for issues like academic freedom. 
 
Withdrawing from such agreements, however, means forfeiting revenue, kudos and (in 
theory) an opportunity to promote Western values. Partly for this reason, when universities 
with IBCs are criticised their instinct is to wave the concerns away. Thus when NYU 
President Andrew Hamilton faced criticism about NYU’s campus in Abu Dhabi, he 
responded: “I’m not aware of any constraint on discussions that take place on the Abu Dhabi 
campus or discussions that take place in the classroom at Abu Dhabi”. He then somewhat 
undercut his position by saying that NYU should not be viewed as a democratic institution.92  
 
Yale too faced criticism when its branch campus in Singapore (Yale-NUS) cancelled a course 
called “modes of dissent and resistance in Singapore”. Critics complained that the decision 
was contrary to the principle of academic freedom. Explaining why the course had been 
cancelled, the President of Yale-NUS Tan Tai Yong said that the planned activities in the 
course schedule would have put students at risk of breaking Singapore’s laws, and so of 
“incurring legal liabilities”. He added, “All institutions have to operate within boundaries of 
legally permissible activity, and that is true in all countries.”93 When Yale University 
launched a probe into the cancellation it agreed that the course would have posed a legal risk 
to international students if they had taken part.94 
 
What we learn is that when a Western university seeks to promote Western values in an 
authoritarian country it is in danger of simply pandering to the authoritarian values of the host 
nation. It is a fine line. As Inside Higher Ed pointed out, amongst other things the Yale 
incident raises questions “about whether academic freedom can be protected in authoritarian 
states.” At a time of increased international tensions, and growing suspicion and distrust 
between nations, incidents like these are leading some to conclude that operating an IBC is 
too risky and/or compromising. Either way, we are likely to see a fall in international 
collaboration. As the THE suggests, the branch campus movement seems to be on the wane. 
 
At the same time, foreign nationals are finding it more and more difficult to obtain visas to 
study or work abroad. Iranians looking to obtain a visa to work in the US are especially 
challenged. As STAT explains: “While it’s hard to track scientists specifically, the overall 
numbers have dropped drastically, from 35,363 Iranians getting such visas in 2015 to 6,014 
in 2018.” 
 
 
92 Meanwhile, the pro-democracy protests sweeping Hong Kong are considered too controversial to discuss at 
NYU Shanghai. 
93 Yale President Peter Salovey later issued a statement and report.  
94 For a balanced discussion of this see this article.  
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Unsurprisingly, the US has also been clamping down on visa requests from Chinese 
researchers – as explained in this Nature article.95  
 
Trump’s arrival in the White House also saw the introduction of a travel ban that currently 
affects eight countries, six of which are predominantly Muslim. Travel bans don’t just impact 
the targeted country. Because of the new US rules, for instance, European researchers are 
more reluctant to visit banned countries, for fear that a stamp in their passport showing they 
have visited a banned country could make it more difficult for them to enter the US. As The 
Scientist points out, a prior trip to, say, Iran prevents European researchers from being able to 
benefit from common visa waiver schemes that avoid the need to apply for a full US visa. 
 
And the more suspicion researchers face when they visit the West, the fewer are likely to 
apply in future. Likewise, the more we see collaboration between research institutions fall. As 
Philip Altbach points out, “for both internal political reasons and as a reaction to foreign 
criticism, especially from the United States, China is likely to become less open to 
international collaboration with top-tier universities.” 
 
He adds: “[W]ithin China, academic collaboration arrangements with foreign universities are 
slowing. Last summer, 234, or one-fifth, of its international university partnerships were 
closed, including more than 25 with American institutions – many of which were inactive 
anyway.” 
 
There are two important additional reasons why Chinese researchers and students are less 
inclined to study or undertake research abroad today: First, for many the idea of going abroad 
to get a “liberal education” is no longer appealing. Second (and related) China is now much 
more confident about its role in the world and its own importance as a research hub. This new 
confidence is the result both of China’s economic success and the government’s decision to 
invest heavily in research96 – both at home and abroad.  
 
Key here is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).97 Announced in 2013 the BRI, reports Nature, 
is expected to cost an estimated US$1 trillion and intended to connect China with “more than 
130 nations through roads, railways and marine links to increase trade and China’s influence 
in the world.”98  
 
Importantly, despite the name, this is not about building physical infrastructure alone. The 
BRI is heavily focused on technology and science too, and China is investing in research in 
BRI countries around the world, including by means of the so-called digital silk road 
 
95 The number of F1 visas – the primary type of student visas – issued to China fell by 13% between fiscal 2017 
and 2018, compared to an 8% decline for all countries, according to an analysis of State Department data by 
the nonpartisan National Foundation for American Policy (and reported by the LA times here). 
96 Nature reports that Europe’s relative share of global science and research spending is shrinking as China’s 
expands. Elsewhere, the Wall Street Journal reports that US funding has been falling, and that it is investing 
more money in life sciences relative to important areas like AI, gene editing, synthetic biology, 5G and 
quantum computing.  
97 Otherwise known as the New Silk Road. 
98 The competing US New Silk Road Initiative announced in 2011 never got off the ground. 
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initiative.99 It is also funding scholarships for researchers in the Global South to spend time in 
China.  
 
In other words, China is flexing its geopolitical muscles not just economically and politically, 
but in science and education as well.  Essentially, the government wants to shift science’s 
centre of gravity from the West to China.100 This of course helps to fuel suspicion in the West 
and, as I shall suggest, could have important implications both for OA and scholarly 
communication more generally. 
 
So, we can expect to see a decline in international collaboration and a fall in foreign students 
and researchers studying and conducting research in the West. Speaking in California, at a 
gathering of university leaders from countries of the Pacific Rim, including the US, Canada, 
Latin America, China and the Asia-Pacific, the vice-chancellor of the University of New 
South Wales in Sydney, recently reported that he is seeing a “pushback” against the large 
number of foreign students visiting Australia. “In the current political environment, it is 
influenced by things that are happening here [in the US] and elsewhere that are flowing 
through to Australia.” 
 
Again, this indicates that while it is a particular issue for the US right now, it looks set to 
become a general trend, as this article also makes clear. And in confirmation of this, in 
September it was reported that for the first time the number of visas issued to students from 
China applying to study in Australia has fallen. 
 
In the same month came news that Iranian students accepted to US schools had had their 
visas suddenly revoked without explanation. 
 
Also of note: at the same California event, the president of the California Institute of 
Technology (Caltech) indicated that this is bipartisan concern in the US and “not going to go 
away if there is a change of administration.”  
 
International collaboration is also falling in the UK,101not least because of Brexit. Amongst 
other things, this will see a decline in the free movement of researchers in Europe. In 2016, 
the Royal Society (RS) warned: “Many of the research programmes funded by the EU 
support scientists to move to and from the UK … They also support scientists to establish and 
maintain international collaborations, including large networks across Europe and beyond.” 
 
The RS added that it would be arguing for the UK to have the closest possible association 
with EU research programmes, but added mournfully, “whether the UK will remain a part of 
them will ultimately be decided through the Brexit negotiations.”102  
 
In fact, even before Brexit had taken place the number of Horizon projects led by UK 
researchers in nine universities surveyed had dropped from 49 in 2016 – the year that the 
British voted for Brexit – to just 20 in 2018. The RS also reports that Britain’s annual share 
 
99 See also here. This initially includes an attempt to create new networks and telecoms standards, and 
providing BRI countries with technology dedicated to ecommerce, surveillance and censorship. 
100 See this article for more on this. 
101 See this article for some of the problems academics from abroad are having when trying to get a UK visa. 
102 See also here. 
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of EU research funding has fallen by nearly a third since 2015. (See here for some case 
studies).   
 
Some also believe that (ironically) Europe’s current push for OA with Plan S could have a 
similar.  effect. If it fails to get global buy-in (and it seems increasingly likely that it will fail 
to do so)103 collaboration between researchers in countries that sign up to Plan S and those 
that don’t is expected to fall – an unfortunate and counter-intuitive consequence of trying to 
force greater sharing and collaboration on the research community. 
 
The larger point is that wherever you look today international collaboration looks look like a 
tide going out. The Dutch Minister of Education, Culture and Science, for instance, has 
proposed drastic cuts to the budget of the Dutch Organization for Internationalisation in 
Education (Nuffic), and in 2018 the University of Groningen in the Netherlands shelved plans 
to establish a branch campus in China after concerns were raised about academic freedom.  
 
Meanwhile, the atmosphere for foreign researchers is becoming less welcoming and 
collaboration more difficult not just in the West but in other parts of the world too. Some 
countries are creating a hostile environment for foreign researchers. Thus, Indonesia has 
passed a new law that will see foreign researchers found guilty of violating visa regulations 
facing criminal charges.104 And in India, the University Grants Commission has decreed that 
Indian colleges and universities will no longer be able to collaborate with Chinese institutions 
without prior approval from the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of External 
Affairs.  
 
International collaboration and sharing seem to be declining across the globe. If Hook is right 
to argue that open science and international collaboration are co-dependent, then current 
events must give us all pause for thought.   
 
All of which suggests that the BOAI vision of a world in which research is openly and freely 
shared on a from-all-to-all basis looks increasingly naïve. Countries now look more likely to 
erect barriers105 and turn inwards, than collaborate and share. 
 
Homogeneity vs. heterogeneity  
 
Why is this happening? I have pointed to the rise of populism and I have suggested that this is 
partly a product of neoliberalism. And I have suggested that great power rivalry between 
China and the US, and the changing geopolitical environment, are also important factors.  
 
 
103 In fact, those who have signed up appear to have started backsliding. In March it was announced that the 
Swedish funder Riksbankens Jubileumsfond said that it could no longer support Plan S in its current form. In 
August the Italian funder Compagnia di San Paolo also appears to have left cOAlition S. There was no public 
announcement, the funder’s name simply disappeared off the cOAlition S website. And in May rumours began 
that Agence Nationale de la Recherche wants to continue using green embargoes (rather than insisting that all 
research is made immediately freely available on publication).  
104 In addition, any foreigner who conducts research without a valid permit could face a fine of Rp 4 billion 
[US$287,418] and be banned from applying for a permit for five years.” 
105 Or what in the context of the developing populism and attempts to erect new walls against immigrants 
Yascha Mounk refers to as “populist curtains”.  
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But I think there is a broader issue to consider, one that stems from the West’s mistaken 
assumption that it had won the ideological war.  
 
Following market liberalisation and reforms in higher education and science in China in 
1978, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,106 the West assumed that both countries 
would have little choice but to liberalise, both economically and politically. And it was 
assumed that they would adopt Western-style liberal democracy and sign up to the Rules 
Based International System established in the wake of WWII via organisations like the 
United Nations and World Trade Organisation (WTO).  
 
It was also assumed that this could only be good for the West. When China was allowed to 
join the WTO in 2001, for instance, the US assumed that its entry would “force China to open 
its markets, which would produce one-sided gains for the United States.” 
 
The thinking behind these assumptions was famously articulated by Francis Fukuyama in his 
1989 book The End of History107. For Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union signalled not just “the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but 
the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” 
 
This thinking was later extended to argue that the combination of market liberalisation, 
globalisation and the growth of the internet would force most if not all countries to adopt 
openness and neoliberalism. As American political commentator Thomas Friedman put it in 
2000, the combined forces of globalisation and the web are, “acting like nutcrackers to open 
societies.” Essentially, it was believed that a newly homogenised world was emerging and 
that this new world was being created in the image of the West.  
 
Today these assumptions look naïve. As US historian Timothy Snyder puts it, “Until recently, 
we had convinced ourselves that there was nothing in the future but more of the same. … We 
allowed ourselves to accept the politics of inevitability, the sense that history could move in 
only one direction: toward liberal democracy.”108 
 
But it turns out that the world remains, and is keen to stay, economically, culturally, and 
politically heterogeneous. More countries may be embracing the market, but they are 
choosing to do so in their own way, not simply aping the West. In fact, interest in liberal 
democracy has been declining ever since. In Russia, we have seen the ascendency of Putin 
and the iron grip he has maintained on the country for the past 20 years. In China, we saw the 
1989 crackdown of the Tiananmen Square protesters in Beijing,109 and we have seen the 
recent decision by the Chinese National People’s Congress decide to the remove the two-term 
 
106 In 1978 China announced a number of reforms that led to market liberalisation. In 1989 the Berlin Wall fell 
and in 1991 mass privatisation took place.  
107 As Wikipedia puts it, “Fukuyama argues that, following the ascendency of Western-style liberal democracy 
following the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, humanity was reaching ‘not just ... the passing of 
a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human 
government’.” 
108 On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century, Timothy Snyder, Page 115, 2017 (Kindle) 
109 One of the leaders of the protests, Wu’er Kaixi, says, “From that day on they said, okay, we're going to give 
you economic freedom. In exchange you give us your submission.” Elsewhere, Shao Jiang, one of the student 
leaders in 1989, has  said,  “The Chinese government has turned China into a big prison.” 
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limit on the Chinese presidency, effectively allowing Xi Jinping to remain in power for life. 
Thirty years on, political oppression in both countries has increased not reduced.  
 
So, while many countries are adopting a more market-based approach, they are developing 
their own distinctive approaches, approaches better suited to their cultural and national 
predilections. And this usually means spurning the model of democratic capitalism 
promulgated by the West.  
 
Thus today we see the state-directed, or state-controlled, capitalism favoured by China and 
Russia, we see the “state-sponsored capitalism” characteristic of countries like Hong Kong, 
Macau, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and we see the so-called Singapore model. In 
addition, there are the models adopted by countries in Western Asia like Iran and those in 
Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia and UAE. These latter approaches better fit the 
needs of Islam. Importantly, these countries take an authoritarian approach and attach little 
significance to human rights, free speech, and academic freedom. 
  
Today we see a rich mix of different ideologies and cultural norms, and a range of different 
views on how societies should be organised and managed. And we are seeing a growing clash 
between countries viewed as authoritarian and those that are liberal democracies.  
 
This is the source of much of the conflict between nations, cultures and ethnic groups. And it 
inevitably poses a threat to international collaboration, sharing and, ultimately, to the 
openness agenda of BOAI. Looking over the long arc of history, of course, there is nothing 
new here. What is different is that the West had assumed we were now all headed in the same 
direction and that a more homogeneous world was in the making.  
 
Above all, however, we see two large countries (China and the US) with very different values 
and economic interests squaring off against each other as they jostle for the position of 
dominant superpower in the 21st Century. The US wants to retain its pole position, China 
wants to “recast the global order” in line with its own values and restore itself to its former 
position as “one of the world’s great civilizations”. This, suggests Nature,  “includes being 
seen by all other nations as a source of scientific power, too”.  
 
The developing world will find it hard not to get sucked into this struggle, and countries in 
the Global South will likely feel the need to pick a side.  
 
The renewed stress on heterogeneity has brought with it a strong sense that Western 
assumptions about the role and place of science in society, what the research priorities should 
be, and indeed the nature of knowledge itself, need to be challenged and questioned, and we 
are seeing calls in some countries for science and education to be reassessed and reengineered 
to fit local needs.  
 
This is most evident in countries that experienced European colonialism. In South Africa, for 
instance, we can see calls for the de-colonisation of education in order to get rid of “colonial 
tags, colonial means of assessing students, and their colonial curricula.” Only in this way, 
advocates insist, can the current system be freed from its “apartheid-linked shackles.” A 
recent conference of the Southern African Historical Society went so far as to conclude110 
 
110 Consider also the contrast between the home-grown Continental Education Strategy for Africa and SDG4. 
Yet CESA has yet to be funded. 
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that “unless [South African] universities becomes spaces of robust and open debates in the 
true sense, they may as well close down.”  
 
We have also seen calls to de-colonise science, and even to statements like “science must 
fall”.  
 
More widely, there is growing discontent sense in the Global South that the Global North has 
been able to embed its dominance, its priorities and its interests into both the international 
education system and the international research process. And it is complained that this has 
allowed them to continue to enjoy unfair privilege, and to engage a form of academic neo-
colonialism.  
 
This is a valid and justified critique. It was the Global North that defined what modern 
science is, what its priorities should be, how it should be conducted and communicated, and 
in what language it should be communicated. And it was the Global North that devised and 
continues to control the international ranking systems and tables (not to mention the Journal 
Impact Factor) that are used to evaluate and measure the activities of researchers and 
institutions and to define what good science is. These ranking systems invariably favour those 
in the Global North. 
 
Strikingly, we are also seeing suggestions that open access needs to be de-colonised, with 
events organised specifically to discuss how this might be done. This provides a timely 
reminder that open access itself has been defined, and is to a great extent controlled, by and 
for those in the Global North.111 
 
So, today we are seeing Western assumptions and privileges challenged in many different 
ways, and as the tectonic plates of geopolitics begin to shift, so political and cultural 
differences are being heightened and exaggerated. This is leading to new tensions and points 
of difference and the research community cannot withstand these developments, not least 
because the resulting conflict is starting to impact negatively on international collaboration.  
 
Indeed, the very nature and structure of international collaboration is being questioned. We 
have in recent years seen growing complaints that researchers in the Global South are 
routinely exploited and side-lined when they partner with those from the North. 
 
Writing last year, The Lancet said, “No one likes a parachute researcher: the one who drops 
into a country, makes use of the local infrastructure, personnel, and patients, and then goes 
home and writes an academic paper for a prestigious journal”. Or as a recent BMJ Global 
Health article put it, “Current paradigms of scientific advancement provide no long-term 
models to challenge the status quo or privilege knowledge that is generated primarily in the 
Global South”.  
 
This must surely impact on the willingness of developing countries to share and collaborate.  
 
In short, the world is increasingly fissiparous. Indeed, the desire for greater heterogeneity and 
self-determination is leading calls for more localism in all parts of the world, including in the 
 
111 As INASP’s Siân Harris puts it, “In practice … many discussions about Open Access approaches have taken 
place without the involvement of stakeholders in the Global South.” 
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Global North. This is what led to the Brexit decision, and it what is driving calls for 
devolution and independence in a number of other European regions – e.g. Scotland and 
Catalonia.112 113 Unfortunately, this tends to encourage populism and the less healthy aspects 
of nationalism I have been discussing, and so feeds further conflict. 
 
Wrong footed 
 
As the global order reshuffles the West is confronted with the fact that China appears to have 
a more effective long-term strategy,114 one moreover based on a more realistic understanding 
of the geopolitical moment. Mesmerised by the belief that it had won the ideological war, and 
that an end of history moment had arrived, the West now finds itself wrong-footed. And 
Trump’s erratic foreign policy decisions will surely exacerbate the problem. 
 
One of the more important battlegrounds for the great power rivalry between the US and 
China will be fought around technology and the internet. This inevitably has implications for 
sharing and collaboration, and for open access.  
 
Although it is a global network today, the internet was built in California. As such, its 
infrastructure and the values baked into it reflect a Western (mainly American) view of the 
world. Even if unconsciously, the people who created the internet assumed a cultural, social, 
technological and economic homogeneity that does not exist in the real world.  
 
Having created the internet, the US tended to assume that it would continue to dominate the 
network and the technology around it. This assumption is now being challenged in a number 
of ways and the US is having to contemplate the possibility that it could lose its dominance, 
both of the internet and of the cutting-edge technologies that are expected to power economic 
development in the 21st Century.  
 
The current dispute between the US, China and Huawei is a case study here. A Chinese 
multinational technology company, Huawei is now said to be the world’s leader in 5G, the 
technology that will be key to the development of the internet, the Internet of Things (IoT) 
and AI. Not only is 5G much faster than current cable internet but – unlike the hardware-
driven 4G – it will rely heavily on software, and much of this software is being created by 
telecommunications providers like Huawei.  
 
And in a kind of virtuous circle, 5G will allow the fast machine-to-machine interaction that 
will be essential for the IoT and AI revolutions, while also providing the infrastructure and 
large data sets that AI needs to realise its potential. In return, AI is driven by advances in 
machine learning and so will be able to make sense of the chaos and complexity of 5G.  
 
Both Huawei and 5G are central to China’s plans to dominate the rollout of a super-fast 
wireless network and to assume a leadership role in both 5G and AI. And we should not 
doubt Chinese ambitions here, or the efforts it is putting into realising them. In its 2017 New 
Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, China set as a goal that by 3030 its 
domestic AI industry will be worth nearly $150 billion.  
 
112 See also. 
113 Consider also how in 1991/92the former Yugoslavia became six separate countries.  
114 A point conceded recently by Trump’s science advisor Kelvin Droegemeier. “The Chinese think really long 
term,” says. China has played the long game and is doing things that are concerning to us.”  
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And judging by China’s publication of AI-related papers, Nature believes the country 
overtook the United States in in this key feld in 2006, putting it in second place to Europe. 
Elsewhere, Wired has estimated that China is now the leader in AI implementation, noting 
“What matters in AI implementation is speed, execution, product quality, data, and 
government support. Chinese companies are equal to or ahead of their American counterparts 
in each of these areas.”115 
 
Moreover, since access to very large amounts of data will be critical to the success of AI, 
China has a further advantage in that it will be able to generate huge amounts of data from the 
monitoring and surveilling it undertakes on its 1.43 billion citizens. 
 
Huawei is vital to many of the other areas that China is focused on too, and so key to the 
country’s ambition of becoming a global tech superpower. As The Los Angeles Times points 
out, the company is also working to become the first to produce “a new generation of 
sensitive military systems, smart grids, autonomous transportation vehicles and other crucial 
products and services.”  
 
China is also said to be leading in the area of quantum computing.  
 
It is against this background that we need to view the arrest in Canada last year of Huawei’s 
CFO Meng Wanzhou.116 The main charge against Wanzhou is that she covered up violations 
of sanctions on Iran. But that would seem to be only one of several grievances the US has 
against the company, including allegations of intellectual property theft. The US also believes 
Huawei poses a national security threat, not least by spying on governments and companies 
(see also here).117 118 
 
While Huawei has repeatedly denied these claims, its case was not helped by the discovery of 
a “backdoor” in one of its laptops.  
 
In short, the arrest of Wanzhou underlines US concern about China’s growing technological 
prowess and awareness that primary superpower status in the 21st Century will depend on 
having technological supremacy.  
 
What we are seeing, therefore, is the emergence of what the BBC has characterised as a tech 
cold war and Huawei is at the centre of the battlefield. “The fate of Huawei will be decided 
by forces that could define the unfolding century: the tension between US exceptionalism and 
Chinese expansionism,” says The Los Angeles Times. 
 
One again we should note that this struggle predates Trump’s arrival in the White House. 
When Edward Snowden leaked highly classified information in 2013, for instance, we 
learned that the National Security Agency (NSA) had been hacking into Huawei’s servers as 
far back as 2009.119 And this spying activity was defended by Obama in 2014.  
 
 
115 See here for a contrary view. 
116  Wanzhou is the daughter of the company’s founder Ren Zhengfei. 
117 Further background on this case can be read here.  
118 It also seems to have led to tit-for-tat punishment by China. 
119 In an operation code-named “Shotgiant”. 
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Elsewhere, the UK has had a Huawei cyber security evaluation centre in place since 2010. 
The centre’s fifth annual report was published in March.120  
 
As always, of course, Trump has upped the ante and shown a determination to confront China 
in ways that Obama was not, including triggering the current trade war with China.  
 
It was when trade talks with China broke down in May that the US attack on Huawei came to 
a head. Trump responded by signing an executive order banning the company from the US.121 
A few days later Google suspended Huawei’s access to updates of its Android operating 
system and, the same week, the BBC reported that an internal memo sent out by UK chip 
manufacturer ARM indicated that it would need to suspend business with Huawei.122 123  
 
This was a major blow to the company, which shortly after announced that it expected its 
revenue to be $30 billion less than forecast over the next two years. And The Wall Street 
Journal predicted extensive layoffs at Huawei’s US operations as a consequence.  
 
How this dispute will end we do not know. When he met Chinese President Xi Jinping at the 
G20 meeting in June Trump announced that he would lift some restrictions on Huawei. Exactly 
what this meant was unclear. When the ban was delayed for 90 days on 19th August we were 
told that this was in order to allow “companies such as Google to trade with Huawei while 
adjusting to the restrictions.” In the meantime, US lawmakers seem intent on keeping the 
company blacklisted and Trump is said to have been contemplating blocking all US investment 
in China. 
 
The US has also been putting pressure on other countries to ban use of Huawei’s 5G 
technology. When in May a leaked UK government document124 indicated that the British 
government was planning to allow the company to supply some parts for the UK 5G 
infrastructure US officials threatened that if the UK did so the US would have to reassess its 
ability “to share information and be connected with them in the ways that we are today” – a 
point later emphasised by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. c|net is keeping a timeline on 
the Huawei ban here.  
 
The dispute over 5G will surely impact the future of the internet125 (See also here), and 
perhaps (without wanting to sound pompous) the next chapter in humanity’s development. As 
the New York Times puts it, “If China and the United States have begun a technological Cold 
War, then the Huawei order can best be seen as the beginnings of a digital Iron Curtain.” 
 
I shall later argue that the dispute could also see the technology underlying the internet begin 
to facture. It if did it would surely have serious implications for the research community and 
its ability to share and collaborate internationally and so jeopardise the whole OA project. 
 
120 Amongst other things, the report concludes, “Overall, the Oversight Board can only provide limited 
assurance that all risks to UK national security from Huawei’s involvement in the UK’s critical networks can be 
sufficiently mitigated long-term.” 
121 It is also thought that the Chinese surveillance firm Hikvision could also be blacklisted. 
122 What impact this will have remains unclear. 
123 Trump’s executive order has also led to IEEE banning Huawei employees from reviewing paper for over 200 
journals.123 (This ban has subsequently been lifted). 
124 The leaking of the information also led to the sacking of the UK’s Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson.  
125 As the BBC put it, “If there is going to be an all-out ban on US firms working with the Chinese company then 
that could make its products – which use some American components – unreliable in the longer term.” 
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Imbalance of values 
 
I said earlier that rather than embracing the values and political model of the West, many 
countries have chosen to manage their economy, their country and their citizens in their own 
way. These decisions reflect a different view about, amongst other things, individual 
freedom, privacy, human rights and free speech. China is key here not just because it is 
building an unprecedented surveillance state in which not even lip service is paid to these 
values, but because it is newly powerful and assertive and it is busy exporting both its values 
and its surveillance and blocking technologies to other countries so that they can follow its 
example. “Thirty-six countries sent representatives to Chinese training programs on 
censorship and surveillance since January 2017,” explains the Internet Society. “Another 18 
countries have purchased monitoring technology or facial recognition systems from Chinese 
companies during the same time frame.”126 
 
The important point here is that China is seeking to make its model and values the new global 
norm. As a UK House of Commons report put it in March: “In the area of human rights, the 
evidence suggests that China does not intend to reform the rules-based international system 
but rather intends to subvert it, by promoting an alternative version of human rights which 
stresses economic development at the cost of the universality of individual civil and political 
freedoms.” 
 
Great power rivalry aside then, the growing tension between China and the West reflects a 
fundamental clash of culture and of value systems. Here too China would seem to have an 
advantage. As an authoritarian country it doesn’t have to go through the laborious process of 
consulting citizens before taking action, or be overly sensitive about the impact its political 
decisions will have on its citizens. This allows it to respond to events more quickly and to 
exploit what it surely views as weaknesses in the Western model. As BBC anchor-man John 
Humphrys found himself perplexedly asking an interviewee when discussing the controversy 
over Huawei, “So authoritarianism is more effective than liberal democracy?” 
 
Thus, China is happy to exploit the West’s commitment to free speech for its own advantage. 
This point was made in a March 2019 Bloomberg article reporting on the arrest of Huawei’s 
CFO. Pointing out that there is an “imbalance of values” between the West and China the 
author argued that this imbalance favours both Huawei and China. 
 
For instance, the article says, Huawei was able to respond to US attempts to limit its activities 
in the US by suing the US government.127 It can also use overseas media128 and social media 
to press its case. As such, Bloomberg noted, the company has been able to utilise freedoms 
available in the West to do in the US what China would not allow others to do in its own 
country. Let’s not forget, Bloomberg added, that China is “one of the world’s least-free 
countries based on an aggregate of scores across 25 categories.” 
 
126 In terms of internet freedom, the Internet Society says, the most restrictive countries were China, Iran, 
Ethiopia, Syria, and Cuba, the group said. Iceland, Estonia, Canada, Germany, and Australia were the countries 
with the most Internet freedom. The United States ranked sixth highest, the UK seventh, and Japan ninth. 
127 Huawei took the US government to the courts over an earlier ban, even going so far as to challenge the 
very legality of the ban and asking that what is known as Section 889 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) thrown out. 
128  The interview the company’s founder gave to the Lost Angeles Times is a case in point.  
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Bloomberg went on to point out that the Chinese government frequently uses this strategy too 
– i.e. it is happy to leverage “the openness of developed-nation democracies to push its 
message, while refusing the same opportunities at home.” It added, “China blocks its citizens 
from accessing Twitter, yet the country’s state-controlled media and government agencies 
have dozens of accounts with the US social media service that they use to spread Beijing’s 
agenda. One editor-in-chief even regularly criticises foreign governments on his personal 
timeline, a practice that would probably land him in detention if it was directed at his own 
government.” 
 
It is not always apparent how self-consciously (or cynically) this is being done. In 
commenting on the controversy caused by the leak over UK plans to allow Huawei’s 5G 
technology on its mobile network129 the Chinese Ambassador to the UK wrote to The 
Telegraph to suggest (without any apparent irony), that “The last thing China expects from a 
truly open and fair ‘global Britain’ is a playing field that is not level.” 
 
In some ways, we might be better talking about conflict of values rather than an imbalance of 
values.  
 
I will return to this imbalance when I come on to discuss OA initiatives like Plan S. For the 
moment, we could note that the research community has been directly impacted by the 
Huawei dispute, not least because many universities are now dependent on funding from 
corporations. Those US universities in receipt of money from Huawei have therefore faced 
pressure from their government to cut their financial links with the company130 – pressure 
that they seem to have no choice but to bow to.131  
 
Pandora’s Box 
 
But before I come on to discuss current developments in open access, I want to explore 
another background issue – one that I think could have very real and important implications 
for OA. This goes back to the point I made earlier about openness not being an unmitigated 
good. I am going to suggest that OA advocates have been naïve not just about open access 
but about the internet itself. That is, they failed to appreciate the unintended consequences 
that creating a global network whose default position is set to open would have.  
 
I am not just pointing the finger at others here. I admit I too was naïve. In retrospect, 
everyone (including me132) who thought that it was possible to create a global network, insist 
that the content and services on it should be open by default, that anyone using it should be 
able to do so anonymously, and that the network would operate by some magical new laws 
separate from the real world were plain silly.  
 
 
129 The leak quickly became a source of controversy, as it was said to originate from a top-secret cabinet 
meeting, and led to the Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson being sacked by the Prime Minister. 
130 In September Reuters reported that Huawei plans to spend more than $300 million a year in research 
funding for universities. 
131 In April MIT cut ties with Huawei. In the UK universities have independently been rejecting Huawei funding. 
132 I am not aware that I ever self-described as an OA advocate, but I have always supported the idea of greater 
openness. 
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Today we can see that rather than laying the foundation for “for uniting humanity in a 
common intellectual conversation and quest for knowledge” the internet has opened a 
Pandora’s Box in which “all the ills of humanity swarmed”. Much of the content flowing 
across the network today is not knowledge but lies, damned lies and dubious sales pitches. To 
change metaphors, the well has been well and truly poisoned. 
 
We also failed to anticipate the security and privacy issues that would arise on an open 
network, particularly when people are able to roam around on it wearing the cloak of 
anonymity. 133 Above all, we failed to anticipate that the internet would unleash on the world 
a tide of fake news and political propaganda from both home-grown and foreign actors, 
including state actors like the Russian government (which has shown itself happy to conduct 
false and deceptive media campaigns for political purposes).  
 
Elsewhere the Chinese government has been happy to distort the news reporting of Taiwan-
related issues, and in August we learned that Twitter had removed nearly 1,000 accounts 
associated with the Chinese government targeting protesters in Hong Kong.  
 
The internet is now widely used by governments not just to spread misinformation about their 
own country (and its past) for propaganda purposes but to sponsor hate campaigns against 
anyone and everyone deemed threatening, including those who are simply critical of the 
regime. Most worryingly, it is being used to interfere with the democratic process in multiple 
countries. A recent report indicates that the number of countries that have been subjected to 
social media disinformation campaigns by governments or political parties reached 70 this 
year, up from 48 in 2018 and 28 in 2017. In October Facebook announced that in preparation 
for the US 2020 election it had removed four separate networks of accounts, Pages and 
Groups on Facebook and Instagram that originated in Russia and Iran for “engaging in 
coordinated inauthentic behaviour”. 
 
Sadly, many internet users are so silly that they (often unwittingly) help spread the tide of 
propaganda and fake news that swills around the internet, particularly when it supports their 
own prejudices and/or political biases. This is not just confusing, annoying and offensive; it 
can be downright dangerous – leading, for instance, to health epidemics and posing a direct 
threat to democracy. 
 
It is important to remind ourselves here that it was our desire for free content and services 
that gave rise to the toxic business models that have facilitated this flood of fake news and 
disinformation. As Zen Faulkes, a biologist at the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley has 
pointed out, it also gave rise to recommendation algorithms that allow false and malicious 
information of all sorts to be widely and repeatedly disseminated. In fact, Faulkes suggests, 
this is the “biggest problem in science communication” today. YouTube, he adds, is 
particularly pernicious: “You watch one thing, and YouTube recommends something even a 
little crazier and more extreme. Because YouTube wants you to spend more time on 
YouTube”.134 
 
 
133 I understand that anonymity can play a very useful role – for instance with whistleblowing – but as a 
general rule of the network it has turned out to be dangerous. Some intermediate position is surely required. 
134 I.e. since YouTube is advertising based, the more time users spend on it, the greater the revenues 
generated from the ads it sells. 
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In response to a Verge article discussing the same topic another researcher135 tweeted “I will 
say this until I am blue in the face – repeated exposure to disinformation doesn’t just confirm 
your priors. It warps your world and gets you to adopt beliefs that initially seemed ridiculous 
to you.”136 137  
 
This is the flip side of the wisdom of crowds, it is a phenomenon some now refer to as “the 
madness of crowds.” 
 
In short, the business models developed to allow content and services to be free on the 
internet have made us all susceptible to quacks and quackery and helped increase public 
distrust in science and scientists. A famous New Yorker cartoon in 1993 had a picture of a 
dog at a keyboard saying, “On the internet, nobody knows you are a dog”. This remains a 
powerful image and well encapsulates the fact that on the internet, we frequently do not know 
whether the information we are receiving comes from an expert, a faux expert, or a complete 
charlatan. More worryingly, many of us no longer seem to care. 
 
The reality is that a network created to help researchers share their work and ideas with one 
another has been so thoroughly co-opted and monetised by for-profit organisations, 
scammers, spammers, propagandists and other bad actors that it has been engulfed in false 
information, and this is often indistinguishable from (or viewed as no more authoritative 
than) information provided by specialists and experts. This is ironic indeed.  
 
The implications of this for the research community are only just beginning to be understood. 
These articles here and here outline some of them. The authors of the first article (medics), 
for instance, point out that the internet has made it extremely easy to disseminate “unfounded 
opinions and personal beliefs based on no formal, validated, or evidence-based data”. This, 
they add, “is frightening to us in the medical field.”138 
 
Regulators have begun to respond by, for instance, disciplining vaping companies for 
inappropriately promoting their flavoured nicotine formulas through “influencers” on 
Facebook, Twitter and other social media sites.139 But we must question whether the tide can 
be turned.  
 
Recently, a transgender teenager in Cambridge UK was so distressed when he was told he 
would have to wait six-years for treatment on the National Health Service that he resorted to 
buying hormone treatment from unregulated online doctors who had been suspended. Shortly 
afterwards he committed suicide.  
 
The problem is that trying to police and prevent these dangers is like playing whack-a-mole. 
The company that sold the unregulated hormone treatment quickly reappeared operating 
under a different name and on a different web site.  
 
 
135  Mike Caulfield 
136 Wired reported recently that Amazon Prime Video is “full of dodgy documentaries pushing dangerous cancer 
“cures”.  
137 This study found that the majority of videos on YouTube propagate conspiracy theories about climate 
science and technology. 
138 The issues were also discussed in a recent Royal Society article called, “Fake science and the knowledge 
crisis: ignorance can be fatal”. 
139 These products the FDA warned are being promoted without proper warnings attached. 
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The internet has also allowed online extremism (of all kinds) to grow and flourish, not just 
through the dissemination of hatred, religious intolerance and racist poison via social media, 
but via the “Dark Web”, a place where vulnerable and gullible people are daily radicalised 
and weaponised by disturbed and/or malevolent actors.  
 
As the UK’s Minister of State for Security and Economic Crime Ben Wallace has pointed 
out, the internet allows people with extreme views to gather together to reinforce their 
ignorance and teach each other ways to harm their fellow citizens by, for instance, building 
explosive devices or buying and creating guns.140 
 
Elsewhere, the former UK Home Secretary Sajid Javid warned that social media “is 
increasingly being used as a platform to incite violence, promote gang culture and also 
legitimise the use of knives” (the latter is currently a serious problem in the UK). 
 
As noted, it was the internet’s foundational principle of openness that led companies like 
Google and Facebook to create the business models that facilitate many of the problems we 
see on the network today. Likewise, the ability the internet offers for people to operate 
anonymously has fed the explosion of disinformation, propaganda and crime online. 
 
The problems of social media aside, pay-to-publish open access has given rise to predatory 
publishing (as noted earlier) This allows false science to be widely disseminated over the web 
by any rogue, quack, misguided individual or snake oil salesman. For those willing to pay for 
the faux authenticity these publishers provide it is now possible to present any misleading or 
downright dishonest information as sound science. Predatory publishers also allow dishonest 
researchers to scam their institutions and funders in order to advance their careers and obtain 
funding on false pretences. Sadly, it also means that naïve researchers now regularly pay 
$1000s a time to have their research posted on the Web without it being subjected to 
adequate, or any, peer review first. They mistakenly believe that they are dealing with a 
respectable publisher, and if trapped by one of these predators they risk facing irreparable 
reputational damage. 
 
These rogue publishers also offer a new marketing channel for pharmaceutical and medical 
device companies looking to promote their products by falsely presenting marketing 
messages as independent and objective research. (See this for instance). This is the research 
community’s own fake news, fake news that is not only deceitful but potentially very 
dangerous. 
 
Predatory publishers aside, pay-to-play open access may itself be a boon for pharmaceutical 
companies even when they publish in reputable journals. In 2010 three medical doctors, a 
biostatistician, and a research librarian examined the funding source and access status of 216 
extended reports published between 2007 and 2008 in the Annals of the Rheumatic Diseases, 
a journal published by the prestigious BMJ Group. Their conclusion: “author-paid open 
access publishing preferentially increases accessibility to studies funded by industry. This 
could favour dissemination of pro-industry results.” 
 
Pharmaceutical companies are now also able to exploit the less rigorous peer review process  
of OA megajournals (which accept around 50% of the papers submitted to them). Here again, 
 
140 See also here. 
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marketing messages can too easily slip through the net.141 (See also this commentary on a 
paper published in Nature’s megajournal). 
 
Finally, as the OA movement increases its calls for the routine posting of unrefereed preprints 
our concern should be that much greater. Preprint servers allow pharmaceutical companies to 
post unrefereed papers online in the knowledge that they will be unlikely to undergo 
meaningful scrutiny by experts in the field before being made freely available to all. The 
dangers here were flagged in 2017.142  
 
Given their uncertified status, Kent Anderson has suggested that preprints should not be made 
freely available to the world but only to researchers able to judge the scientific claims made 
in them. Anderson reports that c.30% of preprints remain unpublished. In the context, this 
must be cause for concern. 
 
It is hard not to conclude that we were naïve to think that openness is an unmitigated good 
and that everything can and should be free on the internet.  
 
What is to be done? 
 
For Tim Berners-Lee this is all hugely dispiriting. On the recent 30th anniversary of the Web 
he complained that his invention has now been so thoroughly “hijacked by crooks” that it 
could be destroyed. It has, he says, “morphed into a platform where disinformation spreads 
like a contagion, hate foments and personal privacy has been relinquished to the highest 
bidder looking to make a quick buck.” What he had never anticipated, he added, was that 
nation-states “would use the web to influence elections and public discourse.”143 
 
As a solution, Berners-Lee has proposed what he calls a “Contract for the Web”. His idea is 
that governments, companies and individuals agree to a set of principles designed to defend a 
free and open internet.144 Along similar lines, last year 30 technology companies signed up to 
a “digital Geneva convention”, committing never to partake in cyber-attacks against 
individuals or businesses. While Facebook was one of the signatories of this convention, 
Google, Apple and Amazon were not. In any case, cyberattacks are just one part of the 
problem we face today. 
 
 
141 As the blogger who drew attention to this paper commented, “I am very concerned about the open access 
and loose editorial control of PLOS ONE as a megajournal being exploited by commercial interests seeking a 
peer-reviewed article to advertise their products.” 
142 There is also concern that the launch of medRxiv could be particularly risky because, as Nature puts it, 
“some researchers are concerned that releasing unvetted clinical research could be risky, if patients or doctors 
act on what could end up being inaccurate information.” 
143 Technology Review reports that social media was used to influence elections in at least 18 countries in 
2016, including in the US. Bad actors were also said to have used Facebook to influence the UK’s Brexit 
referendum – although we should note that head of global affairs and communications at Facebook, Nick 
Clegg has denied that Facebook was used to influence the Brexit decision. 
143 The Church of England has also published a set of guidelines for social media, designed to make online 
platforms happier places. 
144 The Church of England has also published a set of guidelines for social media, designed to make online 
platforms happier places. 
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Either way, one is bound to conclude that talk of contracts and digital conventions is too 
little, too late, and highly unlikely to provide adequate solutions.145 Apart from anything else, 
the extent to which social media companies are willing to co-operate meaningfully to fix the 
web must be doubted.146  
 
The fundamental problem is that at the heart of the business models developed by these 
companies is the need to monetise personal data. It is this that has given rise to surveillance 
capitalism and to incidents like the Cambridge Analytica scandal. It has also facilitated and 
encouraged the fake news problem, not least because these business models are highly 
dependent on online advertising and so clicks are more important than veracity, and the 
companies have taken the view that they have no responsibility for the content posted on their 
sites. Any solution would surely require that social media companies abandon their current 
business models in favour of less predatory ones – which would surely mean replacing their 
current free models with pay-to-play models. This in turn would challenge the foundational 
principle that content and services on the internet should be free. 
 
Interestingly, as scholarly publishing moves away from subscription-based models, 
newspapers are returning to them.147 And this seems to be a successful strategy: In May, the 
Guardian reported that by adopting a “contribution/subscription” model it has been able to 
break even after a long period of losses.  
 
One of the benefits of having users subscribe to news services is that it can avoid many of the 
problems inherent to free content models. It would also see an improvement in the user 
experience. Ad-driven sites inevitably offer an appalling user interface, with web pages 
drowning in a mess of colours, flashing text, audio and clickbait, all of which makes it 
practically impossible to read the content adequately. 
 
The job of journalism is to separate truth from falsehood. When reporting is overwritten with 
ads and distracting promotional messages the user inevitably struggles to distinguish factual 
reporting from fake news.148 149 The subscription model, by contrast, enables (and actively 
encourages) publishers to fund professionally trained journalists and fact checkers and to 
focus on creating a trustworthy brand and a pleasant user experience. In this way, by moving 
back to subscriptions news sites can begin to chip away at the fake news problem and 
produce more valuable products and services. And as the reader becomes the primary 
customer (not the advertiser) there is much greater incentive to create a cleaner and clearer 
user experience. 
 
 
145 Berners-Lee is also developing software based on a decentralised web called Solid with the aim of allowing 
users to own and control their own online data. Again, it may be too little, too late.  
146 Consider, for instance, that Facebook promised to crackdown on vaccine misinformation, but then little 
happened. It also failed to honour the first agreement it came to with the US government. More recently it 
introduced a new policy that includes not fact-checking political ads, nor putting restraints on politicians’ 
speech on the Facebook platform. 
147 Often now called a “membership” model as users who do have a subscription can get, say 4 free articles a 
month) – e.g. here, here and here. Another approach that has become popular is the so-called freemium 
model.  
148 See one example of how this works in these two pieces I wrote in 2106 (here) and in 2017 (here).  
149 Worth noting here perhaps Elsevier’s view that “Online advertising allows Google/Facebook to capture 
most of the value, leaving media companies with crumbs.” 
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Is there a lesson here for the research community as it grapples with the problem of predatory 
publishing? I think so. Certainly, some believe that the subscription model is more suited to 
scholarly communication, not just because it helps avoid predatory publishing but because it 
offers a more stable and predictable revenue stream. Importantly, it significantly reduces the 
temptation to accept ever lower-quality papers in order to earn revenue from APCs. Again, 
the reader becomes the customer rather than the advertiser (author).  These points are 
frequently made by Anderson – e.g. here and here.  
 
The long and short of it is that free and open content appears to have created as many (if not 
more) problems than paywalls ever did.  
 
What we have also learned is that business models have implications not just for 
sustainability and profitability. They have political, sociological and legal implications. And 
new and untested business models too often have undesirable and/or dangerous side effects. 
 
Reaching for legal remedies 
 
As the unintended consequences of the internet have become ever more apparent and 
regulators have struggled to grapple with them governments are now reaching for legal 
remedies. Last year the US Federal Trade Commission sought to address the problem of 
predatory publishers by suing an India-based predatory publisher called OMICS, a company 
grown rich on its dubious publishing and scam conference activities.150 151 – an intervention 
also that appears to have had little or no effect. 
 
Above all, governments are looking at ways to force the so-called FAANGs to fix the 
problems they have created and/or facilitated – by, for instance, blocking and taking down 
inappropriate, false, violent, illegal and/or dangerous content and desisting from selling or 
inappropriately using the personal data of their users, or allowing others to use their platforms 
for these purposes.152  
 
The search for legal remedies will surely grow, because while social media companies have 
made some effort to address the problems – Facebook, for instance, has suspended apps and 
Twitter has suspended accounts – they have done far too little to satisfy critics and 
politicians, and seem unlikely to unless something significant changes. It does not help that 
these companies don’t appear to accept it is entirely their responsibility to fix the problems. 
Facebook’s head of global affairs and communications Nick Clegg, for instance, has 
suggested that others need to take responsibility to clean up the mess too. To this end, the 
company has proposed an independent oversight board be created. 
 
 
150 A federal judge ordered journal publisher and conference organiser Srinubabu Gedela and his companies to 
pay more than $50.1 million to resolve Federal Trade Commission charges that they made deceptive claims to 
academics and researchers about the nature of their conferences and publications, and hid steep publication 
fees. 
151 Meanwhile, a Russian site is selling authorships for more, allowing researchers to pay to have their names 
attached to articles.  
152 This is an important development if only because internet-based providers who host third party content 
have long held that they are not publishers and so not responsible for the content on their platforms. In the US 
this is articulated in Section 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act.  
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Moreover, given the huge revenues these companies earn they have to date been generally 
unfazed by efforts to rein them in. Facebook’s earnings are sufficiently high that it was able 
to set aside $3 billion to settle with US federal regulators over the Cambridge Analytica 
incident without much pain. As NPR pointed out, Facebook’s total revenue for the first 
quarter stood at more than $15 billion. “So whatever the final figure, the company has the 
money to pay for the estimated fine.”  
 
In the event, the company was fined $5 billion. But when the news was released Facebook’s 
shares rose!153 
 
Government intervention will therefore undoubtedly escalate. With an eye to solving the fake 
news problem, for instance, 17 governments have now approved or proposed new laws 
intended to restrict online media.154 And given that some of these companies can simply 
shrug off large fines, individual directors and executives are also likely to be targeted. In the 
UK, a new “online harms bill” has been proposed that would provide powers “to issue 
substantial fines, block access to sites and potentially to impose liability on individual 
members of senior management.” In the US a proposed new bill would aim to address the 
privacy issue by allowing greater fines and threating senior executives with 10 to 20 years in 
prison if they lie about their privacy standards.  
 
However, there are no easy solutions here. Attempts to improve user privacy can exacerbate 
some of the other problems. When, in order to provide greater privacy, Facebook announced 
plans to encrypt all the messages on its platform governments complained that doing so 
would hamper existing agreements to grant law enforcers faster access to private messages on 
social media in order to protect young people from online exploitation. 
 
Given their sheer size and power, proposals are also being made to break up the larger social 
media companies. Democratic presidential hopeful Senator Elizabeth Warren is one of those 
who has called for this.155 We have also seen a series of moves in the US in recent months 
that would seem to be moving in this direction, including an announcement by the US justice 
department of a wide-ranging antitrust review of tech giants, an antitrust investigation of 
Facebook by the attorneys general of eight states and Washington, DC, and an antitrust 
investigation of Google by 50 attorneys general.  
 
But breaking up these companies will not fix the problems inherent in surveillance 
capitalism, says Zuboff. At issue is not just the size of these companies, she explains, but the 
business models they use.  
 
As noted, these models are a direct consequence of the internet’s open philosophy. If web 
companies were forced to jettison them then the free content and services that we have all 
become accustomed to would likely be closed or converted to pay-to-use. Actually, this may 
already be the direction in which we are travelling. YouTube, for instance, is currently 
aggressively promoting a premium subscription service. We could therefore see the 
 
153 The New York Times put it, the recent FTC settlement was “so extraordinarily light that it makes a slap on 
the wrist seem like cruel and unusual punishment”. 
154 The Los Angeles Times reports that governments around the world, including in Russia, Malaysia and 
France, have introduced regulations seeking to stem the spread of so-called fake news. So too has Kenya. 
Meanwhile Ukraine is considering introducing legalisation and the EU has outlined an action plan to counter 
disinformation.  
155 See also. 
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fundamental principle of openness underlying the internet challenged. And this could call 
into question the whole open philosophy of the internet. 
 
For his part, Clegg argues that taking action against the FAANGS would be 
counterproductive. Describing current criticism of social media companies as a “techlash”, he 
maintains that weakening or breaking up the FAANGS would simply open the door for large 
Chinese companies to fill the vacuum. “There is a battle for tech dominance between China 
and the US,” he told the BBC. “They [China] don’t have similar privacy concerns as we do. I 
can predict within a short period of time, we will have a tech domination from a country with 
a wholly different set of values to our own.”  
 
This is clearly an opportunistic response, but it could prove a successful strategy. For that 
reason it is now a routine rejoinder from social media companies. In May Google’s CEO Eric 
Schmidt warned that attempts by the EU to curb the power of the FAANGs, “hands China a 
competitive advantage on everything from privacy to data collection.” 
 
A further problem is that absent more drastic action (which I will discuss below) it is far from 
clear that content can be effectively controlled on the internet After the Christchurch mosque 
shootings earlier this year, for instance, Facebook reported that it had deleted a video of the 
shooting 1.5 million times in the first 24 hours.156 Did that eradicate the video? 
 
Collateral damage 
 
Breaking up the FAANGS may not therefore be politically do-able. Unfortunately, legislation 
intended to filter and block content may also not be workable on a global network whose 
founding principle is untrammelled openness. The inherent difficulties in doing so could 
perhaps explain why the UK dropped its plans to introduce online porn blocking legislation.  
 
Blocking content can also cause collateral damage. In the US, for instance, the Internet 
Archive has demonstrated that attempts to block content can lead to perfectly harmless 
information being mistakenly identified as, say, terrorist content.  
 
In addition, legislation aimed at blocking content raises free speech issues. Commenting on 
the proposed UK Online Harms Bill, for instance, critics complain that it would mean the 
“state regulation of the speech of millions of British citizens.” 
 
Similar concern has been raised over a new law introduced in Singapore intended to protect 
citizens from fake news. The way the law is worded, say critics, will give the government of 
Singapore the power to decide what qualifies as true or false, and so become a  censorship 
tool.157  
 
156 The BBC discovered images and videos on social media of the bodies of fighters and civilians being 
desecrated by fighters from the self-styled Libyan National Army, videos that Facebook and YouTube seemed 
unaware were there – despite reported claims that they have developed sophisticated tools to detect and take 
down such content. 
157 As Kirsten Han put it in commenting on the new law in Singapore in The Nation, “For a ruling party that 
already dominates the mainstream media and has the power to set the national agenda, such a law is a handy 
weapon to add to the government’s arsenal of methods to suppress speech. It would allow PAP ministers to 
become the arbiters of truth in the first and second instance. The implications for freedom of expression, press 
freedom and even academic freedom were clear.” 
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Moreover, they say, the Singapore Bill could infringe academic freedom, censoring not just 
fake news and illegal content but research papers and the journals they are published in too. 
As economist Linda Lim puts it, “It’s not just a problem for academics but also for any 
platform that hosts their work. It could be just one sentence in a book or an entire article in an 
academic journal that they object to, and the entire thing would have to be taken down.”158  
 
There are also concerns that legislation intended to protect the privacy of online users will 
have similar negative effects. In 2018, for instance, the EU introduced the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in order to protect personal data. One immediate consequence 
of the GDPR was that many mainstream news sites became unavailable in Europe, including 
the web sites of widely regarded professional newspapers.  
 
This is because where publishers outside Europe choose not to, or are unable to, comply with 
the new law (or have yet to do so) their web sites are blocked to European users. Amongst 
other things, this means that many US newspapers and news web sites are now effectively off 
limits to European users. At the time of writing (some 18 months after the GDPR came into 
effect) around 1,000 such sites were inaccessible in Europe, including those of the Chicago 
Tribune, the eighth-largest newspaper in the United States by circulation. Some parts of the 
web site of the Los Angeles Times (the third-largest circulation among United States 
newspapers) are also blocked.159 
 
The GDPR is also thought likely to have implications for open science. Concerns have been 
expressed, for instance, that it will clash with journal and funder open data policies (as noted 
here). On Twitter, one OA advocate said: “data protection laws now also intersect in wildly 
unpredictable ways with open data. It can be illegal to do open science under data protection 
laws.”  
 
Copyright laws also inevitably have unintended consequences. The recently introduced EU 
Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market is expected to see a lot of content 
blocked, both material that is infringing but also perfectly legitimate content.  
 
The most controversial part of the EU Copyright Directive is Article 13, which requires 
online platforms to police content uploaded to them. To do that they will need to use content-
blocking technology. This, says the Internet Society, is “generally inefficient, often 
ineffective, and prone to cause unintended collateral damages to Internet users.”  Making the 
same point, the Electronic Frontier Foundation demonstrated that the Mueller Report into 
 
158 As reported here: “The bill also allows ministers to order internet service providers to block access to 
content in Singapore that the country deems false. Academics fear that international academic journals will 
issue corrections to prevent their content being blocked in Singapore and it could also make foreign scholars 
more reluctant to collaborate with Singaporeans … scholars fear that the bill could be used to censor academic 
papers across the world and university teaching materials both at institutions in Singapore and at foreign 
universities with links to the country, unless the wording of the legislation is amended to include a specific 
protection for academics.” See also here. 
159 As noted, the purpose of the GDPR is to protect data and presumably could help in the struggle with 
surveillance capitalism. However, POLITICO fears that the European regulator (in Ireland) may not be able 
and/or willing to police the legislation effectively.  
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President Trump and his presidential campaign was being blocking by copyright bots.160  
Again, there are fears that it could also impact on the research community. (See also here).161 
 
In short, balancing openness with information integrity, user privacy and intellectual property 
rights is far from easy and legislative attempts to block and filter content often introduce new 
harms. As World Politics Review has noted, the EU Copyright Directive, the implementation 
in Australia of a new law162 to police certain content on social media following the mass 
shooting in New Zealand and the UK’s white paper on online harms have “major 
international implications: the importance of adequate checks and balances on these kinds of 
internet policies, in both what content these governments filter and how they do that 
filtering.” 
 
For their part, cyberlibertarians argue that any effort to censor content on the internet is not 
only inappropriate but in vain. Users, they say, can always access blocked content via Tor 
services, proxy servers and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) etc.  
 
But these tools may be out of reach or too expensive for many (as online users in Chad 
discovered when they tried to turn to VPNs) and governments are in any case now seeking to 
control and emasculate them. This year, for instance, Russian authorities introduced a new 
law that requires internet providers to install equipment that will route Russian internet traffic 
through servers based in Russia. This will make it harder to circumvent government 
restrictions. And the government has said that unless 10 of the top providers of VPNs connect 
to its state content-filtering system they will banned from operating in the country. (see also).  
 
There is also a view that in the constant cat and mouse game we have seen being played out 
between those offering circumvention tools and the authorities, the authorities are gaining the 
upper hand in other ways. In June, an article published by KFGO noted: “Ahead of the 
[Tiananmen Square] anniversary, censors at Chinese internet companies say tools to detect 
and block content related to the 1989 crackdown have reached unprecedented levels of 
accuracy, aided by machine learning and voice and image recognition.” 
 
What is indisputable is that the openness of the Web has opened a Pandora’s Box. Today 
most people still want content to be freely available but they realise that a free-flowing 
uncensored network where users can operate anonymously has created all sorts of problems, 
including a tide of hate, pornography, child grooming, cyberstalking, fake news,163 scam ad 
campaigns, conspiracy theories, cybercrime, cyberattacks etc. etc. 
 
Today, much of what is now available online is of unknown provenance, uncertain 
truthfulness (and for vulnerable or naïve users) downright dangerous. People want this kind 
of content censored and/or removed. But two important questions arise: Can it be done 
effectively? Who decides what is acceptable? 
 
 
160 See also here.  
161 Although the Directive has been welcomed by some academic librarians, while elsewhere the European 
University Association sees both good and bad in the legislation.  
162 As the NYT put it on 3rd April 2019, “Australia passed sweeping legislation Thursday that threatens huge 
fines for social media companies and jail for their executives if they fail to rapidly remove “abhorrent violent 
material” from their platforms.” 
163 And now “deepfake”. 
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Importantly, much of this noxious content and activity traverses national borders.164 The CEO 
of the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) reports that cyber-attacks from Russia, 
China, Iran and North Korea pose “strategic national security threats to the UK”.  
 
What is surely certain is that legislation is no silver bullet and, as always with the internet, the 
issues are both complex and controversial.  
 
Some may say that these issues have minimal or no relevance to open access, others will say 
they do. Lim, for instance, worries that Singapore’s plans to filter and censor content could 
see research papers blocked, either accidentally or as an act of censorship. We could also note 
that the second most targeted sector for cyber threats is academia. The threat to universities, 
says the latest report from the NCSC, comes from nation states looking to steal sensitive 
research, research data, intellectual property and other assets, for strategic advantage. 
 
There is also the thorny issue of Sci-Hub to consider. Sci-Hub is a huge illicit database of 60 
million stolen research papers made freely available on the internet by computer programmer 
Alexandra Elbakyan. 
 
OA advocates are conflicted over Sci-Hub. Many are inclined to applaud Elbakyan’s 
activities – on the grounds that it is helping to persuade publishers to embrace open access. 
But is supporting an illegal service really good publicity for OA?  
 
The larger issue is that legislation like the EU Copyright Directive seems unlikely to solve 
the problem with Sci-Hub since the service operates out of Kazakhstan. For this reason, legal 
attempts to close the service have to date failed. This failure, and the problems of blocking 
content, could fuel calls for more drastic action – and this could certainly have implications 
for the research community, which I will discuss in the next section. 
 
My point is that if the legal remedies currently being introduced by governments fail to be 
effective, we can expect more drastic measures to be taken. Some predict that this will 
eventually lead to the breakup of the internet. If that were to happen, BOAI’s hopes of open 
access laying the foundation “for uniting humanity in a common intellectual conversation and 
quest for knowledge” will begin to seem decidedly moot. 
 
Splinternet? 
 
This brings us to what could prove the greatest threat for open access today – the possibility 
that the infrastructure on which its very logic depends could fracture and be balkanised.  
 
The possibility of this was raised in a 2018 Fast Company article entitled ‘splinternet’. As the 
article puts it, “Rising protectionism, nationalism, and security fears could see an internet 
sequestered by national borders.”  
 
How likely is it that the internet could break up? I cannot say, but currently the signs are not 
encouraging. In a separate article called the World Walled Web Engineering and Technology 
(E&T) magazine165 noted: “In just two decades the internet has gone from being a symbol of 
 
164 The New York Times reports that while some ransomware attacks on US cities come from within the 
country, many come from Eastern Europe and Iran. 
165 E&T is the Institution of Engineering and Technology’s monthly magazine. 
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‘no borders’ utopianism to a place where nationalist-inspired ‘cyber-space sovereignty’ is 
being robustly asserted by countries keen to cordon themselves off from the rest of the world 
– and the trend is unlikely to peter out any time soon.” 
 
For the research community this raises the possibility that paywalls could be pulled down 
only to be replaced by national/regional firewalls. 
 
As Fast Company points out, countries and groups of countries are already creating separate 
networks able to operate independently of the internet. “In 2013, Brazil, India, and South 
Africa joined Russia and China in constructing a completely separate telecommunications 
system cut off from the global internet’s infrastructure,” it reported. Known as the BRICS 
Cable, this is intended to “connect the five countries with each other by a 34,000-kilometre 
long underwater fibre optic cable”.  The goal of the group, says Fast Company, is to 
“construct its own independent internet between the countries involved.”166 
 
In a separate initiative, China and Chile are building an underwater fibre optic cable between 
the two countries. Explains China Daily, “It would be the first underwater fibre optic cable to 
directly connect Asia with Latin America and would help drive interconnectivity, trade, 
investment, as well as scientific and cultural exchanges between two continents.”  
 
In other words, as the geopolitical environment becomes increasingly fissiparous, we could 
see the internet start to break up. As noted earlier, many governments are now filtering more 
and more content and a growing number of countries have begun to permanently censor parts 
of the network. This is most evident today in authoritarian states with, for example, China’s 
Great Firewall (GFW), Iran’s halal net, North Korea’s Kwangmyong, and Cuba’s RedCuba. 
 
We are also seeing more countries blocking specific web services – sometimes on a 
temporary basis (usually during times of social unrest, which is becoming more common), 
and sometimes on a semi-permanent basis. In Turkey, Wikipedia has been blocked for the 
past two years, leading Wikipedia to request the European Court of Human Rights to demand 
that the block is lifted.167  
 
While it will sometimes be a specific service (e.g. Twitter and Facebook) that is blocked, at 
other times the entire internet is being cut off. In April it was reported that Chad had been 
without internet access for over a year. This year Sudan, Zimbabwe, Benin, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo have all faced a shutdown for various reasons.168 Some of the 
implications of this for citizens are outlined in this article about Sudan.169 
 
Likewise, when India recently revoked Kashmir’s special status the first action of the Indian 
government was to shut down mobile networks, internet, broadband, and landlines.170 For a 
sense of the impact this had on the research community in the region see this article.  
 
 
166 Current plans are that a number of other South American countries might also join. 
167 See the Turkish civil society Declaration on the state of the internet here.  
168 See the Internet Without Borders web site for more information.  
169 According to the  pilot African Open Science Platform landscape study,20 African governments applied 
some form of Internet censorship 45 times since 2001, of which 36 times the shutdowns related to anti-
government related protests. The study also found internet access impacted by power cuts, failure to 
appreciate the benefit of NRENs and that many journals are still only available in print form. 
170 See also here. 
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In this context we should also note that half the world is still not online.   
 
In short, suspension and/or cutting off of the internet (or parts of it) is becoming routine in a 
growing number of countries, often as an attempt by the government to quell or prevent civil 
unrest or discussion. The Internet Society reports that in 2018 freedom on the global internet 
declined for the eighth straight year, with a group of countries moving toward what it calls 
“digital authoritarianism”. Elsewhere, Freedom House reports that about 47 percent of 
Internet users now live in countries where access to social media or messaging platforms has 
been temporarily or permanently blocked. 
 
And while many of these shutdowns are temporary, the duration is getting longer. The end 
point for some countries may be permanent loss of the internet, to be replaced by a national 
or regional intranet. Recently, Iran’s Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution announced 
that the country’s national information network (Iran’s intranet) is now 80 per cent complete, 
and that it has conducted 142 successful tests to “weigh the independence of Iran’s national 
intranet network, against a possible internet disconnection.” And this last weekend Iran 
organised a near-total internet and mobile data blackout following civil unrest. While this is 
still not a simple process for countries with many network connections, this Wired article 
explains how governments are becoming more and more adept at doing so. 
 
In February there were reports that Russia was planning to temporarily disconnect the 
country from the internet. Subsequently (early May), Russian President Vladimir Putin 
signed into law new measures that would enable the creation of a national network able to 
operate separately from the rest of the world. As CNN put it, “Russia is one step closer to 
creating its own, independent internet – at least legally speaking.” 
 
But it would be wrong to imply that it is only authoritarian states that are toying with the idea 
of creating a separate national or regional intranet. When the German chancellor Angela 
Merkel discovered that US spies had tapped her personal BlackBerry her first reaction was to 
call for the European Union to create its own regional internet tied to the political bloc.171 
This, explained Fast Company, was envisaged as being “separate and completely walled off 
from the world wide web”.  
 
And during the 2015 presidential campaign Trump suggested that in order to counter the 
online activities of extremist groups like ISIS, US technology leaders should be consulted 
with a view to “closing that Internet up in some way.”172 Trump’s suggestion was derided as 
naïve and silly. In fact, at the time, Hilary Clinton was making a not so dissimilar 
suggestion.173  
 
In other words, a growing list of countries are beginning to explore the possibility of boxing 
off parts of the internet or “closing that internet up in some way”. Concern about terrorism, 
cyberattacks, cyberespionage and  other illegal and/or malign online activity is feeding this 
 
171 See also this and this.  
172 See also here. 
173 Compare this with what President Bill Clinton said in 2000: “Now there’s no question China has been trying 
to crack down on the internet,” Clinton said, his eyebrows arched as he neared the punchline. “Good luck! 
That’s sort of like trying to nail jello to the wall.” CNN quotes this and says, “In the decades since that speech, 
Clinton’s jello comment has become a something of a dark joke among internet freedom advocates as China 
continued to build up the Great Firewall.” 
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idea and it seems entirely possible that at some point we will see national or regional 
networks being disconnected from the internet. 
 
Cyberattacks and terrorism aside, authoritarian governments clearly want to control 
dissidence and prevent their citizens from accessing or publishing content online that the 
regime does not like (not least criticism of it) and to limit their ability to collaborate, both 
internally but also externally with critics of the regime.  
 
We have, however, to be open to the idea that governments who choose to censor the internet 
may be doing so because they want to defend their country’s distinctive cultural, ideological 
and religious differences, as much as to control citizens’ speech or filter out dissent. It may 
simply reflect a desire to prevent “contamination” by foreign cultures and values.174  
 
Indeed, it is possible that the majority of citizens of some countries do not actually want 
culturally offensive, criminal in intent, or dangerous in design content to flow freely through 
their part of the network. As noted earlier the world is still heterogeneous and cultural and 
national sensibilities vary between countries, regions and ethnic and religious groups, many 
of whom will have very different views on what is acceptable.  
 
As such, moves to block content and services on the internet, or completely disconnect from 
it, may simply reflect a national rejection of the hegemonic nature of a global network still to 
a great extent controlled and dominated by the US – a rejection, that is, of the internet’s 
powerful homogenising effect. That alone could prove sufficient to fracture the internet, 
particularly if current legislative attempts to block and filter content and services are deemed 
inadequate. 
 
What is clear is that many countries have come to resent both the technical and cultural 
dominance the US continues to have over the internet and social media. As Fast Company 
points out, many countries do not want to have to rely on a Web “predominantly built on 
technology and infrastructure made by US companies and controlled by US tech giants – in 
other words, an internet that exports American influence and soft power around the world.”  
 
It was partly for this reason that some countries developed their own non-Western social 
media platforms – e.g. China’s Sina Weibo and Baidu, and Russia’s VK service.  
 
It was the emergence of social media that really brought home to the world the homogenising 
nature and hegemonic effect of the internet – with monoculturalism an unspoken assumption 
of those who created and continue to manage the internet and primary social media platforms. 
 
Social media is perhaps the best example of the problem here. These platforms were by and 
large created by a small group of young and unrepresentative – mainly US-based – 
entrepreneurs who have proved happy to exploit their users in an irresponsible and 
unrepentant way in order to enrich themselves. Indeed, even in the US there are now 
concerns about the negative consequences of the social and cultural bias of social media. As 
the New Yorker put it when discussing the development of Twitter, “Since the 2016 election, 
it has grown increasingly clear that allowing young, mostly male technologists to build 
 
174  Iran’s prosecutor-general has compared the internet to a “slaughterhouse” and said that “Blasphemy, anti-
national security teachings, and destroying the identity of the youth are among issues we face in cyberspace.” 
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largely unregulated, proprietary, international networks might have been a large-scale, high-
stakes error in judgment.”175 The issue today, of course, is how and whether one can row 
back from that error. 
 
Also relevant here is that all the major social media services are built on proprietary 
platforms laid over the open infrastructure of the internet. As such, their rise has come at the 
expense of openness. The internet was created using open transparent standards and software 
and data that is portable, extensible and interoperable. Social media platforms have turned 
much of the Web into a series of proprietary platforms. As Wired put it in 2010, “Today the 
Internet hosts countless closed gardens; in a sense, the Web is an exception, not the rule.”  
 
We can see the same process taking place in the scholarly communication space as a result of 
the “rise of the platforms” (of which more later). 
 
Be that as it may, as cultural beliefs, traditions and political differences come into conflict the 
temptation to hit the internet off switch can only grow, and it seems entirely possible that the 
network will end up balkanised. Reporting on recent developments in Russia, 
SecurityInfoWatch said, “Russia’s attempt to create a network separate from the rest of the 
world is unprecedented.”  
 
One of the most likely reasons for a splinternet is that the internet has turned out to be one of 
the most effective tools for spying and surveillance. And the extent to which this has been 
happening became evident in 2013, when Edward Snowden revealed the way in which the 
US176 was surveilling not just hostile states, but its allies (including individual politicians) as 
well as its own citizens. 
 
I don’t know whether Merkel’s proposal for a separate European internet has been 
progressed, but to discover that an ally and supposed friendly state is spying on you is a very 
good reason to consider – as Trump puts it – “closing that internet up in some way.” 
 
Interestingly, in November Merkel called on the EU to assert “digital sovereignty” by 
developing its own platform for managing data, rather than rely on US-based cloud services 
run by Amazon, Microsoft and Google. The FT commented, “Her speech, at an employers’ 
conference in Berlin, shows the extent to which the information economy is emerging as a 
battleground in the EU-US trading relationship.”  
 
Another compelling reason for countries to seek cyber sovereignty is concern about law and 
order. Speaking to E&T in 2018, security researcher Lee Munson suggested that, for better or 
worse, Western countries will likely start to mimic some aspects of digital authoritarianism, 
including creating national cyber boundaries. The aim, he added, would be “to ensure their 
local laws can be effectively enforced and citizens protected.” 
 
Unsurprisingly, law enforcement agencies are sympathetic to this idea. Speaking to E&T in 
2017, UK Chief Constable Michael Barton argued that it is time for democratic nation states 
to think about “reasserting sovereignty” over the internet within their territories. “I think the 
 
175 Of Facebook, Zuboff points out that the founders were themselves adolescents and emerging adults. “They 
designed practices from an imagined universe of adolescent users and college students, and those practices 
were later institutionalised for the rest of us, reducing the world to a tally of ‘friends’ who are not friends and 
‘likes’ that provide a continuous ticker of tape of one’s value on the social market.” 
176 And the UK of course. 
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concept of the World Wide Web without frontiers needs to be challenged,” he said, “it is 
perfectly possible for nation states to reassert their sovereignty. One of the biggest problems 
police forces have when investigating the internet is its international nature.” 
 
In short, geopolitical issues aside, governments of all stripes are warming to the idea of 
building walls around their section of the network. Speaking to the Financial Times earlier 
this year, Michael Posner, professor of ethics and finance at NYU’s Stern School of Business 
(and former Obama administration official) said that given the way the internet has developed 
he expects we will see “each government deciding what is illegitimate or not. And you end 
up with what Iranians have called the ‘halal internet’ – where [each country] decides what is 
kosher or not.” 
 
Of course, blocking content and services is one thing, creating a separate network is another 
but, like trade wars, internet balkanisation would probably be an infectious process. Either 
way, the signs of cyber walls going up (and calls for them to be erected) are there for all to 
see. The day of the digital Iron Curtain may be approaching.  
 
As populism grows and trade wars escalate and as countries begin to seek cyber sovereignty, 
we are driven back to Hook’s suggestion that international collaboration and open access are 
co-dependent. While Hook provided evidence that both have grown in recent years, he was 
looking through the rear-view window. Looking through the windscreen the situation looks 
far less upbeat. Indeed, as one commentator has put it, “free exchange and mobility in higher 
education and science now face an existential threat.” 
 
One problem for the research community is that OA advocates and scholarly publishers are 
currently so distracted by the details of open access (who should pay APCs? How much 
should they pay? Should APCs rather be abandoned? Is a PAR better than a RAP? What 
licensing should be used for OA papers etc. etc.?) that they seem to be oblivious to the 
shifting political sands on which they are building their hopes for an open access future.177 
The geopolitical forces at play today seem more likely to see international collaboration fall 
rather than grow. Yet so far as I can see, no one in the OA movement is giving much thought 
to this possibility, or to the likelihood that the internet could fracture.  
 
The fact is that the internet is the product of a different age and a specific culture, as is the 
BOAI. Given today’s rising international tensions, the increased resistance to US dominance 
of the internet, and a growing desire for cyber sovereignty is it not silly to assume that the 
internet of tomorrow will be the internet of yesterday, or even the internet of today.  
 
Overstating the situation? 
 
Doubtless there are those who would still assert, with Friedman, that the combined forces of 
globalisation and the web are acting “like nutcrackers to open societies”. But the evidence 
does not support this. Not only are countries failing to become open societies, but  we have 
seen a growth in authoritarianism and what the Internet Society calls “digital 
authoritarianism.” A splinternet might seem a possible next step. 
 
 
177 When someone asked on the Scholcomm mailing how universities are responding to the Droegemeier letter 
a couple of librarians posted some links, but no one addressed the larger issues the letter raises. 
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There are, however, sceptics who maintain that a splinternet is unlikely. While conceding that 
we could see regional webs emerge, Rajneesh Narula of the Henley Business School, 
suggested to Fast Company that any talk of a splinternet overstates the situation. As he put it. 
“Economics always wins over nationalism.” 
 
On the other hand, one could argue that the isolationism enabled by the Chinese GFW has 
been economically beneficial to the country. After all, the Chinese network is to a great 
extent a cut off from the rest of the world. As the Washington Post points out, “With nearly 
one quarter of the global internet population (700 million users), the internet behind the GFW 
can be considered a ‘parallel universe’ to the Internet that exists outside.”  
 
Or as the New York Times puts it. “Today, the Chinese internet at first glance doesn’t look 
much like the one the rest of the world uses. It has different platforms, ideals and business 
strategies, all tended carefully by censors.”  
 
Thus, while the GFW may not be a completely separate network today its partial 
disconnectedness is a deliberate part of China’s economic policy. The GFW is not just a 
censorship tool,178 it is also a component of what the US refers to as China’s “predatory trade 
practices”. It has helped China limit and control foreign competition as it builds up its own 
technology companies. It has enabled China to hot house its own companies in a protected 
environment.  
 
As Wikipedia puts it, “The Great Firewall is a form of trade protectionism that has allowed 
China to grow its own internet giants. 179 Or as the FT puts it, the GFW is “the world’s 
biggest non-tariff trade barrier.” 
 
The NYT goes on to argue, however, that GFW has mostly been one-sided. “American chips 
and software power Chinese servers and mainframes. China has been a big revenue driver for 
Apple, Oracle, Intel, Qualcomm and other big names in tech. Much of this was by necessity, 
since China couldn’t make all this stuff itself, but it still gave American companies a role in 
the direction of the Chinese digital future.” 
 
But is not this one-sidedness sound strategy? After all, it has allowed China to use and learn 
from US technology while creating its own. The US complains that this has been based on 
predatory trade practices, and intellectual property theft. But the US has been happy to use 
cheap Chinese labour to assemble it tech gadgets, not least the iPhone. If this has helped 
China benefit from technology transfer it is a price that the US has apparently agreed to pay. 
 
The American Interest refers to this as China’s “Attract, Access, Adapt” policy. In addition, it 
says, China has been able to benefit from structural changes in the global economy, including 
the fragmentation of global supply chains.  
 
The next stage of China’s strategy became apparent in 2015, when it launched its Made in 
China 2025 initiative. The aim is to make the country more self-sufficient by increasing 
Chinese-domestic content of core materials – to 40 percent by 2020 and 70 percent by 2025. 
 
178 John Lanchester has also described the GFW as considerably more than a blocking and filtering too. And he 
has said it is more than just a separate network. 
179 E.g. Tencent, Alibaba, and Baidu. China has its own version of many foreign web properties, for example: 
Tencent Video (YouTube), Tencent Weibo (Twitter), Qzone (Facebook), WeChat (WhatsApp), Ctrip (Orbitz and 
others), Zhihu (Quora). 
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And the focus is on high-tech fields, including the automotive and aerospace industries, and 
semiconductors, IT and robotics. 
 
In other words, China first set out to learn from foreign technology companies in order to 
build its own industries. Now it is moving up the value chain and competing directly with the 
United States and the rest of the world. The aim today presumably is to become a global 
technology leader. And companies like Huawei would seem to demonstrate the success of 
this strategy.  
 
We might also want to challenge the claim that a splinternet is unlikely because any country 
disconnecting from the internet would pay a heavy economic price from another perspective. 
Even if it is true, it overlooks the fact that in populist eras a desire for independence, self-
determination and self-assertiveness can take precedence over simple economic calculations 
– as the whole Brexit drama surely demonstrates.  
 
In the case of the US, amour proper clearly also comes into play in the trade wars it has 
embarked on. While most (if not all) economists argue that trade wars hurt both sides, 
America is not only seeking to rebalance trade but to maintain its dominant position in a 
world that now contains a hugely successful and assertive China. US pride is at stake and 
Trump’s actions are intended to flex US muscles to assert itself more powerfully on the world 
stage. 
 
Understating the situation? 
 
As I have said, this text is speculative. We cannot know where we are headed. Nevertheless, I 
believe OA advocates ought to be spend more time thinking about possible futures and with a 
broader perspective than who is going to pay APCs – something they have been very bad at 
doing to date.  
 
In fact, some believe that current speculation about a splinternet downplays rather than 
overstates the situation. This at least would seem to be the view of Dame Wendy Hall.180 
Writing on the blog of the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Hall 
argues that the term splinternet “understates the divisions” that the internet faces since it is 
already splitting. “Viewed through a geopolitical lens, the monolithic, unchanging internet 
dissolves into at least four,” she says. 
 
Citing a paper she co-authored last year, Hall describes these four different internets in this 
way: First, she says, there is, “what we call the ‘open internet’ of Silicon Valley”, which 
welcomes decentralisation and the openness and freedom it allows. 
 
Second, there is the regulated “bourgeois internet” we see emerging in Europe. Third, is the 
“commercial internet” which, says Hall, is “supported particularly by Donald Trump’s 
administration and other Washington policymakers”, who prize the innovation facilitated by 
data collection and oligopoly but resist the West Coast vision. 
 
 
180 Hall is Director of the Web Sciences Institute and Professor of Computer Science at Southampton 
University. We could note that the University of Southampton was instrumental in the development of open 
access, and both OA advocate Stevan Harnad and Tim Berners-Lee are associated with the University’s 
computer science department. 
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Finally, she says, there is the “authoritarian internet” championed by Beijing. This, says Hall, 
uses the technology of the internet not so much to encourage innovation and freedom but to 
“monitor and influence social interaction to address security, social cohesion, health and 
wellbeing, transport or climate change”.  
 
Hall makes the key point that these internets are now pulling against one another in a way 
that could “see the internet’s essential openness threatened.” For instance, she says, the 
internet consists of a delicate network of systems, protocols, standards, hardware and 
organisations. As national, cultural and political forces pull in different directions, she says, 
we could see the internet start to fracture at the technical level. At some point, therefore, the 
component parts and standards of the internet could cease to be interoperable.  
 
Indeed, the seeds of such a split are evident in the row over Huawei and 5G. US attempts to 
ban Huawei, suggests the FT, could lead to a fracturing of global standards and thus a 
bifurcated market, “much as China’s great firewall has created a ‘splinternet’ of what was 
conceived of as borderless cyber space.”  
 
Such a possibility is more likely given that China is seeking to subvert not just the 
international rules-based system and attitudes to human rights, but also global technical 
standards. The latter is the focus of the China Standards 2035 project, which includes 
attempts to set the standards for 5G, and to develop standards for things like UVH and AI. If 
successful in this, China would not only be less reliant on foreign technology but could hope 
to write/rewrite international standards to suits its needs. 
 
Hall stresses that in defining the different internets she sees her aim is to be descriptive not to 
judge. “This is not an anti-Chinese argument. Beijing is entitled to regulate as it sees fit, and 
all governments find the authoritarian internet attractive to some extent.”  
 
That’s a fair point. We are, however, bound to wonder what the likely consequences would 
be if China succeeded in imposing its view of the world on other countries, both in terms of 
human rights and technology. As noted, China is currently building a frightening surveillance 
society and exporting the technology to do it to other countries so that they can do the same 
to their people.181 Last year, for instance, it was reported by the US Council on Foreign 
Relations that China is providing the Zimbabwean government with facial recognition 
software. This, notes the CFR, is being presented by Beijing as a case of ‘win-win’ 
diplomacy. “Chinese AI companies get to train their algorithms on Africans to diversify their 
datasets and Zimbabwe gets to use cutting edge tech to monitor its population. Similar deals 
have been signed in Angola and Ethiopia.” 
 
Chinese citizens face an extreme degree of monitoring and social control today and this looks 
set only to increase in intensity as its social credit system (a national reputation system based 
on mass surveillance) is rolled out. Police are already using real-time facial recognition 
technology to identify and shame jaywalkers. This is expected to be extended to include 
sending instant fines by text.182 And even the scantiest knowledge of the way in which the 
Uighurs are being treated in China should give us all pause for thought. 
 
181 And Huawei seems to be part of this process too. 
182 Of direct relevance to the scientific community, China is seeking to address research misconduct by linking 
it to the social credit system. As this article puts it, “academic misconduct could be punished by a 
comprehensive list of penalties, resulting in a kind of accountability system that has never been seen before all 
over the world 
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The extent to which China can succeed in imposing either its view of the world or its 
standards on everyone else remains unclear. It could, however, see international standards 
start to fracture, not least because the US (and doubtless most in the West) are determined to 
resist Chinese ambitions here, citing amongst other things security issues. It seems we may be 
looking at an emerging standards war and a splinternet might seem all the more likely as a 
result. 
 
If it were to occur, a splinternet would doubtless be a gradual process. Today governments 
are focused on blocking unwelcome or illegal content. If current attempts prove inadequate, 
we will surely see more draconian laws introduced. In Egypt the government recently passed 
the Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law. This not only allows the authorities 
to block websites considered “a threat to national security” or the “national economy” but 
individuals who visit these websites can face steep fines and penalties. This suggests that the 
law will target not just the owners of banned websites but those who visit then.183 
 
Such drastic action may not be palatable for countries in the West. But this could make a 
splinternet more likely, on the grounds that it could be presented as a less oppressive 
approach. As such, authoritarian and democratic countries could end up in the same place. In 
other words, if attempts to tame the Web with legal remedies prove inadequate governments 
may conclude that the only solution is to disconnect from the global internet in some way. 
Another possibility is that we could see a series of tit-for-tat responses as governments deny 
other countries (or foreign-based services) access to their part of the network, before 
eventually de-coupling all together.  
 
A further possibility is that new trade deals could be negotiated in which access to a country’s 
section of the internet and its citizens is offered as part of the package. As Fast Company puts 
it, we could see “the formation of digital access pacts, essentially trade deals granting one 
country access to another country’s national intranet and its users”. Perhaps the recent Digital 
Trade Agreement between the US and Japan is moving the world in this direction.184 
However, some countries – e.g. China and India – have said they are not willing to engage in 
these kinds of arrangements, preferring “data localisation”.  
 
So, where does this leave the OA movement? The assumption of BOAI was that the internet 
would not, and could not, be undone, and that there would always be a seamless uncensored 
global network that anyone could access. As such, the belief was that anyone would be able 
to make their research papers and data available on the network in the knowledge that these 
would be freely accessible to anyone in the world with an internet connection. And it was 
assumed that this openness and the sharing and collaboration it enables would grow 
exponentially as the world wired up and OA went mainstream.  
 
Above all, it was argued that one of the main beneficiaries of open access would be 
researchers in the Global South. OA advocates still maintain this. Writing in PNAS cOAlition 
S members asserted: “As research funders, we are dedicated to serving the research 
 
183 On an open access mailing list recently, an Egyptian citizen posted a message critical of the Egyptian 
government. Shortly after, the poster asked for the message to be taken down on the grounds that it could 
lead to a prosecution for the political opinions expressed it. 
184 Amongst other things, the agreement prohibits “data localisation measures that restrict where data can be 
stored and processed.” I.e. sign this and you allow our companies to export the data they collect on your 
citizens. 
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community, but we are equally committed to ensuring that the access to outputs from the 
research that we fund is made open, globally, and without delay, so as to benefit humanity at 
large.”  
 
Co-chair of the Plan S Implementation Task Force David Sweeney went further, saying that 
the aim of Plan S is to ensure that “the developing nations who may struggle at the moment to 
pay subscriptions will have this material to read freely.” 
 
These statements assume that the internet will remain a global open platform of course. They 
also skate over the issue of how researchers in developing nations can afford to make their 
own research available if the world shifts to pay-to-publish, which seems the inevitable 
outcome of Plan S. What will have been gained if paywalls are replaced by publication walls? 
Does this arrangement not assume that all researchers in the Global South need is access to 
research produced in the North, not the ability to share their own research in international 
journals?  
 
Moreover, in light of a recent comment from the European Commission’s open access envoy 
Jean-Claude Burgelman we are bound to question European claims that it wants to make 
research available to developing nations. Those countries unwilling to introduce OA policies 
like Plan S, Burgelman suggested, could be prohibited from accessing the content of those 
countries who have done so (notably Europe). This would be achieved courtesy of a solution 
that the THE described as geo-specific access models185 (or as Lisa Hinchliffe dubbed it 
“geowalling”).186 In other words, those unwilling to follow Europe’s OA lead will be blocked 
from freely accessing European research.187 This is surely a splinternet by any other name, 
and completely at odds with the BOAI vision. What benefit can open access offer the Global 
South if paywalls are replaced by national firewalls/geowalls? 
 
However, there are other threats to the open access movement that I think we need to 
consider. 
 
What then of open access? 
 
Having explored the current geopolitical environment (as I see it) I want to focus in on the 
current situation with regard to open access, notably initiatives like Plan S and OA2020188 189 
and the current fad for “transformative agreements”. The latter are also referred to as Read 
and Publish (RAP) or Publish and Read (PAR) agreements (I shall henceforth refer to them 
collectively as PARs).190 Plan S is mainly being driven by governments and their funding 
 
185 Burgelman made a similar comment about the European Science Cloud in 2018.  
186 Hinchliffe also points out that geowalling would make a nonsense of the Plan S requirements regarding 
both CC BY and hybrid OA.  
187 This idea was initially proposed in a UK HEPI Occasional Paper in 2015, and proposed again by Elsevier in 
2017. Ironically, it was initially proposed as an April Fool’s joke on The Scholarly Kitchen in 2012. How long 
before it becomes reality? 
188 OA2020 is focused on “flipping” the world’s subscription journals to open access, an objective that would 
surely lead to a predominantly pay-to-publish environment.  
189 cOAlition S and OA2020 have issued a joint statement with a view to negotiating “transformative 
agreements” for a transition to open access.  
190 I shall use the term PAR in this document to cover all three types, on the grounds that the emphasis and 
end goal is one in which the default is for authors to be able to publish OA. RAPs and transformative 
agreements are meant to be a waystation on the route. See the primer here.  
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agencies, with the aim of forcing researchers to embrace open access. OA2020 is an initiative 
of the German Max Planck Society with the aim of forcing legacy publishers to flip their 
journals to OA. PARs meanwhile are being driven primarily by libraries and library 
consortia, also with the aim of achieving a global flip. Since Plan S looks likely to be 
implemented primarily by means of transformative agreements, the end point for all three 
will be the same. 
 
Transformative agreements are viewed as a vehicle for transitioning the world from the 
traditional subscription model (in which institutions pay to read research papers), to an OA 
model (in which institutions pay fees to publish research papers). Since publishers have over 
the years acquired huge amounts of paywalled content PARS provide both access to the 
publisher’s paywalled content plus publishing rights for authors. Such broad-brush 
explanations, however, obscure the fact that there are no officially agreed definitions here yet 
and each deal is different. For the moment, therefore, they are controversial, complex and 
hugely time-consuming to negotiate – as the standoff between UC and Elsevier indicates.191 
In fact, PARs  may not scale as currently conceived, because publishers will not want to 
negotiate bespoke deals for every institution or consortium. Rather, they will likely start 
offering institutions pro forma contracts. The key point, however, is that (as things stand) 
Plan S, OA2020, PARs are all taking us to the same end point: a world of universal pay-to-
play publishing. 
 
True, cOAlition S and OA2020 pay lip service to alternative OA models, but the aggressive 
timescale they have set (2021) and the strict Principles and Implementation Guidelines they 
insist on, will, for all practical purposes, surely mean that pay-to-play OA becomes the 
norm.192 One irony here is that the very publishers that open access advocates have for so 
long vilified will be embedded in the new regime, and in such a way that they will be able to 
continue charging a level of fees for their services that librarians have long maintained are 
unsustainable.193  
 
The push for PARs assumes that all nations are equally willing and/or able to negotiate them, 
and that everyone is willing to move to a pay to publish system. It also assumes that small 
publishers and societies are equally able to negotiate PARs.194 In short, there is an assumption 
that a balance of power, wealth, values, priorities and objectives exists between nations and 
between publishers. This assumption is surely wrong and divisive. PARs are in effect seeking 
to force homogeneity on a heterogeneous world. 
 
As noted, for those in the Global South it will mean that today’s paywalls will be replaced by 
tomorrow’s publication walls, leaving many unable to publish in international journals (of 
which more later).195 
 
191 See video here for more information. 
192 As  Eduardo Aguado López and Arianna Becerril García put it, “Plan S has stated that it is not focused on 
delivering only one business model for scholarly communication. However, Article Processing Charges have 
been the only model clearly identified for financing.” 
193 These agreements will likely morph into open access Big Deals, where institutions and consortia pay APCs in 
bulk.  
194 Information Power has produced a Report and Toolkit designed to enable them to engage in PARs. Time will 
tell if this is realistic. 
195 OA advocates argue that this problem can be avoided by means of APC waivers. But leaving aside the 
haphazard and inequitable way in which these are managed, researchers in the Global South are looking for 
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This leaves me to conclude that the OA movement is likely to splinter at some point. If it 
does, we will surely see the scholarly communication system at large splinter too. 
 
However, the future of scholarly publishing will surely depend to a great extent on what 
China does – not least because it is now the second largest publisher of research papers in the 
world196 and expected soon to overtake the US as the world’s top economy. Doubtless for this 
reason, members of cOAlition S were initially keen to suggest that China was planning to 
sign up to the plan.197 Indeed, it was striking to see the way the coalition was grasping at 
straws when Plan S was launched, and doubly striking to see them shout down those who 
sought to draw attention to the gap between Europe’s and China’s value systems.  
 
Be that as it may, the reality is that (as yet at least) China has not signed up to Plan S and it is 
far from clear that it ever will. True, some Chinese librarians have expressed an interest in 
both Plan S and OA2020, but these are librarians not the Chinese government, or a 
government funder. When one of those librarians was asked if China was going to sign up, he 
replied, somewhat gnomically, “Whether or not you sign up to Plan S is not a test.”   
 
In a subsequent message posted on the GOAL mailing list, the same librarian again expressed 
support for Plan S but again did not confirm that China plans to sign up. What he posted was 
a response from Chinese librarians that asked for a number of changes to Plan S – changes 
related to licensing198 and to the use of ORCIDs for instance. 
 
Disappointment at China’s failure to sign up has doubtless been that much greater for the 
coalition in light of the reluctance of the US to date to do so. When asked about Plan S the 
director of the US Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) Kelvin Droegemeier 
indicated that, quite apart from anything else, the implications Plan S has for academic 
freedom are unacceptable to the US.199 “One of the things this government will not do is to 
tell researchers where they have to publish their papers,” Droegemeier said. “That is 
absolutely up to the scholar who’s doing the publication. There’s just no question about 
that.”200 201 
 
Reading the Chinese librarians’ text, one is reminded of Bloomberg’s “imbalance of values” 
and tempted to conclude that China’s interest in open access is one-sided; or at least 
confused. What they are clear about is that there is a strong desire for the Chinese research 
community to, as they put it, “have our copyrights back”.  
 
equality, not charity. I have explored this here. It also ignores the fact that other authors are being asked to 
fund every waiver. (see also footnote 216) 
196  Scimago reports a figure of 534,879 papers in 2017. 
197 What was offered was support for European efforts with Plan S, not a commitment to sign up to it. 
198 E.g. “We support that open access publications are made under open licenses. We support the use of the 
CC BY license as the preferred one but recommend that other CC licenses also be allowed as compliant to Plan 
S.” 
199 This is because Plan S aims to ban hybrid OA and so will dictate in which journals researchers can publish. 
200 This goes to the notion of academic freedom, which is valued more highly in the US. Even so, the 
researchers who published an open letter in response to Plan S viewed the plan as a “serious violation of 
academic freedom” in the European context too. This has to some extent been addressed in Plan S’s update 
guidelines, but only partly.  
201 We should note, however, that  the National Cancer Institute (NCI) has said it will require immediate open 
access to the peer-reviewed publications it funds. As has the NIH Heal (Helping to End Addiction Long-term) 
Initiative. But this is envisaged as being achieved by means of green OA rather than gold OA.  
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What China clearly wants is for paywalls to go away, not least because most of its institutions 
cannot, or will not, pay subscriptions. The Chinese librarians reported that the international 
publisher with the largest customer base in China has no more than 500 customers and “most 
of the provincial research academies, and local research parks where enterprises and start-ups 
are concentrated, have no access to international subscription journals such as Nature, 
Science or Cell, even the papers funded by Chinese public investment.” 
 
As the librarians point out, therefore, paywalls seriously limit Chinese scholars’ and 
entrepreneurs’ access to international research. “We used the data from 2016 to have an 
analysis of the possible benefits from open access as demanded by Plan S or OA2020 carried 
out. The first direct benefit will be that those blocked from access, 95% of the whole national 
innovation system, would now have access and the increased R&D and productivity are 
tremendous.”  
 
They added: “The secondary ‘indirect’ benefit would be that, when we have our copyrights 
back and have the XML full-text copies, the capacity for verification, reproducibility, and 
data mining would be enhanced greatly.”  
 
Finally, they said, “The third-level ‘indirect’ benefit would be the opportunities to connect 
the digital entities traditionally buried within the full text to all the intelligent sensing objects, 
objects in IoT (Internet of Things), and smart societies, to help the development of smart 
industries and smart services, with goal of a smart society.” 
 
In other words, access to the world’s research would not only assist China’s research efforts, 
but allow it to mine international research, and thus enhance its ability to become a leader in 
IoT and AI technologies. 
 
But while Chinese librarians are supportive of Plan S’s desire to tear down paywalls it is far 
from clear that the country is willing to contribute financially towards that goal. After all, if 
most Chinese institutions are currently either unable or unwilling to pay subscriptions, why 
would they be willing or able to pay APCs? 
 
That is presumably why China has been far more focused on green OA. It has introduced a 
number of green OA policies mandating its researchers to make their research available in 
online repositories. The same is true of the US, where the 2008 NIH Public Access Policy 
settled on a green OA strategy. From the point of view of the US government, this strategy 
has changed little. Certainly, there has been much less interest in pay-to-publish at a 
government level and thus of Plan S.  
 
The attraction of green OA is that it allows researchers to publish in international journals at 
no cost and then make their research freely available by posting copies to an institutional 
repository.202 We have to ask why Chinese researchers would want to pay to publish these 
papers if they can already make them freely available? True, they would be able to retain 
their copyright if they paid for Gold OA, but at what price? So, while China is keen to see all 
international research made OA it is far from clear why it would want to start paying to 
publish.   
 
 
202 Generally, after an embargo. 
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This seems even less likely if we consider the findings of a briefing paper produced by 
Information Power. This indicates that China would have to pay more than most countries if 
it signed up to Plan S and started to pay APCs. In other words, OA would be a far more 
expensive option for China than the current subscription system. As the authors explain, 
“China gets a good deal on subscriptions which does not reflect its fast-growing proportion of 
global research outputs. For this reason, a change to some form of pay-to-publish system 
might cost China considerably more than it currently pays to read.”203 
 
We must therefore doubt that China is willing to pay APCs in order to make OA a reality. 
Using Cambridge University’s figures – which estimate the average APC at $2,323 per paper 
– and noting that Scimago lists 599,386 papers by Chinese authors for 2018, a world of 
universal OA would seem to imply that China would have to pay some $1,392,373,678 a year 
for pay-to-publish OA.204 This must represent a serious sticking point and is presumably why 
China has not joined cOAlition S. 
 
This draws our attention to the fact that that the OA movement has only recently taken on 
board that for research intensive institutions OA is a more expensive option than the 
subscription system. As a Wiley executive has pointed out, in an author-pays model the 
researcher has to bear the cost both of the production and the publication costs of their 
research. As such, they have to subsidise the cost for consumers (readers). “Not surprisingly, 
this will affect producer-heavy geographical regions differently from consumer-, or reader-, 
heavy ones.” 
 
This is an issue not just at the country level, of course, but at the institutional and library 
consortium level too – a point made by the Executive Director of OhioLINK, Gwen Evans on 
The Scholarly Kitchen. Whether gold OA advantages or disadvantages a university or 
university consortium, she noted, will be based on whether it is a “Publish” or a “Read”205 
university or consortium.  
 
It also suggests that the University of California is being unrealistic (or plain naïve) in 
demanding that Elsevier charge it less for a Read and Publish agreement than it has been 
paying for a subscription Big Deal. The university boasts that it generates nearly 10% of all 
published research in the United States. By rights, therefore, it should expect to pay more 
rather than less in an open access regime.206 207 
 
This truth was conceded in Germany earlier this year when a new Read and Publish deal with 
Springer was announced. Horst Hippler, the spokesman for Projekt Deal negotiating team and 
former president of the German Rectors’ Conference explained, “those research institutes that 
 
203 In fact, the librarians’ comments suggest that China does not subscribe to many journals. 
204 The latest figures from the Wellcome Trust suggest an average of 2,803€, or £2,400. 
205 Here Evans is classifying a Read institution as one that publishes less than the average number of papers 
and a Publish institution as one that publishes more than the average.  
206 UC says it is simply seeking to end “double dipping”. As Jeff MacKie-Mason explained to UC Board of 
Regents’ Academic and Student Affairs Committee in July: “The UC Libraries pay $40M in annual subscriptions 
so that we can read published research. In addition, a small number of UC authors independently pay $10M a 
year for their articles to be published open access.” But this does not obviate the fact that as a research-
intensive institution UC should expect to have to pay more in an OA world, even as it complains that the 
current subscription system is unaffordable. Nor is it clear that UC is funding all the APCs its researchers incur, 
many will presumably be paid by external funders and agencies.  
207 Some funders – e.g. The Gates Foundation – pay APCs direct to publishers of course. But this could present 
a threat to library budgets if the university seeks to recoup some of that funding for other things.  
6 4  O A :  C o u l d  d e f e a t  b e  s n a t c h e d  f r o m  t h e  j a w s  o f  v i c t o r y ?  
 
publish a lot will in the future have to pay more. Those that publish nothing will have to pay 
nothing.” 
 
Interestingly, the University of California has responded by proposing that “Read” 
institutions subsidise “Publish” institutions. For the moment UC appears to have persuaded 
all the other universities in California to help it in its fight with Elsevier. But can we really 
expect Read institutions to be willing to subsidise the publishing activities of Publish 
institutions going forward? Publishing consultant Michael Clarke thinks not. Either way, is 
this a fair arrangement? Does it not imply that in an OA world, readers in the Global South 
would be expected to subsidise wealthy Publish institutions in the Global North? 
 
Open China? 
 
At this point, it seems logical to ask whether China’s interest in OA demonstrates a 
commitment to openness or simply a desire to have free access to research produced in other 
countries. In fact, the evidence suggests that openness is anathema to China. This is a 
country, after all, that keeps very tight control over what information its citizens can access 
and publish and with whom and how both citizens and researchers can collaborate. 
 
It is also clear that China’s censors are keen to control what scholarly content is made 
available, and not just in Chinese publications but in Northern-based international scholarly 
journals too. For instance, we have seen recent demands that foreign journals censor content 
that the Chinese state does not like. Over the last year or so a number of Western-based 
publishers have been instructed that when they make their journals available in China they 
must exclude articles whose content the Chinese government disapproves of. Springer 
Nature, Taylor & Francis and Cambridge University Press have all faced such demands – 
with only CUP apparently resisting (although only after it faced pushback from the research 
community).208 
 
More recently, Holland-based Brill announced that it has terminated the relationship it had 
with Beijing-based Higher Education Press to distribute four China-focused journals 
following reports that Chinese censors had removed an article from one of the journals. 
 
Marijk van der Wende has also pointed out that all scientific data in China has to be 
submitted to government-sanctioned data centres before appearing in publications. “This is in 
contrast to the EU’s promotion of open access, open science, and feeds into concerns about 
mutual academic integrity and academic freedom”. Here again we bump up against the 
imbalance of values between East and West. 
 
And as we noted earlier, the New York Times has reported that China is unlikely to relax the 
tight regulations that block multinational companies from moving data they gather on 
Chinese customers’ purchases, habits and whereabouts out of the country. Why? At least 
partly presumably because China will be conscious that if it permits these data to be exported, 
foreign companies will be better able to compete on a level playing field with Chinese 
companies. As we have seen, China much prefers to protect itself from raw market forces. If 
they have exclusive access to data Chinese companies will be better able to create superior AI 
products, along with all the other smart technologies expected to shape and control the world 
in the 21st Century. 
 
208 See also here. 
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In saying this I am (like Wendy Hall) not seeking to judge China.209 I am making the point 
that the West has for too long clung to what now seems to be a naïve view/fantasy that there 
is some balance of values between China and the West, or that China can be persuaded to 
sign up to liberal democracy and the international rules-based system cherished by the West – 
if only the West continues to cajole and/or bully it into changing its ways. The OA movement 
seems to be particularly vulnerable to this kind magical thinking.  
 
Those in the West who want to believe that China is an advocate for the principles of 
openness enunciated in BOAI, therefore, might want to reflect more on what the country does 
than what it says.  
 
What seems clear is that China’s modus operandi is authoritarian censorship and control (of 
information and people), not the free flow of information from-all-to-all as envisaged by 
BOAI and cyberlibertarians like Barlow. China also appears to have little interest in the 
notion of academic freedom, a principle the West views as fundamental to the research 
process and to innovation,210 and which I have suggested is crucial for the sharing and 
collaboration that open access requires. 
 
As David Stilwell, an assistant secretary in the US State Department’s bureau of East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs put it to Forbes: “On American campuses, scholars from around the world 
enjoy academic freedom and open access. But in China, speech and topics are restricted, and 
the flow of information and scientific data has become a one-way street. Research in China 
has become more difficult, with American academics experiencing a variety of barriers 
including censorship, visa issues, lack of access to archives, and attempts to control agendas. 
It is difficult to move forward in true bilateral partnership amid such a huge discrepancy in 
academic freedom.” 
 
More significant, perhaps is that in China political orthodoxy often appears to trump 
scientific facts. This might seem to be implied in the leaked Document 9. It is also a principle 
that President Xi Jinping appears to have made explicit when speaking to a symposium of 
teachers earlier this year.211  
 
However, it would be wrong not to point out here that there are signs that the West is itself 
moving in the direction of censorship and political control. Aside from what we see going on 
in countries like Poland and Hungary, the world currently has a US President who is happy to 
brand as “fake news” any reporting he disagrees with, to block or delete data that does not 
suit his agenda, and to withdraw funding from research he does not like.212  
 
209 I am not saying I don’t have strong views about the current situation in China (not least to the Uyghurs) but 
I feel this is not the place to rehearse them. 
210 These issues have been discussed in a recent report by Scholars at Risk. 
211 As he put it, “Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era should be used to educate 
people and guide students to strengthen their confidence in the path, theory, system, and culture of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics and to boost patriotism.” See also this comment on Xi Jinping: “To create a culture 
based on ‘market socialism with Chinese characteristics,’ Xi Jinping asserted political control over higher 
education in 2016 in a widely-publicized speech that put ideological and political work at the heart of 
university education to promote socialism. Xi also expressed a desire that Chinese colleges and universities be 
‘guided by Marxism’ to become ‘strongholds that adhere to Party leadership’.” 
212 And who is happy to suggest that his supporters might “demand” that he remains president for more than 
two terms. 
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Is this not as much of an attack on academic freedom and Western values as China 
demanding that papers it does not like are removed or hidden from sight? I leave readers to 
judge, but I wonder if we are not all headed down an authoritarian road.  
 
In addition, we have begun to see papers in Western journals retracted as a result of death 
threats; we have seen scholars dismissed as a result of open letters attacking them and their 
research; and we have seen professors dismissed for the content of fictional works they have 
published. We have also seen a researcher investigated for quoting James Baldwin’s use of 
N-word in order to make a teaching point, and a professor at Reading University face rape 
threats and have urine poured under her office door for suggesting that government proposals 
on how people can change their sex might affect women’s rights. This was accompanied by 
demands that she be sacked for her views. 
 
Likewise, we see a growing trend in universities for no-platforming, excessive use of safe 
spaces213 the emergence of “bias response teams” and what has been dubbed “academic 
mobbing”. And we have seen the censoring of ideas that vocal advocacy groups dislike. We 
have also seen the launch of a new journal founded in order to provide scholars with a forum 
where they can publish controversial ideas anonymously in order to avoid such personal 
attacks. 
 
We might also want to consider that the West Coast internet (with its foundational 
assumption that content and services on the network should all be free) has given rise to 
surveillance capitalism. Unlike in China (where the surveillance is undertaken by the state) 
this consists of corporations doing the surveillance. Who is to say that over the long run this 
will not prove just as intrusive and anti-democratic as the surveillance activities of the 
Chinese state? One could also argue that it is being done in a more hidden and non-
transparent way than in China. Either way, as Zuboff points out, both models are “profoundly 
antidemocratic.” 
 
Might it be that in a few years’ time Western values and actions will have moved somewhat 
closer to those of China or Russia? Yale professor Timothy Snyder has suggested that it is the 
deliberate policy of Russia to push Western nations down this road. And he fears that it could 
happen. “History, which for a time seemed to be running from west to east, now seems to be 
moving from east to west.”214  
 
Russian President Vladimir Putin certainly believes this is the direction of travel, declaring 
that liberalism215 has “outlived its purpose”, has ‘become obsolete’ as a political philosophy, 
and is a spent ideological force. 
 
Leaving aside issues of democracy and human rights, the attacks on academic freedom we 
see today could prove highly damaging for the global research endeavour. Let’s recall, 
academic freedom is based on the principle that researchers need to be free to engage in 
critical thinking, intellectual inquiry and empirical observation without government or 
 
213 See also. 
214 On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century, Timothy Snyder, Page 96, 2017 (Kindle) 
215 The differences between liberalism, classical liberalism, political liberalism, economic liberalism, and 
neoliberalism. I suspect Putin here has in mind more political liberalism than liberalism. Neoliberalism has 
been described as essentially hyper-capitalism, in which everything becomes subject to the market. This is how 
I understand it when I use it in this text.  
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institutional interference or censorship, even where it involves taking a critical view of the 
institution or government. If researchers lose this independence we are vulnerable to what 
Steven Pinker has variously characterised as “pluralistic ignorance” and “collective 
delusion”. The 20th Century taught us that when political diktat trumps scientific fact we are 
susceptible to disasters like Lysenkoism (see also here).  
 
To my mind, this is why academic freedom needs to be viewed as essential to the kind of 
collaboration and sharing that BOAI assumed. Open access without academic freedom leaves 
us as vulnerable to Lysenkoism as was Soviet Russia. Open access without academic freedom 
is simply not enough. 
 
Challenge for the Global South 
 
I have said that the way OA is developing in the Global North is bad news for the Global 
South and I have suggested that it could see both the OA movement and scholarly 
communication splinter. 
 
Of course, open access has always been a contested area and members of the OA movement 
have always been a fractious bunch. They have constantly wrangled over terminology and 
strategy, and even over what exactly OA is! But by seeking to force a Northern-based model 
of OA on the global research community OA2020,  Plan S and the push for PARs would 
seem in danger of causing a geographical rift. Rather than helping to “lay the foundation for 
uniting humanity in a common intellectual conversation and quest for knowledge” these 
initiatives seem more likely to disenfranchise the developing world and usher in a new era of 
academic neo-colonialism. 
  
For researchers in the Global South there are two particularly troubling issues. The first is 
that a pay-to-publish model would be prohibitively expensive and so threatens to push them 
further into the scientific periphery.  
 
Certainly, researchers in the developing world are appalled at the thought of having to find 
$1000s every time they want to publish a paper in an international journal. This is just not 
viable for them. As Egyptian librarian Mahmoud Khalifa put it to me, “If I need to publish a 
paper internationally, and the APCs are $2,000, I have to pay 35,000 LE! This is roughly 
equivalent to the salary of a professor for 6 months.”216 217 A recent study found that 60% of 
researchers in the Global South who paid an APC had had to fund it themselves. This is not 
sustainable over time. 
 
Unsurprisingly, Plan S has been widely criticised in the Global South, with the most 
organised resistance to date coming from Latin America. Commenting on Plan S, Arianna 
Becerril-García of the Autonomous University of the State of Mexico, and co-founder of 
AmeliCA, has said: “If the focus of any new initiative is on replacing the model of paying-to-
 
216 OA advocates argue that most publishers offer waivers for those in the developing world. In my view the 
problems with this argument were made clear in a letter to Nature Indian researcher Raghavendra Gadagkar in 
2008. Pay-to-publish, he concluded, “does more harm than good in the developing world.” (see also footnote 
195) 
217 See also the poster here for more a comparison of monthly salaries in the Global South compared to APC 
prices. 
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read with one based on paying-to-publish, it will inevitably create an unsustainable and non-
inclusive system.” 
 
And it’s not as if the alarm bells were not ringing before cOAlition came up with Plan S. At a 
regional assembly of Ibero-America and Caribbean countries in 2017, for instance, a number 
of national organisations signed a public statement warning that “an OA expansion policy, 
through the payment of APC fees, is impossible to undertake from a financial point of view 
for the participant countries.”218 For this reason, the signatories advised universities in the 
region not to “create grants to pay a publication in OA-APC magazines.” 219 
 
The second issue is the insistence by OA advocates in the North (and now cOAlition funders) 
that research papers should be made available with a CC licence attached.220 Many 
researchers find CC BY to be problematic but it is especially problematic for those in the 
Global South. This too was a known issue before Plan S. It was highlighted in January 2018, 
for instance, by a group of regional Latin American organisations 221 who were sufficiently 
concerned that they signed the Declaración De México. This warned that if CC BY becomes 
the norm it will “end with effects contrary to its initial objectives”.222 
 
Developing nations see this as very much a North/South issue, not least because they fear it 
will allow large legacy publishers based in the North to capture and monetise research 
published in the Global South. For this reason, the signatories of the Declaración De México 
advised authors and publishers in the region to abjure CC BY in favour of the CC BY-NC-
SA223 licence. 
 
Nevertheless, cOAlition S members continue to insist that all scholarly papers funded by 
them should be made available with CC BY or CC0 licence attached.224 As such, Plan S 
hopes not only to force all international journals to flip to pay-to-publish but to make CC BY 
the norm. While this might (arguably) be accepted by European researchers (for articles but 
not monographs), many in the Global South have very good reasons to be concerned about it. 
 
OA advocates insist that using liberal licences like CC BY is necessary in order to prevent 
publishers acquiring exclusive rights in the papers they publish225 – a practice, they say, that 
is inherent to the traditional publishing system and which allows publishers to privatise 
 
218 This consists of group of Latin American organisations that includes CINCEL, CONRICyT, ibict and CONICYT 
219 This last part might be better translated as, “We recommend that institutions do not create funds to pay to 
publish in APC-funded OA journals.” 
220 This was later extended to read “the publication must be openly available immediately with a Creative 
Commons Attribution license (CC BY) unless an exception has been agreed by the funder.” 
221 Including Latindex, Redalyc, CLACSO, and ibict. 
222 A recent Taylor and Francis study found that researchers “least preferred” licence is CC  BY, with most 
preferring CC BY-NC-ND.  
223 In other words, a license that prevents third parties using a work for commercial reasons without 
permission, and requiring them to licence any derivates using the same CC BY-NC-SA licence – what is referred 
to as a viral licence. 
224 Plan S requires use of CC BY 4.0, CC0 Public Domain, or CC BY-SA 4.0 Share-alike. It does not allow for an NC 
option. This was, however, later extended to read “the publication must be openly available immediately with 
a Creative Commons Attribution license (CC BY) unless an exception has been agreed by the funder.” No one 
wants to have to rely on such arbitrary decisions.  
225 In the subscription system authors are required to assign copyright to the publisher. In a CC BY environment 
authors retain copyright but licence the content to the publisher. In effect, they are licensing it to the whole 
world, retaining only the right to be acknowledged as the author. 
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publicly funded research and then sell access to it back to the research community by means 
of ever more expensive subscriptions. Instead, they say, funders should require authors to 
retain copyright in their papers and insist that a CC BY licence is attached. Only in this way, 
they say, can publishers be prevented from appropriating research.  
 
But is that right? CC BY and CC0 licenses allow anyone to reuse the content, including for 
commercial purposes. Publishers may not be able to acquire exclusive rights, but they will 
still be able to monetise research papers, and indeed put them behind new paywalls.  
 
Thus in an OA world in which CC BY was the norm the northern-based publishing oligopoly 
(who already have huge databases of research in which the own exclusive rights) would be 
able trawl the web (and other publishers’ sites) for CC BY-licensed content, combine it with 
their exclusive content, wrap additional services around the combination and then sell that 
aggregated package back to the research community in the form of new value-added services. 
Importantly, large international publishers based in the North would be able to capture and 
monetise any research produced in the South with a CC BY or CC0 licence. This is what 
Declaración De México sought to prevent. I have outlined this scenario in more detail here. 
 
Moreover, we can be sure that over time legacy publishers will develop ever more 
sophisticated search products and proprietary infrastructure around OA content. As such, they 
will be able to offer exclusive packages that include CC BY content on a pay-to-access basis. 
Researchers unable to buy access to these databases will be at a significant disadvantage.  
 
This suggests that Plan S, OA2020 and PARs will facilitate the creation of a wave of new 
subscription services built around OA content, opening the gates to a new form of digital 
enclosure. As Leslie Chan has put it, “They [legacy publishers] are using data extraction as a 
new form of capital accumulation and rent-seeking, which is further fuelling inequality, and 
diminishing epistemic diversity and social inclusion.”  
 
Funder insistence on CC BY reminds us that for governments open access is not viewed as a 
moral issue but a way of boosting the economy by helping companies develop new products 
without having to do the research themselves or pay to access it. As librarian Lisa Hinchliffe 
noted on Twitter, open access will be “an amazing gift to commercial entities who currently 
pay large amounts to read but don’t really publish.”  
 
As it happens, there are implications here for the Global North too – as the controversy that 
surrounded the launch of the Open Research Library (ORL) by Knowledge Unlatched (KU) 
demonstrated. ORL is a new KU service designed to hoover up OA books from the Web and 
aggregate them into a proprietary platform. To fund this (and make a profit) KU is selling 
membership subscriptions.226 That is, libraries are asked to subscribe to the platform hosting 
this captured content.227 News of the launch of ORL was greeted with some consternation by 
 
226 On launch KU said, “The hosting of all book content is free of charge. In order to finance the ongoing 
technical costs Knowledge Unlatched will initiate a partner project to secure the necessary funding.” The web 
site, however, indicates that prices for a basic membership starts at $1,200 per annum. 
227 As publishing consultant Joe Esposito points out, “I wonder if some of the people who use these [CC BY] 
licenses have actually thought through their implications. The entire point of the CC BY license, which is 
preferred by many OA advocates, is to let anyone do anything they like with the licensed content as long as 
they provide proper attribution. Permitted uses include aggregating content for commercial purposes.” This, of 
course, is exactly why the Declaración De México rejects CC BY licences. 
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OA advocates, who view it as an attempt by KU to profit from content whose creation it 
contributed nothing to. 
 
We could note in passing that at least one legacy publisher (Elsevier) insists that even when 
they publish open access, authors must sign an exclusive agreement in which “authors have 
copyright but license exclusive rights in their article to the publisher”, including “the right for 
the publisher to make and authorise commercial use”. This might seem to make a mockery of 
the openness called for by BOAI.228 (Dove Press appears to operate similar terms for many of 
its papers).  
 
OA advocates maintain that once a CC BY-licensed work has been posted on the Web it 
cannot be appropriated as there will always be at least one free copy on the network. There 
might seem to be two flaws to this argument. First, if the alternative source does not persist, 
legacy publishers are likely to become the only source. This suggests that if small start-up 
publishers fail and disappear legacy publishers could end up with a de facto monopoly of the 
content in any case. 
 
Second, we need to factor in the added value and convenience that large paid-for services are 
able to provide. Anyone can search across the internet for OA content, but that content will 
be widely dispersed across 1,000s of institutional repositories, publisher websites, preprint 
servers etc. etc. Individual users needing to, say, undertake a literature search will find it very 
difficult to track down all relevant papers in order to get a full picture. By contrast, legacy 
publishers have huge databases of aggregated content and sophisticated discovery tools to sift 
and sort the content. So the real value will lie in discovery services. And if legacy publishers 
start to syndicate content the publishing oligopoly will likely be able to offer access to most if 
not all the research corpus. Who would want to drive to a mom and pop store twenty minutes 
down the road if they can go to a superstore two minutes away and have access to a huge 
inventory and the latest technology to identify and pick the desired product? And while today 
legacy publishers tend to offer basic search services at no cost, when the moment is right they 
will surely start to charge. 
 
Unfortunately, this is the future that Plan S and PARs looks set to bequeath to the world. 
 
The launch of ORL suggests that liberal licensing has serious implications not just for the 
Global South, but for the research community at large. Apart from anything else, it will allow 
any CC BY licensed content to be enclosed in a proprietary infrastructure – a process that has 
been dubbed openwrapping.229 As a 2015 blog post put it “Everything we have gained by 
opening content and data will be under threat if we allow the enclosure of scholarly 
infrastructures”.  
 
 
228 The point is that even in a pure OA world content is king. Consider this comment from Elsevier’s Chief 
strategy officer Andrew Matuch explaining why Elsevier is not a pure play software company: “I travel there 
[Silicon Valley] at least once or twice a year and then talk to the startups that try to shake up the industries in 
which we operate. I always come back from there with a broad smile. Because although they are super 
enterprising and motivated, every presentation ends with the comment that they need our content and data 
to expand further. And that is exactly what it is all about: you can have the best technology, you also need the 
content and data. With this combination we add value for our customers.” 
229 Open source software appears to be suffering from the same phenomenon.  
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When the OA movement became aware of the dangers here, it launched a number of 
initiatives aimed at creating alternative (open) infrastructure services able to compete with 
publishers – e.g. SHARE, SCOSS, ScholarlyHub and IOI.230 The likelihood that any of these 
(or all combined) will be able to catch up and compete effectively with publishers, however, 
seems remote. Commenting on a recent MIT Press study that surveyed these initiatives The 
Scholarly Kitchen noted that MIT had discovered they were not even co-operating 
effectively. As TSK explained, the report found, “a nearly total lack of coordination and 
integration across individual (in some cases competing) initiatives.” 
 
The greatest challenge these initiatives face, however, is that publishers have far greater 
financial resources. This truth became all too apparent recently when ScholarlyHub reported 
that after two years of unsuccessfully trying to obtain funding it had had to give up the ghost 
[the link has now gone dead]. A similar fate appears to have befallen Pubfair, which likewise 
failed to obtain funding. Even where funders provide money for infrastructure (which they 
are reluctant to do), they do not like to commit long-term. Achieving sustainability is a huge 
(and probably impossible) task for these initiatives.231 KU, we could note, began life as a 
non-profit but had to reinvent itself as a for-profit in order to get the funding it needed.  
 
A further threat comes from the increasing interest the FAANGS are showing in the scholarly 
communication market. A recent paper pointed out that “complex digital tools and rapidly 
growing electronic databases require advanced computing skills.” As a result, it added, 
“internet-based mega-companies such as Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple may become 
interested in spearheading further transformation and outcompete current stakeholders in 
scholarly communication and develop more user-friendly tools. Such developments could 
potentially lead to a few large entities controlling the gateways to scientific knowledge, a 
sobering thought.” 
 
In fact, it is generally agreed that the publishing oligopoly already has this degree of control. 
And it now seems unlikely that OA can fix the problem. In addition, Microsoft and Google 
are already well embedded in the scholarly communication market, with Microsoft Academic 
and Google Scholar for instance. And in 2018 we saw the launch of Google Dataset 
Search.232 While this provides free access to data, points out Peter Kraker, it is a proprietary 
and closed service. 
 
Like Google Scholar and KU, Dataset Search is a further example of a for-profit company 
harvesting and leveraging publicly funded information that has been made freely available on 
the Web for the benefit of its shareholders. As Kraker puts it: “Google is capitalising on a 
movement that they have contributed nothing to.”  
 
What the research community needs to do, suggests Kraker, is to create an open and 
community owned alternative service to Dataset Search. Unfortunately, he adds, funders, 
research administrators and infrastructures are currently content to leave it to Google. “This is 
 
230 As this article concludes, “The odds currently are stacked against academy-owned, academy-governed 
groups. And while tenacity and willpower and in some cases, outrageous talent, have led to some significant 
success stories, I worry that we’re relying too much on these traits and too little on our collective capacity for 
action.” 
231 Some background on the challenges such services face is available here.  
232 From Wikipedia: “Google Dataset Search is a search engine from Google that helps researchers locate 
online data that is freely available for use.” 
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highly problematic, especially since we have discussed the problems of lock-in effects and 
other negative outcomes of proprietary infrastructure for years now.”  
 
In the hope of galvanising his colleagues Kraker launched the #DontLeaveItToGoogle 
campaign. But the likelihood that the research community will be able and/or willing to 
develop services able to compete effectively with behemoths like Google is surely laughable.  
 
Another consequence of the FAANGS entering the market is that they will bring surveillance 
capitalism to the scholarly communication space, a development likely to expand as journals 
start to wrap advertising around their journals. In addition, we will likely see growing use of 
datawalls that require users to give up personal information in order to gain access to 
scholarly content. Publishers and aggregators will therefore be able to monitor users and their 
usage and exploit and sell the harvested data in ways users may not be aware of and would 
surely deprecate if they knew. 
 
As Richard Jefferson puts it, “Imagine the most advanced scholars, science and technology 
thinkers and creators in the world – literally millions of them – letting an enormous 
multinational know what they know, what they don’t know, what they’re interested in, who 
they know, what their knowledge journey is and where they’re going. And letting that 
knowledge – vastly more valuable in the aggregate – become privatised, monetised and used 
to advance the very power and privilege that many of them decry?”233 
 
And with universities digging their heels in on the costs of PARs Elsevier is now saying that 
it will provide 100% open access in return for access to the universities’ (meta)data. This 
must increase concern not only about surveillance capitalism but also “vendor lock in.” We 
might also need to anticipate a future in which the entire research life cycle ends up 
privatised. (Please see footnote)234 
 
Elsewhere, new entrants like Academia.edu (which promotes itself as a provider of open 
access services) are busy building subscription services around open scholarly content and 
ResearchGate has obtained a patent for linking documents to citations. For its part, Elsevier 
has obtained a patent for managing peer review.  
 
This comes at a time when the US is reconsidering whether genes can be patented and patent 
wars have erupted over gene editing tools like CRISPR, a development, says PLOS co-
founder and editor-in-chief of OA journal eLife, that is destroying the soul of academic 
science. 
 
Here perhaps is the key point: the open access, open science and other open movements have 
given too little thought to the fact that they have perforce to operate in a neoliberal world, a 
world in which commercial enclosure is a natural instinct and invariable endpoint, regardless 
of whatever high-sounding claims researchers might make about laying the foundation “for 
uniting humanity in a common intellectual conversation and quest for knowledge”.  
 
Today it surely requires a very large dose of doublethink, or self-blindness, to maintain that 
Plan S, PARs and Northern-style OA are on track to realising the BOAI vision. As the author 
 
233 Jefferson operates Lens, an online database of research papers, patents etc. That is to say, he has a dog in 
this race. 
234 Please note that after I published this document Elsevier’s Tom Reller responded by saying that this is not 
correct, that there is no “in return”, and pointed me to this tweet.    
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of this paper puts it, we are told that “scientific literature and data ought to be given out for 
free, while knowledge produced under patents, or subject to commercial exploitation, is 
exempt from the requirements of open science. The fruits of scientific research are thus 
provided for free to businesses, which can then draw from it to develop commercial products 
that will be brought to the market in a re-enclosed form.”  
 
Open access is also assisting in the ongoing process of proletarianising researchers. 
Compelled to comply with OA mandates that ratchet up the bureaucratic scrutiny they are 
subjected to, researchers are discovering that open access has become a new tool for 
increasing the level of micromanagement they are forced to undergo (as I have discussed 
here).  
 
Ulrich Herb refers to this as data capitalism, in which the proletarianisation of researchers is 
facilitated by for-profit companies creating “operating systems with highly integrated 
services” that monitor scientists’ workflow. The captured data is then used to create new 
products, which are sold to “science bureaucracy as a tool for recruitment and research 
planning.”  
  
Elsewhere, David Golumbia has said: “The very point of OA, despite what its advocates 
claim, is to entirely brand the labour of intellectuals as unproductive vis-à-vis capital, and 
therefore to make available for exploitation that labour by everyone but the labourer,”  
 
Golumbia’s view of open access, suggests Enrico Natale “bears disturbing similarity to the 
‘free’ Internet economy, where contents and data generated by users are given out for free in 
exchange for access and services. The data is then privately exploited for their corporate 
interest by a handful of dominant players with massive computing power.”   
 
This is a long way from the vision articulated by early advocates of OA, open data and open 
science and irreconcilable with the BOAI vision. But it is fast becoming the reality that OA 
advocacy has enabled. 
 
Northern-style open access looks set to operate much in the way international capitalism does 
– in so far as it will homogenise the research and scholarly communication processes, and in 
a way that pushes those in the Global South further into the periphery. “There is today a real 
risk that the epistemological and linguistic plurality of science so essential for sustaining a 
worldwide innovative research activity could disappear,” says Florence Piron, a professor in 
the Department of Information and Communication at Laval University in Quebec. “In other 
words, one consequence of an intensified open access environment could be to reinforce a 
homogenous unilingual type of science publication at the expense of the ecology of locally 
relevant knowledge.” 
 
Open access split? 
 
This larger problem has perhaps been implicit in the OA movement from day one. But Plan S 
has made it explicit, attempting to foist on the world a model of OA that is proving illogical, 
unfair and divisive. From the perspective of the South this amounts to little more than 
“economic discrimination”, and it is for this reason that many in the developing world are 
concluding that rather than ape the Global North they need to focus on creating their own 
national and regional models and strategies, both for OA and for scholarly communication 
more generally. 
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Fortunately, they have something to build on: unlike the research community in the Global 
North, the developing world has not outsourced much of its journal publishing to for-profit 
companies and there remains a strong tradition of universities and societies running and 
managing their own journals. In the wake of Plan S, therefore, we are seeing a new focus on 
preserving, developing, extending and promoting national journals and publishing platforms.  
 
With this aim in mind, in November 2018 the Latin American OA portal Redalyc (in 
partnership with UNESCO and CLACSO) launched AmeliCA. The aim is to propagate 
models more suited to the needs of the Global South – notably scholar-led university and 
society-based journals run on a non-profit basis. This is being promoted very much as an 
alternative to Plan S. 
 
Last year AmeliCA produced a video directly contrasting the cOAlition S approach with the 
one it favours. Where Plan S is seeking simply to regulate commercial agreements, the video 
explains, AmeliCA is focused on “building an infrastructure from and for the academy.” 
[Google Translate] 
 
What is needed, adds AmeliCA is “a new configuration of strategies, in response to the 
international, regional, national and institutional context” to ensure there is a scholarly 
communication infrastructure able to include rather than exclude those in the South – one 
offering “a collaborative, sustainable, protected and non-commercial open access solution for 
Latin America and the Global South.”235 
 
How successful AmeliCA will prove remains unclear. But it underlines the level of concern 
in Latin America today that the current trajectory of Northern-style open access will further 
marginalise the Global South – increasingly turning what was historically an essentially self-
managed system into an all-encompassing neoliberal marketplace. Rather than delivering on 
the BOAI promise of removing epistemic injustice, Plan S will simply migrate this injustice 
to the OA environment. 
 
Concern is also spreading beyond Latin America. In April, UNESCO announced the launch 
of the Global Alliance of Open Access Scholarly Communication Platforms (GLOALL). This 
brings together a group of scholarly platforms based primarily in the Global South236 – with 
the aim of facilitating the “democratisation of knowledge generated in ALL places, subjects 
and languages.”  Amongst other things, GLOALL members want to see the development of 
multilingual scholarly communication standards, products and services.  
 
This would seem to fit with the aims of the French-initiated Jussieu Call for Open science and 
bibliodiversity (two of which signatories were involved in the launch of GLOALL).  
 
Likewise, we are seeing a growing sense in Africa that – rather than insisting researchers 
obsess on trying to publish in international journals – governments and funders should be 
encouraging them to think locally and create and support national or regional journals and 
publishing platforms, and to do so in a coordinated way. The Academy of Science of South 
 
235 A little confusingly, in May AmeliCA and the African Open Science Platform, signed the São Paulo Statement 
on Open Access.  
236 Including those based in Latin American and Africa, but also Japan and France 
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Africa has suggested that what South Africa needs is a smaller set of sustainable high-quality 
local scholarly journals. These, it added, should all be online and open access and hosted and 
indexed on local services like SciELO SA.237 
 
As pushback against Northern-style OA grows I expect to see more calls for diversity (and 
bibliodiversity), and increased resistance to a homogeneity that prioritises the interests of the 
Global North while marginalising the Global South. 
 
Indian scholar Vandana Shiva talks of what he calls the ‘monoculture of the mind’, a mindset 
that “treats diversity as disease and creates coercive structures to remodel this biologically 
and culturally diverse world of ours on the concepts of one privileged class, one race and one 
gender of a single species.”  
 
For all that, the Global South is clearly conflicted. Earlier this year, for instance, the Principal 
Scientific Advisor to the Indian government K. VijayRaghavan announced on Twitter that 
India was joining join Plan S. 238 This led to some pushback – see, for instance, here, here and 
here – and my take here).239 
 
Perhaps in response to this pushback, when VijayRaghavan gave an Open Access Week 
lecture he said, “We are not committed to whatever Plan S does or does not do.” In 
subsequent interviews he has clarified that India will not now be joining Plan S, but that 
future directions “will be entirely determined by the interests of Indian academia and of 
India”. It appears this will be by means of a “One Nation-One Subscription” model with 
“capped subscription charges”. In addition, the aim is to enter into OA publishing agreements 
that have “capped article processing charges”. Exactly how realistic this is, and how it might 
work in practice remains unclear.  
 
And in June, an EU report indicated that Argentina has agreed to join cOAlition S. This 
immediately saw a robust rejoinder from Argentinian researchers (see also here). Time will 
tell if Argentina does indeed sign up. 
 
These tensions are not new: When in 2014 Brazilian OA advocates discovered their 
government was planning to outsource over 100 Brazilian journals to a legacy publisher in 
order to “internationalise” them there was immediate pushback – which appears to have 
successfully halted the process. 
 
Also of note, in 2015 SciELO240adopted CC BY as its favoured licence, putting it at odds 
with the Declaración De México. And to the disapproval of AmeliCA, SciELO has agreed 
with Clarivate Analytics to build the SciELO Citation Index. This, says AmeliCA, has the 
effect of “drawing its journals into the system of impact factors and rankings by letting a for-
profit company take advantage of information processed with public resources from Latin 
America.” More strikingly, SciELO has begun to introduce APCs in order to fund the cost of 
translating papers into English.241 
 
 
237 Or in international indexes that screen out predatory journal publishers. 
238 All we were told was that India will negotiate ACP fee that will be “normalised to India.” 
239 Further confusing the situation AmeliCA has subsequently indicated that Indian journals will be made 
available in the Redalyc system – although it may just be on journal. 
240 The South American Scientific Electronic Library Online and OA publisher. 
241 More here. 
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What we appear to be witnessing are the first signs that both the OA movement and the larger 
scholarly communication system are beginning to splinter. Europe’s recent proposal for geo-
specific open access surely demonstrates as much. Essentially, it reads as an attempt to 
punish those who don’t sign up to Europe’s model of OA. As Sara Rouhi puts it, “Geo-
walling feels like yet another instance of resource-rich regions dictating to other parts of the 
globe how they are expected to ‘play’ in the global scholarly ecosystem, rather than the 
collaborative approach — oft-discussed but not nearly as often implemented — of an 
inclusive ecosystem that takes into account all global scholarly communities — not just those 
with the most resources.” 
 
East or West? 
 
It seems sensible to ask whether it would be a good or a bad thing if scholarly communication 
and OA splintered? In light of the current geopolitical environment and the evident renewed 
desire for greater heterogeneity in the world – for individuals, countries, regions, societies 
and cultures – to try and squeeze scholarly publishing into a single global homogeneous 
system based on a model proposed by Europe (with no prior consultation) might not be wise. 
Either way, we must doubt that such a system would be equitable. Would it not inevitably be 
controlled by the privileged for the benefit of the privileged, and to the disadvantage of the 
less privileged? 
 
We have learned that attempts to internationalise systems like education and research tend to 
favour the wealthy and powerful. It is usually they who propose and design the system and 
they who tend to set the rules. And they do so (consciously or not) in a way the preserves 
their power and privileges. Those without money and power are usually left outside with their 
noses pressed against the window. cOAlition S’s attempts to introduce a global pay-to-
publish OA system would seem to be a case in point.  
 
Similar issues have arisen in the internationalisation of higher education space. Hans de Wit 
has pointed out that “internationalisation” inevitably sees existing power structures and 
vested interests embedded in the new system.  Moreover, he says, internationalisation is an 
inevitably coercive process. As he puts it, “international partnerships, rankings and language 
policies have unequal power dimensions in which the Global South is operating in a coerced 
way.”  He adds, “Over the past decades, most scholarly and public attention with respect to 
internationalisation in higher education has focused on the Western world, with little 
attention being paid to the implications of colonisation.” 
 
The University of Pretoria’s Chika Sehoole has therefore suggested that it is necessary to 
address issues of equity and fairness first. As he says “a prerequisite for mutually beneficial 
partnerships in higher education” would require the “asymmetries” in international trade and 
financial flows to first be redressed.  
 
For its part, OA is also an increasingly coerced process. Individual researchers are now 
coerced by their institutions, research institutions are coerced by governments and funders, 
and cOAlition S wants to coerce other countries to adopt a system that will benefit the Global 
North to the disadvantage of the Global South. In addition, of course, Plan S was designed 
around the STEM disciplines but the arts, humanities and social sciences are being coerced 
into squeezing themselves into the same template, despite that template being inappropriate 
for HSS.  
 
7 7  O A :  C o u l d  d e f e a t  b e  s n a t c h e d  f r o m  t h e  j a w s  o f  v i c t o r y ?  
 
Given its global ambitions can we expect China to play an important role in OA and scholarly 
communication? One would certainly expect so. We should not doubt it wants to play as 
large a role in the science sphere as it clearly wants to play in the economic and political 
spheres. Earlier this year Nature reported that China’s President Xi Jinping has made it clear 
that science is one of the central pillars of the BRI. And courtesy of its Alliance of 
International Science Organizations in the Belt and Road Region (ANSO) China is providing 
both financial support and organisational assistance to research projects in BRI countries. As 
a result, added Nature, the country has emerged “as the scientific partner of choice for a large 
swathe of the developing world.”  
 
Nature added: “Whereas previous generations of researchers in Africa, Asia and, to some 
extent, South America trained in Western countries and had their intellectual roots there, the 
same cannot be said for the current generation.” 
 
In other words, China is pushing an alternative globalisation agenda – one that has been 
dubbed Sinocentric globalisation. And as noted, this is based on alternative values and goals 
to those promulgated by the West. Developing nations may therefore feel the need to choose 
between the Western road to the future or the Eastern road. As Nature points out, many 
countries in the Global South are choosing to partner with China – to date, 152 countries and 
international organisations have signed up to BRI. 
 
Does China offer a better form of globalisation for the developing world than that on offer 
from the West? That is far from clear, not least because as, Marijk van der Wende points out, 
it is hard to tell how “globalisation with China’s characteristics” aligns with issues of human 
rights, rule of law and civil society.  
 
Nature points out that some believe those low- and middle-income countries who have signed 
up to BRI, “are sleepwalking into the arms of an authoritarian and neo-colonial state, and that 
everything else, including technology agreements and research alliances, are part of that 
trajectory.”  
 
If correct, this suggests that partnering with China could mean becoming financially 
dependent on a country with no meaningful commitment to openness.  
 
But the truth is that whether they opt for an Eastern model or the Western model developing 
countries could become victims of academic neo-colonialism. The dilemma for the Global 
North, especially the EU, is that China has shown itself keen to recruit poorer countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe to the BRI. When it was announced earlier this year that Italy 
was joining the BRI, some panic ensued in Europe, with concern expressed that China is 
seeking to drive a wedge between European nations. Nature reports that when three days 
after Italy joined French President Emmanuel Macron met Xi in Paris he promised “more 
cooperation, but also said that Europe expects its major partners to ‘respect the unity of the 
European Union and the values it carries in the world’.” 
 
Here perhaps is further evidence that the North has been wrong-footed by China. But one is 
tempted to suggest that Europe has brought this dilemma on its own head. It has failed to look 
after EU countries properly when they got into financial difficulties – most notably with 
Greece. This was surely a strategic error. Might Europe be in danger of making a similar 
strategic error with Plan S? 
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To explore this further, let’s speculate that China decided to offer a competing model for 
scholarly communication and open access and ask if, in doing so, it would be likely to offer a 
solution more in line with the objectives of BOAI. Personally, I am sceptical. I have 
suggested China doesn’t really value openness, either in society generally or in the science 
and research spheres. Critics believe that countries signing up to BRI could end up so 
indebted that they have to forfeit intellectual property, land and assets to China.242 Indeed, 
this appears already to be happening with Greece again the victim.243 
 
Rather than facilitating greater openness and mutual sharing, therefore, China might seem 
more likely to appropriate assets, research and innovation from its partner countries. “In this 
narrative,” says Nature, “struggling nations are sagging under billions of dollars of debt to 
China and are giving away the keys to untold amounts of economically valuable and sensitive 
resources – from oceanic-current readings to biological samples to next-generation 
communication systems.” 
 
So, what could this mean in the context of scholarly publishing? I have said that this 
document is speculative. What follows is particularly speculative and I make no assertion that 
the scenario I lay out below will ever come about. I nevertheless want to map it out in order 
to suggest how an initiative like Plan S could backfire in today’s geopolitical moment. 
 
Let’s consider, for instance, the recent launch of CCS Chemistry – a new English-language 
OA journal published by the Chinese Chemical Society (CCS). In their May news brief 
Clarke & Esposito noted that the title is “the first noteworthy English-language journal to be 
published by a Chinese society and as such marks an arrival of sorts on the international 
publishing stage.”  
 
CCS describes CCS Chemistry as a diamond OA journal, in so far as it charges neither 
subscriptions nor APCs. The latter characteristic, suggest Clarke & Esposito, could see it 
draw in manuscripts that were traditionally submitted to the many chemistry journals based in 
North America and Europe.  
 
One could envisage a situation in which China launched many more English-language 
journals like CCS Chemistry. In fact, it seems it has been doing so for at least three years. In 
2016, THE reported that new English-language journals were “springing up like mushrooms” 
in China.  If Plan S triggers a global flip to pay-to-publish there will surely be a large number 
of publishing refugees unable to afford APCs. If these Chinese English-language journals 
charged neither publish nor read fees they would be very attractive to these refugees, 
especially those based in the Global South. This might seem all the more likely given that 
cOAlition S is pushing The Declaration on Research Assessment (DORA), which aims to 
promote a culture in which research is assessed “on its own merits rather than on the basis of 
the journal in which the research is published.” 
 
Such a strategy would allow China to accumulate a lot of scholarly content from around the 
world. This could be aggregated in a centralised national database to compete with the 
platforms of the publishing oligopoly.244 Again, China already seems to have such a 
 
242 Critics believe that what happened to the Greek port of Piraeus is instructive here.  And Venezuela had to 
sell 10% of its stake in an oil joint venture to a Chinese oil company when it could not pay its debts. 
243 This is often referred to as debt-trap diplomacy, or debt-dependency diplomacy. 
244 The European idea of geo-specific access models could prevent this, but at what price to the open access 
project? 
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centralised database – in the shape of the China Academic Journals Full-text Database 
(CJFD). This is part of the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) and currently 
hosts 67 million full-text articles. (By comparison ScienceDirect hosts 12 million items and 
Sci-Hub 76 million). I don’t know how much of the content is in English (or languages other 
than Chinese), but it would appear that CNKI is also running the Journal Translation Project. 
This currently plans to translate 400 journals with 20,000 articles in English by 2020. I don’t 
know what the plans might be beyond 2010.   
 
Like legacy publishers, China could also harvest the growing amount of CC BY licenced 
scholarly content becoming available on the Web, both content published in international 
journals in the North, plus any CC BY licensed content published in national journals in the 
South. To this it could also add preprints and green OA articles. Again, this might seem more 
attractive given that Plan S insists that all papers placed in repositories (green OA) must be 
immediately available and with a CC BY licence attached. One can envisage China creating a 
kind of legal Sci-Hub.  
 
And here it gets particularly interesting: CCS Chemistry describes itself as a diamond OA 
journal, but it appears to be acquiring the copyright in the papers it publishes – see, for 
instance, here and here. And these papers appear to be being published on an all rights 
reserved basis.245 OA advocates have suggested that this makes the papers in the journal 
bronze OA rather than diamond OA. Either way, CCS Chemistry appears to be acquiring 
ownership of the research it publishes in the manner that subscription journals have 
traditionally done.246 While currently the journal operates no paywall, could it not put one in 
place at some point? And since it owns the copyright could it not seek to prevent third parties 
from mining the papers it publishes.247  
 
The decision by CCS to buy into the ChemRxiv preprint server is also interesting in this 
respect. CCS is now a “co-owner” of the service and presumably it could add many chemical 
papers from ChemRxiv to its national database.248 
 
The speculative scenario I am suggesting is that China could build up a large portfolio of 
English-language journals and offer to publish papers at no cost (while acquiring the 
copyright in them). For researchers this could offer an attractive alternative to Plan S. 
Moreover, the strict guidelines that Plan S has published might seem to make the logic of 
doing this compelling.249 But what would be the likely consequences? 
 
In such a scenario one could envisage three possible routes for researchers in the Global 
South: they could take the Western road and risk seeing their research captured and 
monetised by the publishing oligopoly; they could partner with China and face similar risks; 
or they could join with AmeliCA and other like-minded developing countries to create 
 
245 Perhaps this is the norm for Chinese society journals. Acta Geodaetica et Cartographica Sinica published by 
the Chinese Society for Surveying, Mapping and Geoinformation also appears to assume the copyright is 
transferred to it. Although it then publishes the papers CC BY-NC-ND and there seems to be an implication that 
authors get royalties. 
246 And indeed, many still do. 
247 The law around TDM is not fully clear today 
248 Today the papers in ChemRxiv all appear have a CC BY-NC-ND licensed attached, presumably with the 
authors retaining copyright – although this might seem to imply otherwise. 
249 Elsewhere the speculation is that China is planning to take a geowalled approach, although if true what that 
might mean is unclear to me. 
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independent national and/or regional initiatives that offered a “third way”. Whether the last 
option offers a viable long-term solution I do not know.   
 
It is not immediately apparent to me that globalisation (East or West) promises an attractive 
future for the Global South, economically or scientifically. It is also not clear to me that either 
holds out much hope of achieving the objectives of BOAI, or that either road would nurture 
the international collaboration that Hook suggests open access requires if it is to prosper. 
Likewise, it is not clear to me that academic freedom can prosper in either the West or the 
East as things stand. 
 
Interestingly, it would seem to be Europe that is currently driving the Western model of 
globalisation. After all, Trump is not a globalist. As he put it recently, “The future does not 
belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots. The future belongs to strong, independent 
nations”. On the other hand, of course, he clearly wants to remain a superpower and to lead 
the world. speaking about 5G, Trump said, “We cannot allow any other country to 
outcompete the United States in this powerful industry of the future … The race to 5G is a 
race that we must win.”  
 
We have, however, to wonder if Europe’s globalisation effort is stable and durable. As things 
stand, it looks set to lose the UK, and it recently blocked the entry of Albania and North 
Macedonia into the EU, despite the two countries undertaking a number of reforms that the 
EU had demanded for entry. If the EU fails to look after its allies, turns potential members 
away, and threatens to punish those who do not sign up to initiatives like Plan S what will be 
the long-term consequences? Meanwhile, China is chipping away at its weaker members.  
 
On the larger stage, there are grounds to believe that the split we see emerging between East 
and West is likely to widen. This would have implications for national economies, for 
political developments, for technology, for the internet, for science and for open access. As 
former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown has put it, we face the possibility of “one world, 
two systems”. 
 
In none of the scenarios I have outlined can I see the BOAI goal of “uniting humanity in a 
common intellectual conversation and quest for knowledge” being realised – unless 
something changes. 
 
We can but hope 
 
I have in this document suggested that the goal of achieving universal open access looks 
today as though it may have been unrealistic. I have suggested that the research community 
failed to appreciate the costs of online publishing, and I have suggested that we all failed to 
anticipate the likely outcome of creating a largely unregulated open network. I have also 
suggested that OA advocates failed to anticipate the unintended consequences of their 
advocacy. They likewise failed to appreciate that changes in the geopolitical situation could 
make the aspirations outlined in BOAI moot. And I have questioned whether these 
aspirations are in any case realisable in the neoliberal environment of the Global North. I 
have also suggested that were China to offer an alternative route to open access it is unlikely 
it would lead to a better outcome. And I have noted that there is a desire in the Global South 
to develop what I referred to as “a third way” but we cannot know how successful that might 
be. I have also suggested that there must be some doubt as to whether a fair and equitable 
global system of scholarly communication is even possible in today’s political environment.  
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Finally, I have raised the possibility that, for a number of reasons, we may in any case see a 
pushback against open access.  
 
I want to finish by returning to my opening question. OA advocates have been celebrating an 
OA tipping point. But while we could indeed be approaching a tipping point it may not be the 
tipping point that OA advocates anticipate, but one that takes us in a very different direction. 
As things stand, the current result of the University of California’s confrontation with 
Elsevier is that the publisher has cut off access to ScienceDirect. Rather than help realise the 
BOAI vision, this has vastly increased the accessibility problem for UC faculty – and we are 
now seeing pushback from UC students over this. UC’s expectation is evidently that Elsevier 
will eventually give UC what it wants. But it is hard to see the publisher agreeing to a price 
that would solve UC’s affordability problem – unless UC can persuade less privileged 
institutions to subsidise its publishing activities or if it is prepared to hand over internal data 
to the publisher in a way that would increase Elsevier’s control of scholarly 
communication.250 
 
Meanwhile, Plan S continues to struggle to sign up new funders, even as it loses members 
(here and here), and potential members (India). The plan also continues to face criticism, 
pushback and scepticism. Meanwhile, in proposing a geo-specific access model in order to 
twist the arms of other countries, the European Commission’s open access envoy appears to 
have cast doubt on the EU’s claim that it is concerned to ensure that developing countries 
have equal access to its research. And proposals to create geowalls surely make a mockery of 
the BOAI goals.  
 
On the other hand, Plan S appears to have so alarmed publishers that (Elsevier apart) they are 
rushing to sign PARs with universities and consortia. Either way, UC’s rebellion and Plan S 
would appear to be leading in the same direction: a pay-to-publish open access future for 
international scholarly publishing. But we have to ask whether this can deliver on the promise 
of the open access movement. OA was meant to solve both the affordability and the 
accessibility problems. Today it is far from clear that the affordability problem will be solved. 
More striking, we could see the accessibility problem worsen, as paywalls give way to 
national firewalls and/or datawalls. Meanwhile, for those in the Global South, paywalls are 
giving way to publication walls and there is now a threat of geowalls. So, I repeat my 
question: Could defeat be snatched from the jaws of victory? I have no answer to the 
question, but I feel it needs to be asked. 
 
In short, it is hard not to conclude that those of us (yes, I include myself) who believed that 
open access was a no brainer in a networked world and that it would lead to a fairer and more 
equitable scholarly communication system now look both naïve and silly.  
 
Open access was an uplifting and generous spirited vision, and the BOAI declaration was a 
compelling and poetic call to arms.251 Poets, said Percy Bysshe Shelley in 1821, are the “the 
 
250 See footnote 234.  
251 As the late OA advocate Fred Friend put it to me in 2013, “The developing world was very much in our 
minds when we met to draft the BOAI, and the beauty of the BOAI text — not drafted by me! — never ceases 
to inspire me. It is still important to “share the learning of the rich with the poor and the poor with the rich”, 
working to “lay the foundation for uniting humanity in a common intellectual conversation and quest for 
knowledge”. 
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unacknowledged legislators of the world”. A century later W H Auden, took a gloomier view, 
concluding that252 “poetry makes nothing happen”. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say 
that poetry can and does make things happen but often not in the way intended! 
 
I want to finish by repeating that this document is speculative. I could be completely wrong 
in the differed scenarios I have sketched out. Nevertheless, I believe the issues deserve airing. 
Either way, it will be a sorry business if – after spilling so much (metaphorical) ink arguing 
over open access, and devoting so many hours debating the many small details of OA – the 
open access movement discovered that its project has been totally subverted, with no 
resolution of the affordability problem, and perhaps no satisfactory resolution of the 
accessibility problem either.  
 
Perhaps populism and toxic nationalism will be put back in their boxes; perhaps Trump will 
fail to get a second term or be impeached. Perhaps the combination of Trump’s trade war and 
economic slowdown in China will (after all) persuade the Chinese Communist Party to 
embrace liberal democracy and join with the West to create a fairer, more equitable world for 
all, including a global scientific endeavour in which no country or group is disenfranchised or 
left behind. Perhaps China will join cOAlition S and a new global non-profit, low-cost 
scholarly communication system based on diamond OA will emerge. Perhaps government 
intervention will allow the internet to become the free global network sans scammers, 
spammers and spies that its creators thought they were building and all moves towards a 
splinternet will splutter out. 
 
In short, perhaps we might yet see an open access infrastructure created truly able to 
“accelerate research, enrich education, share the learning of the rich with the poor and the 
poor with the rich, make this literature as useful as it can be, and lay the foundation for 
uniting humanity in a common intellectual conversation and quest for knowledge”.  
 
We can but hope.  
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